Office of the Historian

241. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, May 6, 1955, 10:30 a.m.1

Washington, May 6, 1955, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Secretary of State
  • Secretary of Defense
  • Deputy Secretary Anderson
  • Admiral Radford
  • Under Secretary Hoover
  • Assistant Secretary Robertson

Secretary Wilson presented a JCS split paper with reference to anti-aircraft defense on Taiwan,2 and a majority of the Joint Chiefs recommended primarily training and instruction of the Chinese rather than putting a large US force on the island for this purpose. Rankin’s cable #7903 was shown to the President who concurred in the decision of the Chairman and the majority of the Joint Chiefs.4

The President suggested that consideration should be given to an experimental unit of “Nike” anti-aircraft sites on the island.5

[Here follows discussion relating to NATO.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–655. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles.↩
  2. Reference is to a JCS memorandum to Wilson, dated April 22, on the subject “U.S. Support for the Air Defense of Formosa” (JCS 2147/142), which presented divergent views on recommendations submitted by CINCPAC for improved air defense on Formosa and for support of U.S. Air Force forces to be deployed on Formosa. Carney and Twining recommended providing the Nationalists on a priority basis with 90-MM antiaircraft batteries and training teams; Ridgway recommended the deployment of one antiaircraft artillery brigade and logistic support troops to Formosa, stating that this was “the only solution which will provide effective antiaircraft artillery protection and logistical support for U.S. Air Force wings in less than one year.” (JCS Records, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50))↩
  3. Telegram 790 was sent in reply to telegram 668 to Taipei, May 5, which requested Rankin’s views on a pending decision as to whether U.S. antiaircraft batteries to be sent to Taiwan should be fully manned by U.S. personnel, totalling approximately 12,000, or accompanied only by U.S. instructors. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–555) Rankin replied in telegram 790 from Taipei, May 6, that Chase and Pride concurred, that the “political and administrative disadvantages of stationing sizeable US tactical forces on Taiwan would outweigh possible military advantages.” (Ibid., 793.5/5–655)↩
  4. A memorandum of May 6 from Wilson to the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Carney’s and Twining’s recommendations. (JCS Files, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50))↩
  5. A memorandum of May 6 from Wilson to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested JCS views on a proposal “that the United States consider sending an experimental Nike Unit to Formosa to participate in the air defense of Formosa in order to afford a possible opportunity to test this weapon under combat conditions.” (Ibid.) A memorandum of June 15 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wilson stated the JCS view that the Army Chief of Staff “should make plans for deploying a special Nike unit to Formosa in case of need, to arrive there within thirty to fifty days after a decision is made for such deployment” but that “no Nike unit should be deployed to Formosa at this time.” (Ibid.)↩