135. Letter From the Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Macmillan1
My Dear Harold: I appreciate your thoughtfulness in making available through your Ambassador your thinking on European collaboration in the field of nuclear energy.2 This is a highly complicated subject with many technical aspects to which we, as well as you, are giving attention. I hope our two staffs keep in close touch on these aspects of the problem. I think it is important that you and I try to align the policies of our two Governments as closely as possible with respect to the broad frameworks within which current European initiatives in the atomic energy and other fields are developing. It is on this wider problem which I would like to tell you of our thinking.
In the light of the Geneva Conference, I am impressed with the necessity of strengthening in every way possible the unity and purpose of the West. I believe we can derive comfort from the fact that the Soviets seem unlikely to resort to general war to achieve their objectives in Europe. At the same time, we can expect no lessening of their political and subversive offensive against Western Europe, as well as other areas. Their tactics will inevitably be to try to divide us and, through so-called “peaceful competition” to step up the battle for men’s minds. I am confident of our ability to compete on any basis with the Soviet system. Our ability to do so, however, will depend upon the degree to which we are successful in preserving our unity and strength.
There is also the related question of Germany. I have no doubt about the present devotion of the Adenauer Government to full cooperation with the West. There is, however, the danger that the appeal of reunification will, over a period of time, become so strong [Page 363] in Germany as to give rise to temptation to discard the associations with the West in an effort to advance reunification on terms which would at best result in a neutral Germany and at worst in an Eastern-oriented Germany. Our problem is to prevent this possibility arising. The best means of doing this, in my judgment, is to so tie Germany into the whole complex of Western institutions—military, political and economic—and to so command her loyalties that neutrality or orientation to the East will be commonly accepted as unthinkable. This is a large order, I know, but I see no other alternative.
The form that European unity takes is, of course, for the Europeans themselves to decide. We should not prescribe. Anything other than objective advice and cooperation could well be self-defeating. Europe can only unite effectively if it sees the advantages of uniting and wants to unite. Only in such a development can the required strength be built.
At present, there are two trends discernible in Europe, both directed toward goals of increased unity. One is the six-nation approach, which has had one signal success in the Coal and Steel Community and one signal defeat in the European Defense Community. This, as we know, is essentially a supranational approach. The other is the OEEC approach, a cooperative effort which has accomplished much in reconciling conflicting national interests. The United States Government has enthusiastically supported both of these concepts. In my opinion, they seek to accomplish different but not conflicting purposes. As we look toward the future it seems to me that the closer community of interests that Europe can build, the more hope Europe will have of realizing its potential for security, prosperity and influence in world affairs. To my mind, the six-nation grouping approach gives the greatest hope of achieving this end because of the closer unity which is inherent in that Community and because of the contribution which it will make to the strength and cohesion of the wider European grouping. It may well be that a six-nation community will evolve protectionist tendencies. It may be that it will show a trend toward greater independence. In the long-run, however, I cannot but feel that the resultant increased unity would bring in its wake greater responsibility and devotion to the common welfare of Western Europe.
It is for these reasons, and with the companion determination to continue to cooperate with the OEEC, that the President and I have been anxious to encourage in every appropriate way the current revival of initiative by the six nations in their search for new forms of integration in the fields of nuclear and conventional energy, a common market and transportation. We hope that progress will be swift, but we should be satisfied if there is sustained and real advance [Page 364] toward the practical ideal inherent in the supranational principle.
I hope that you will let me have your reaction to these views on this matter and that we can count upon your Government’s support. I hope to discuss this matter with you at the NATO meeting in Paris.3 Should it then appear desirable, perhaps we could arrange for further discussions between our two staffs with a view toward assuring that, despite any differences of emphasis between us, we do not give conflicting advice to the Continental Europeans with respect to the movement toward closer unity.4
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/12–1055. Secret. Transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 3261 for delivery to Macmillan.↩
- See Document 131.↩
- Dulles was scheduled to attend the annual Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, to be held in Paris, December 15–16.↩
Dulles’ letter to Macmillan was repeated in circular telegram 384 of December 13 to Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, Luxembourg, Rome, USRO, and the CSC Mission. The circular telegram indicated that the letter was for the information of the Chiefs of Mission only. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/12–1355)
On December 17, Acting Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., forwarded a copy of Dulles’ letter to Lewis Strauss under cover of a letter which reads in part as follows:
“The attached letter to Foreign Minister Macmillan sets forth the Secretary’s views more fully. They are intended to make clear the general perspectives within which we can be formulating particular policies, on such matters as the peaceful uses of atomic energy, over the coming weeks. If the British cannot associate themselves in our efforts, Secretary Dulles hopes that at least they can agree not to impede the efforts which we will be encouraging the Europeans to make towards achieving genuine federation.” (Ibid., 840.00/12–1755)
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