Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

153. Telegram From the Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State¹

Rome, February 4, 1956—6 p.m.

2626. In a conversation with Monnet at Ambassador Dillon’s last night he spoke at great length of the problems facing the creation of EURATOM. He said that the USA, while it should use no pressure on Europeans as EURATOM must come about as the result of their own efforts and desires, could do two things to help, first and most urgent use every possible argument to persuade the British to cease obstructing EURATOM’s efforts. The British still feared a united productive Europe and therefore were backing the OEEC atomic concepts which was basically contrary to EURATOM’s effort to integrate Europe and bring about the Common Market. He believed that French political elements would not in the end reject the plan as they had EDC. Second, the USA could release immediately nuclear material to EURATOM when it had jelled.

Speaking of the Italian delegation at the European action committee he said Malagodi² had been most argumentative and obstructionist making unnecessarily difficult objections in behalf of Italian private enterprise. He said in his view EURATOM was the “last chance” of laying the foundation for an integrated European Community.³

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/2–456. Confidential.
2. Giovanni Malagodi, a member of the European Action Committee.

3. In telegram 3498 from Paris, February 6, Ambassador Dillon also reported on this talk with Monnet. His telegram reads in part as follows:

   “He [Monnet] said it was most important that US tread very warily in this field. Overt support by US for EURATOM or US pressure for its adoption in any country would he felt be counter-productive. EURATOM was a purely European concept and must remain so. He particularly emphasized importance of US staying clear of argument which was bound to arise in France regarding renunciation of right to manufacture nuclear weapons. Any idea that US favored such a renunciation by France would in Monnet’s view cause fatal damage to EURATOM in France. Monnet’s views in this regard closely parallel my opinion expressed in Embtel 3467, except that Monnet is more optimistic than I am regarding chances of renunciation being accepted by France provided US keeps out of fight.” (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1910/2–656)