159. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Mayer, Washington, February 9, 1956, 4 p.m.1
Mayer expressed his great appreciation of the courtesies shown him. He spoke of the Saar and of the mistakes which, in his opinion, had been made by Pinay in dealing with that situation. He felt that the result, while bad, was not fatal to German-French relations. He then spoke of the Roeschling Works and the importance of a solution there. He said that certain American investment bankers were thinking of trying to buy an interest which would be the balance of [Page 413] power between the French and the Germans. He said he might be seeing them in New York and wondered if I had any views on the matter.
I said that this was a matter for “private enterprise” and that I could not see any particular reason why the United States Government should officially either persuade or dissuade the bankers from action in this matter, although we would naturally take a benevolent view toward anything which in fact helped to solve French-German differences.
Mayer then spoke of the vital importance for Franco-German relations of creating EURATOM. He said if this failed and the United States made a bilateral arrangement with the Germans, this would begin to create suspicion which would grow and would have a very disruptive force. The key to EURATOM was the unwillingness of the United States to make a bilateral with the Germans. He thought that if the Germans thought they could get a bilateral, they would prefer it to an integrated approach.
I said the United States would like to have the six-power approach, but that we could not be coercive. I said, however, that if it were apparent that the other five European countries were all ready to proceed on this basis and the only obstacle was a reluctance on the part of the German industrialists, then we might perhaps find a way to be helpful. However, until France, Italy and the Benelux countries made their own positions clear, we could not very well tell the Germans that only by going in could we deal with them. Mayer said he understood this position.
We then went over the Communiqué and made a slight revision in the sentence dealing with scrap. It was then agreed to be issued.2