Office of the Historian

134. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1

Washington, December 8, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • EURATOM
1.
The EUR paper attached to your memorandum of December 6 states very persuasively the need for concrete and dramatic action by the U.S. to give impetus to the idea of European atomic energy integration. The U.S. action must be technically and economically sound if we are to capitalize fully on the present opportunity. I suggest that we proceed immediately, with AEC technical advice, to determine just what action will be most effective. Here are a few preliminary considerations.
2.
The suggested contribution of a uranium enrichment plant might well have the most political appeal of any offer we could make. At the same time, it is not entirely clear to me that it would be the most economic move for the Europeans, even assuming substantial U.S. financing. Enriched uranium from the very large U.S. plants whose costs are being amortized over the life of weapons programs should be much cheaper—unless the EUR proposal contemplates large U.S. subsidy of Europe’s power bill. Enrichment plants are terrific consumers of electric power which is in short supply in Europe and the imminent shortage of which is the basic reason for European interest in atomic energy. Moreover, such a plant would take years to build—with some chance that at the end of that period, enriched uranium will be less essential than now appears likely.
3.
Such a proposal would probably be the most difficult to sell within the U.S. Government because of sensitivity of the technology, which is directly associated with weapons production know-how, and the specter of possible Communist take-over of the plant. We would be making the Europeans independent of us and giving up our monopoly on marketable enriched uranium.
4.
Unless it is certain that the EUR proposal would be the only offer by the U.S. that would have the desired political effect, would it not be better to discuss with the CSC countries what the U.S. could best do for them as a group? Among other aid possibilities (not mutually exclusive) are:
(a)
An offer by the U.S. and the U.K. to release any part of the Congo uranium which Euratom might need for power reactor fueling. Such an offer could be made even more attractive by offering to process such uranium in the U.S. to the degree of enrichment required by Euratom. I think this might be the most attractive offer to the Europeans. It would not require a large investment in an enrichment plant that would be dependent on imported ores.
(b)
The U.S. might help in construction of fuel fabrication or chemical separations plants. If these became the sole European facilities of their kind, they would be very useful control mechanisms (against illegal weapons activities) and would make the individual nations dependent on group facilities, thus tying the Europeans together in a practical way.
(c)
The U.S. might agree to U.K. construction of a uranium enrichment plant in Europe (U.K. has recently requested our views on this).
5.
If an American offer is to be soundly based technically, we ought to get work started on a technical evaluation by AEC of the Brussels Committee report. We should also get AEC technical guidance on all kinds of atomic energy assistance useful to Euratom.
6.
A complicating factor is that AEC, State, and DOD are in the middle of a policy review for the International Atomic Energy Agency negotiations. Any offer to Euratom should be consistent with ultimate U.S. policy on this Agency. Our present view is that Euratom could be a useful adjunct of the Agency and could carry out Agency control functions.
7.
Whatever we are to do, a fundamental problem is raised—is the goal of a supranational European atomic energy organization sufficiently important for the U.S. to incur a large cost to see it established? It may be that before the AEC would give serious consideration to the far-reaching EUR proposal or any alternative involving a wrench to existing policy, a prior Presidential decision would have to be reached that the U.S. should be prepared to pay a price commensurate with the political and security advantages that EUR estimates [Page 362] will flow from Euratom. The NSC Action (1480)2 of November 21 seems too vague to be useful as leverage on AEC.
Gerard C. Smith
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/12–855. Confidential.↩
  2. See footnote 2, supra.↩