240. Despatch From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
REF
- Embassy Despatch 412, February 28, 1956.2
SUBJECT
- Operation Plan “Rochester”
There is enclosed for the Department’s information a single copy of a report entitled “Operation Plan Rochester”.3 This document is the result of combined planning by the United States forces, representing the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and headed by Vice Admiral Arthur M. Pride, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, with representatives of the Ministry of National Defense, of the Republic of China. Conferences resulting in plan “Rochester” were held in Taipei from March 15 through 28, 1955 and were based on a verbal agreement between the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Department of Defense and the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of China. Conferences were held on the military level without participation by an Embassy representative.
The plan, as agreed upon between the U.S. and Chinese military representatives provides for the combined operations of U.S. and Chinese forces in the event of hostilities in the Taiwan area in which both forces are engaged. It defines the basic responsibilities under combat and combat-planning conditions, of the various elements of the U.S. and Chinese forces which it is contemplated will be deployed in the defense of Taiwan, Penghu and, possibly, the off-shore islands. What it does not do—despite MND desires in the matter and extensive press speculation throughout the course of the conference, is to establish a combined staff or combined command intermingling Chinese and U.S. officers in staff and command positions in a single headquarters.
[Page 551]In summary, the plan contains a general estimate of the military situation, including enemy capabilities and Chinese-U.S. potential, a listing of U.S. forces which it is expected will be deployed in the event of hostilities, and an outline plan of how the U.S. and Chinese forces will coordinate their individual planning so that an efficient combined combat operation might be possible. Operational responsibilities are allocated, the Chinese assuming the burden of ground activity and the United States the major task of air defense and naval support and bombardment. Understandings appear to have been reached that Chinese Naval and Air Forces shall be employed under U.S. operational control in the event of a combined effort.
The operations plan stresses coordinated action by the two forces, a maximum of control by the “parent” country and a return of integrated Chinese air and naval forces to such control whenever combat conditions permit. The U.S. forces have, in the conference leading to plan “Rochester”, given assurances to the Chinese Government that the U.S. accepts primary responsibility for air defense, naval surface action and offensive air action in the Taiwan area in the event that U.S. forces are ordered engaged. During pre-hostilities operations, unilateral but closely coordinated operations are stressed, with a view towards a smooth transition into operations on a combined basis when and if required.
The Department’s attention is invited to Appendix 1 to Annex I of the enclosed plan (see tab)4 which the Department will recognize as the draft military agreement which MAAG prepared earlier this year and which it proposed be signed with the Ministry of National Defense on a military level. A copy of this draft agreement and the Embassy’s comments thereon were forwarded to the Department in the despatch in reference. When execution of this agreement was delayed due to lack of CINCPAC approval, it was apparently decided to include it as a part of plan “Rochester” in the hope that, viewed in connection with an operation plan of a scope which would require some type of base rights agreement for its effectuation, the draft agreement would receive immediate approval. However, the opposite result may have obtained, for CINCPAC, after referring the question of the draft agreement to Washington and receiving a negative reply, has as yet to signify his approval of any portion of plan “Rochester”. The Ministry of National Defense was apparently quite confident that the draft agreement would receive instant approval from the higher headquarters (US), as it scheduled a signing ceremony which, after receipt of CINCPAC’s first message referring the matter to Washington, was postponed at MAAG request and, after receipt of the second message stating that no military agreement could be entered [Page 552] into pending inter-departmental action, was called off entirely.5
Plan “Rochester” was reviewed and discussed during the third U.S.–GRC Coordination Conference which took place in Taipei from April 18 through 22 and which is being reported in a separate despatch.6 The plan as it appears in the enclosure was forwarded by Admiral Pride to CINCPAC for final approval before putting it fully into effect. MAAG anticipates that approval will be forthcoming after CINCPAC has had an opportunity to study the plan and to make certain revisions based on recommendations made during the April conference.7
First Secretary of Embassy
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–555. Secret.↩
- Despatch 412 transmitted a copy of a draft military agreement between the ROC Ministry of National Defense and the Senior U.S. Military Representative on Formosa (the Chief of MAAG acting for CINCPAC) concerning the utilization of facilities and services by the U.S. Armed Forces in connection with their mission to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. It was intended that this would be an interim agreement and that it would provide the basis for the negotiation of a base agreement under Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty. (Ibid., 793.5/2–2855) Article VII of the treaty reads as follows: “The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.”↩
- The enclosure, unsigned and undated, is not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The attempt to conclude an interim military agreement was suspended when the Embassy was instructed on June 22 to negotiate a single comprehensive status of forces agreement; see Document 275.↩
-
Despatch 560 from Taipei, May 16, reported on the conference between U.S. and ROC military representatives, headed by Admiral Pride and Defense Minister Yu, the purpose of which was “to coordinate U.S. and Chinese plans and operations in connection with the defense of Taiwan and Penghu”. The despatch concludes:
“The conference was apparently successful, not because it solved the myriad of problems involved in planning and executing combined wartime operations, but because it demonstrated willingness on the part of the U.S. to bring the problems into the open, and to take positive steps toward their solution. Arrangements were made for coordinated US-Chinese planning and action, some of which to the lay observer, seem so basic that he might be inclined to question why such arrangements were only now being settled. The answer undoubtedly is that until the U.S. and the GRC individually had reached the present stage of planning, staffing and preparation, the details of a combined effort could not rationally have been approached.
“The bugaboo of lack of a base rights or status of forces agreement with the GRC made its presence felt throughout the conference. Planning for exclusive U.S. use of certain airfields, for stationing of additional military units and their equipment on Taiwan, for supplementing Chinese defensive efforts with supporting American forces, for the establishment of a POL depot, and for construction, with U.S. military funds, of the various installations and improvements necessary to the foregoing, was seriously hampered, if not deadlocked, by the fact that the U.S. planners had no firm base rights arrangements with the Chinese. The U.S. representatives felt they had nothing on which they could rely for a definition of their rights, privileges and immunities in general and as a basic understanding with the Chinese on such matters as acquisition of, title to and disposition of property and improvements acquired with U.S. funds. Although, as the Department is well aware, U.S. forces brought into Taiwan under Article 7 of the Mutual Defense Treaty of December 2, 1954, have been accorded the privileges of the ‘MAAG Agreement’, this arrangement was clearly understood by the U.S. and the GRC to have been a temporary one and the GRC is now requesting the replacement of this arrangement by a status of forces agreement to be negotiated by the two governments. Until some permanent understanding can be reached on this question it seems doubtful that U.S. plans for the defense of Taiwan can be fully implemented.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–1655)
The “MAAG Agreement” refers to an exchange of notes dated January 30 and February 9, 1951, and a supplementary exchange of notes dated October 23 and November 1, 1952. For texts, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1499 and 3 UST (pt. 4) 5166 respectively.
↩ - No record has been found in Department of State files indicating whether or not the plan was put into effect.↩