Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

160. Telegram From the Ambassador in Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 9, 1956—8 p.m.

2715. To Merchant from Conant. On my return have explored German reaction EURATOM and find mixed views with FonOff much more for supranational agency with real authority than other groups. Min Strauss and others very suspicious of Monnet proposal as method of controlling German atomic development. I am being erroneously quoted by some industrialists as having taken stand with German Government that no reactor should be built in Fed Rep but only in nearby states. Germans very sensitive on issue of possible discriminatory treatment as compared to other European nations and talk of control of their atomic development. On the other hand a few leading bankers and second man of Econ Ministry with whom I raised the issue of the dangers involved in producing of plutonium by national governments were quick to see political dangers and seemed sympathetic to a supranational processing plant.

If there is any consideration in Washington of a power bilateral with the French or other European nations (except Belgium with whom bilateral already completed) such negotiations would constitute a very serious hazard to good German-American relations unless parallel negotiations with FedRep were in progress even if only offer of small amount of enriched fuel material were involved. FonOff undoubtedly still hoping United States will make some very generous offer of enriched material and technical knowledge to six-nation supranational agency. But if this not likely to eventuate in near future and if power bilaterals should be in process of negotiation with other European nations feel it essential that German-US negotiations on same basis be initiated. Very important that nothing be done which would look to the Germans as if we are party to discrimination against them on atomic development even though they would admit French were further advanced technically than they were.

Would like to emphasize again concern I expressed to Secretary, Under Secretary and the President² that Germans will develop on a nationalistic basis their own atomic development in competition with the French unless some degree of European cooperation in this field is achieved. To my mind that greatest source of anxiety is that each nation will erect chemical plants for reprocessing fuel elements thereby putting production of plutonium on a national basis. Such production of plutonium would not in itself constitute manufacture of atomic weapons but would be a long and dangerous step in this direction. Therefore as a minimum of control of all six European nations a supranationally controlled chemical reprocessing plant would seem to be required. Also similar supranationally controlled enriching plant if enrichment were to proceed to a point where U–235 was produced which could be used in a weapon.

The Germans have not yet put forward a draft of their own atomic legislation and there is some danger that they may leave re-processing and direct production of plutonium to private plants which would result in highly dangerous situation.

In presenting above considerations would like to emphasize I am as worried about possible production plutonium in France or Belgium as about its production in Germany. What is more worrisome is the suspicion which can easily be generated in a few years that plutonium in different European nations will be produced on sufficient scale to produce a few bombs which could be used clandestinely not by European nations but by other countries in such highly explosive areas as Africa or the Middle East.³

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/2–956. Confidential.
2. Conant met with Eisenhower on January 19; a record of their conversation is in Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries.
3. In a letter to Merchant of February 10, Conant commented further about the prospects for German participation in EURATOM. His letter concluded in part that “if Germany is to support a real supranational European authority, a very large carrot in the form of what United States is offering would have to be put in front of the mouths of six donkeys. As I told you in Washington it seems to me such an offer would be thoroughly worthwhile from the point of view, (a) steps toward European integration; (b) elimination of rivalry between France and Germany in this field; (c) from the point of view of preventing any European nation from producing clandestinely material for atomic weapons.” (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Euratom—Regional)