Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

152. Telegram From the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

Paris, February 3, 1956—2 p.m.

3467. After spending week back in Paris I feel I should raise serious warning flag over one important aspect of present EURATOM proposal. Sometime during course of past two months Monnet added new thought to original EURATOM idea, namely that no country taking part in EURATOM should have right to make atomic weapons (while this conception of Monnet’s has apparently been wholeheartedly adopted by Guy Mollet, I feel that its retention in EURATOM project would create great difficulties for final ratification here in France). French already have, or are about to have, capability for manufacturing nuclear weapons and this is only respect in which their position is presently more favorable than German position.

I am convinced that French will not voluntarily renounce this right without extremely bitter Parliamentary battle in which, at this stage, proponents of maintenance of French right to manufacture nuclear weapons would seem to have advantage. Any such political fight would be bound to arouse the same type of ultra-nationalistic feeling that was successfully aroused against the EDC. Beginning of such a campaign can already be seen in public opposition of Debre and Weygand² to this aspect of Monnet proposal. I am also informed that Juin³ is opposed to any such concession by France. This does not mean that there is a strong movement in France for immediate manufacture of nuclear weapons, but only that permanent renunciation of this right will arouse the bitterest of opposition.

Communists will probably, as they have already indicated, maintain their opposition to EURATOM on other grounds, i.e., opposition to all European unity schemes. Poujadists and Gaullists will undoubtedly oppose giving up the right to manufacture as being a derogation of national sovereignty. This in itself makes total of over 225 votes against such a project and I am convinced the chances are almost zero of obtaining required 300 favorable votes out of the remaining 375 members of the Assembly.

Therefore, I fear that insistence on renunciation of right to manufacture nuclear weapons may well mean the end of EURATOM as far as France is concerned.

I am also convinced that French will make no definite commitment toward common market although they may well pass some sort of lip serving resolution in favor of progress toward such a goal. Therefore, chances of EURATOM are not good if Belgians and Germans intend to insist on any very definite progress toward common market as price of their support for EURATOM.

I would like to underline one specific danger for US in connection with France. It would be most serious if French should come to believe that US favored their renouncing right to manufacture atomic weapons. Such a feeling would arouse storm of anti-American protest and would ensure the defeat of any such project. If there is any chance of France permanently renouncing right to make nuclear weapons, which I believe is only extremely slight, it would certainly be ruined if it could be labelled as an American project to deprive France of military power that could otherwise be hers.

Finally I would like to warn against dangers of confusion in thinking by US public, Congress or Government between Monnet resolution and actual treaty creating EURATOM. Prospects for early French approval of former currently appear good. This would naturally be major helpful development but would not of itself necessarily mean more than did French Assembly’s approval of resolution favoring EDC early in 1952. It would not mean that major difficulties may not arise in actual treaty negotiations or Parliamentary ratification processes. What situation will then be naturally cannot now be foretold but premature optimism based on approval of Monnet resolution by French and other Parliaments might well produce dangerous let down later.⁴

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/2–356. Secret. Repeated for information to Bonn, Rome, London, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
2. Michel Debré and Jacques Weygand were French Senators.
3. Marshal Alphonse P. Juin, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Land Forces in Central Europe.
4. In a letter to Secretary Dulles, also of February 3, Ambassador Dillon briefly repeated the views expressed in telegram 3467 and recommended that the Secretary find the time to read that telegram in full. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/2–356)