Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

275. Instruction From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

CA–9112

Washington, June 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Chinese Base Negotiations

1. Careful review of recent communications from the Embassy has resulted in the following conclusions:

a. We concur in your suggestion that the activities of the various U.S. military elements in Taiwan, other than the MAAG, be regularized in a single set of arrangements under Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty, applicable to all such United States elements.²

b. Arrangements at government level should be limited as much as possible to statements of broad principle, and to matters which cannot be handled at the CINCPAC-MND level. It is assumed that the MND has or can get the necessary competence or authority to enter into necessary firm understandings at the military level covering a wide area.

c. All arrangements should be “open ended”; i.e., if new United States elements are brought into Taiwan with GRC concurrence, these arrangements should apply to them automatically, except that special arrangements would, of course, have to be worked out for necessary physical facilities and accommodations on a case-by-case basis at military level.

2. For Your Information, we consider that the emergency situation existing in Taiwan necessitates arrangements for the United States Forces which will permit the performance of any mission required; and we expect the GRC to make the necessary arrangements. The United States is not prepared to send United States units to assist in mutual defense efforts unless the GRC can make firm and satisfactory arrangements as to their status, and can guarantee the operational freedom necessary for accomplishment of their mission.

3. In particular, we would expect the GRC to make significant concessions in customs, tax and fiscal matters for the forces and for the United States personnel involved, including dependents and United States contractor personnel for whom such exemptions are essential to facilitate personnel recruitment for service in Taiwan. Defense is additionally unwilling to consider anything less than de facto exclusive United States criminal jurisdiction for the above personnel. On this latter score, any reasonable formula would be acceptable so long as the practical result is achieved. While we appreciate GRC reluctance to extend the MAAG umbrella as such to all the above personnel, we suggest that the variation of this formula as proposed in the attached draft note³ can cover a majority of points which if spelled out in detail, might be much more difficult for the GRC to accept politically. This new formula in no sense implies that we expect the above personnel to be part of the Embassy or of MAAG, for administrative purposes or otherwise. It merely asks that they be guaranteed the same treatment in practice, spelling out certain details and interpretations of such practice in a separate understanding, which can be classified and closely held if the Chinese so desire.

4. If under Chinese law it is possible that the members of the United States forces, as defined in attachment 1, would be subject to arrest or confinement in connection with civil proceedings, a provision against this should be inserted in attachment 2. End—For Your Information.

5. The Acting Secretary on June 2, 1955 approved the negotiation of an executive agreement on base rights.⁴ Attached are the texts of two notes for negotiation which have been drafted with the foregoing considerations in mind. Suggested modifications of the MND level agreement forwarded with Embassy Despatch 412⁵ are also attached, and Defense will forward appropriate instructions through its channels. We believe that negotiations at the government and service levels should be initiated concurrently to guard against the possibility that the GRC might find that certain matters cannot be handled at the MND level.

6. In our view these negotiations should be concluded with greatest dispatch. You should accordingly approach the Foreign Office at the earliest opportunity to present the United States position, making clear the urgency of the project and the importance we attach to a favorable GRC response, and should proceed to the negotiation of the exchange of notes, final texts ad referendum to the Department. Please report results of this approach and subsequent developments by cable for the Department and Defense.⁶

7. This is a joint State–Defense Message. It is requested that the Embassy make copies available to Chief, MAAG and COMFORM-DEFCOM.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56393/6–2255. Secret. Drafted in CA, cleared in draft with the Department of Defense and with L, and approved by Robertson. Repeated for information to CINCPAC, COMFEAF (Tokyo), CINCFE (Tokyo), and CGAFEE (Yokohama).
2. A letter to Robertson, May 4, from Counselor of Embassy William P. Cochran, Jr., stated that the United States now had one “permanent” and four “temporary” agreements or arrangements with the ROC Government concerning the status of U.S. forces in Taiwan and Penghu: 1) the “MAAG Agreement” (see footnote 6, Document 240); 2) an exchange of notes dated February 2 and 14, covering U.S. forces assigned to Taiwan in accordance with Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty (enclosed with despatch 189 from Taipei, September 23; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2355); 3) an exchange of notes dated March 30 and April 26, agreeing to the establishment of a Navy Medical Research Unit (for texts, see 7 UST 173); 4) an exchange of notes dated February 23 and April 28, continuing the operation on Taiwan of an electronic countermeasures unit (enclosed with despatch 533 from Taipei, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/5–255); and 5) an exchange of notes dated April 5 and April 26, agreeing to the operation of certain radio communications units on Taiwan (reported in telegram 765 from Taipei, April 27; ibid., 793.5/4–2755). In the case of each of the four latter exchanges of notes, Chinese permission was granted on a provisional basis, pending the negotiation of a single agreement covering all military units, and the personnel concerned were granted the same privileges and immunities as MAAG personnel, who, under the “MAAG Agreement”, operated “as a part of the U.S. Embassy”. (Ibid., CA Files: Lot 59 D 110, Air Force Communications Project—Formosa)
3. Two draft notes and a draft military agreement, none printed, were attached. The first draft note, undated, concerned general arrangements for U.S. forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores. The Chinese Government was to furnish such areas and facilities as were required for the U.S. forces, their exact location to be determined by agreement; members of the U.S. forces were to be accorded the same treatment in jurisdictional matters as MAAG personnel. A supplementary draft note, undated, set forth an understanding that in criminal matters the ROC Government would in all cases waive any right of jurisdiction over members of the U.S. forces in favor of the U.S. military authorities.
4. Acting Secretary Hoover’s approval was indicated by his initials on a memorandum of May 23, from Robertson to him. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56393/5–2355)
5. See footnote 2, Document 240.
6. The Embassy reported in telegram 87 from Taipei, August 3, that the U.S. draft notes and draft military agreement had been presented to the Foreign Ministry on August 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/8–355) Recommendations by the Embassy, MAAG, Defense, and CINCPAC representatives for revisions were transmitted in telegrams 12 from Taipei, July 8, and 13 and 15 from Taipei, July 11. (Ibid., 711.56393/7–855 and 711.56393/7–1155, respectively)