73. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 2, 19551
SUBJECT
- Formosa
PARTICIPANTS
- The Acting Secretary
- Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Merchant
Sir Roger called at his request. He said that he had received a message from Sir Anthony Eden concerning the desire of the United [Page 196] Kingdom to find the basis on which to work very closely with us in the Far East. Sir Roger underlined that what he was about to say represented the views of Sir Anthony and did not emanate from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting on which he so far had only skeletal reports.
Sir Roger went on to say that Eden was reassured concerning our intentions regarding Formosa and that public opinion in Britain was clear on two points, first that the people on Formosa, who were anti-Communist, cannot be turned over to the Communists, and secondly, that the legal status of Formosa differs from that of the off-shore islands. British public opinion, however, is confused by the lack of clarity in U.S. policy with respect to these off-shore islands. It is also uncertain as to the possible future use of Formosa as a base for the invasion of the Mainland. Eden agrees that it is strategically essential to hold Formosa in friendly hands but he raises the question as to whether this facet of the matter should be emphasized publicly as the basis for policy. He is now asking whether it would be possible for the U.S. to clarify its policy with respect to the off-shore islands. He believes that broad support of the British public can be obtained for our Formosa policy if it is reassured that the island will not be used as an invasion base and that it is not our intention that the offshore islands should be indefinitely held by the Nationalists.
The Acting Secretary replied that, without accepting or rejecting anything that Sir Roger had said, he would like to communicate to the Secretary on his return Sunday2 night the content of Sir Roger’s approach. He added that nothing crucial would arise in the next few days which would require an earlier answer.
Mr. Murphy then inquired whether he had any information or comments on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting. The Ambassador replied he had received virtually nothing.
The Ambassador then mentioned that he had discussed the question of the evacuation of the Tachen Islands with the Secretary just before the latter’s departure.3 He wondered if this movement was imminent and he expressed the view himself that it would be better accomplished before an attack was launched. The Secretary had indicated that he rather expected the Nationalists would agree on a redeployment the early part of this week.
Mr. Hoover indicated that no decision had been taken by the Nationalists as yet, but that it would probably be forthcoming within the next 2 or 3 days.
Mr. Murphy mentioned the great concern we have regarding Nationalist morale. It would be helpful if the Prime Ministers in [Page 197] London took this important factor into account in their consideration.
The Ambassador replied that he had fully reported this element of our thinking and believed it was being taken into account. He recapitulated that there is agreement on the central point of the importance of holding Formosa. He felt that the gulf which had been created by British recognition of Peiping4 and our continued recognition of the Republic of China was tending to lose an [in?] importance, particularly since he believed that the U.S. no longer felt that Chiang Kai-shek was likely to regain control of the Mainland. The risk of war is over the off-shore islands which Britain recognizes as Mainland Chinese territory.
Mr. Murphy pointed out the flaw in this logic since the Peiping regime had never had control of these off-shore islands. They had been continuously under the control of the Republic of China which we recognized. To say that they belonged to Mainland China was to fail to recognize the de jure or the de facto situation.
Sir Roger repeated that in his view war arising from the offshore islands would not secure general public support in the U.K.
The question was then raised with the Ambassador of the necessity of defending Formosa which it was agreed was necessary. How could a build-up of a magnitude to be clearly directed against Formosa rather than an off-shore island be overlooked or disregarded in light of Peiping’s insistence that they were going to liberate Formosa and that this was the objective of all their operations.
Sir Roger closed the conversation by asking again if it would not be best to evacuate the off-shore islands. It was pointed out once more to him that there were military and moral objections to any such proposal.
As the Ambassador left Mr. Hoover reiterated that what he had said would be brought to the attention of the Secretary on his return and that no doubt the Secretary would wish to talk further with the Ambassador.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–255. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.↩
- February 6.↩
- See Document 54.↩
- In January 1950.↩