71. Letter From the President to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Gruenther)1
Dear Al: The past two weeks in Washington have been a period of tension—reminiscent of the numerous “flaps” that used to plague us in the old War Department.
The principal cause has been the Administration’s effort to clarify our people’s understanding of the consequences of an attack by [Page 190] the ChiComs on Formosa and its neighboring islands, and to obtain their expressed support of the government’s plans to defend those islands effectively. An added difficulty, as is always the case, has been the extreme care with which the public relations angle of this effort had to be handled.
In the present case, we have a Europe that, speaking generally, is fearful of what some Europeans consider American recklessness, impulsiveness and immaturity in the foreign field. In Red China we have a dictatorial regime which seeks every opportunity to develop among its own people and all other Asiatics a deeper and deeper hatred of the West, particularly of the United States. In Formosa we have the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists who are suspicious of any move in the Far East that does not involve an “immediate direct and destructive attack on Red China.”
At home we have the truculent and the timid, the jingoists and the pacifists. Underlying the whole is the most important fact of today’s life—the irreconcilable conflict between the theories of the Communist dictatorship and the basic principles of free world existence.
Any military man can easily make clear distinction between the defense of Formosa and the defense of the so-called offshore islands. Not only are two different military problems presented, but in the one case we are talking about territories the control of which has passed from nation to nation through the years—and in the other case, about territories that have always been a part of the Chinese mainland both politically and, in effect, geographically. So the political differences are almost as plain as the military differences when we talk about the defense of these two territories.
If there were no other factors than the military to consider, you and I, for example, would study the problem and would very quickly reach a decision that we would permit no advance by the Communists beyond the offshore islands, but that in any struggle involving only the territory of those islands, we would see no reason for American intervention.
Such a solution would infuriate the Chinese Communists because of their announced objective to take Formosa; it would infuriate the Chinese Nationalists because the retention of the offshore islands sustains their hope that one day they will go back to their homeland. It would more or less please our European friends because it implies to them a moderate attitude on our part, and the responsible officials in those countries can see the danger to all of us if Formosa should fall to the Communists. (Not that Red China, in her present state, would be a direct threat to the United States, but with international Communism having thus penetrated the island barrier in the Western Pacific and in a position to threaten the Philippines [Page 191] and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us would soon be in far worse trouble than we are now.)
At home the hypothetical solution I mention would be accepted by most merely because it is simple to describe, although there is a certain pacifist element that wants us completely out of the Western Pacific. Some people seem to think that we can surrender to the Communists the Japanese productive capacity and all the richness of the South Pacific territories and still be perfectly safe in this country. There are people who did not believe Hitler’s threats any more than they now believe those of Chou and the Kremlin.
Now, if the solution we adopt should state flatly that we would defend the principal islands of the offshore group (Quemoy and the Matsus), we would now please the Chinese Nationalists, but we would frighten Europe and of course even further infuriate the Chinese Communists. Not that I think this last particularly important, because they are going to be infuriated anyway.
By announcing this as a policy we would be compelled to maintain in the area, at great cost, forces that could assure the defense of islands that are almost within wading distance of the mainland. This defensive problem could be extremely difficult over the long term, and I think that the world in general, including some of our friends, would believe us unreasonable and practically goading the Chinese Communists into a fight. We could get badly tied down by any such inflexible public attitude.
On the other hand, as we consider the problem of defending Formosa, we understand how important to us is the morale of the Chinese forces on that island. Their willingness to fight and to keep themselves in a high state of readiness for fighting is one of the keys to the situation. Consequently, even though we clearly see that our major concern, so far as territory itself is involved, does not extend beyond Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores, yet the economical and efficient defense of these islands involves a concern for the areas from which it could most easily be attacked.
You probably read the Resolution that was passed by the Congress, at my request. The wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can understand why this is so.
The Resolution, then, is our publicly stated position; the problem now is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists still remains important to us, so they must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, now before our Senate for ratification. We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa. And we [Page 192] must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack that has only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.
I could go on and discuss a thousand different points, with shadings of each, that we have discussed and hashed over during the past two weeks. Basic conclusions were scarcely involved; there have never been any great differences within the Administration on fundamentals. Most of the talks centered around the question of “what can we say and how can we say it” so as to retain the greatest possible confidence of our friends and at the same time put our enemies on notice that we are not going to stand idly by to see our vital interests jeopardized.
Of course, only time will tell how successful we have been. Every day will bring its problems and many of these will cause much more talking and haggling—even some thinking! More and more I find myself, in this type of situation—and perhaps it is because of my advancing years—tending to strip each problem down to its simplest possible form. Having gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I try in the next step to determine what answer would best serve the long term advantage and welfare of the United States and the free world. I then consider the immediate problem and what solution can we get that will best conform to the long term interests of the country and at the same time can command a sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action.
When I get a problem solved on this rough basis, I merely stick to the essential answer and let associates have a field day on words and terminology. (I suppose that many of those around me would protest that even in this field I am sometimes something of an autocrat and insist upon the employment of my own phraseology when I consider the issue important.) However, I really do try to stay out of this particular job as much as my own characteristics, particularly my ego, will permit.
Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.
I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time—in fact, I do not believe that if we became engaged in rather a bitter fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in the effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies. But I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we could conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia’s treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. As a consequence of this kind of thinking, she [Page 193] would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into a real shooting war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion.
In any event, we have got to do what we believe to be right—if we can figure out the right—and we must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world’s intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.
Oddly enough I started out this letter with the complacent thought that I could point up, in one or two paragraphs, the salient features of my last two weeks’ existence. Now I find that after all these words, I have only vaguely pointed out the biggest ones in this particular “can of worms.”
When I see you in a couple of weeks, we can talk these things over more fully.
With love to Grace, and, of course, the best to yourself,
As ever,2