Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

239. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 5, 1955, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, May 5, 1955, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• 1. Prospective Cease-Fire Talks with Chinese Communists.
• 2. Inclusion of Far Eastern Items on Agenda of Paris Meetings.

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo—Chinese Ambassador
• The Secretary
• Walter S. Robertson—Assistant Secretary for FE
• Walter P. McConaughy—Director for Chinese Affairs

Ambassador Koo called at his own request. He said he wished to make two inquiries: (1) as to U.S. intentions concerning talks with the Chinese Communists; and (2) the inclusion of Far Eastern items on the agenda of the forthcoming Paris meetings.²

As to (1), the Ambassador said he realized that public opinion in general had made necessary some U.S. statement in response to the Chou En-lai declaration at Bandung that he was prepared to negotiate with the United States for easing of tensions. He said that his Government would like to know if the U.S. Government contemplated entering into direct bilateral talks with the Chinese Communists, or proceeding through a third party?

The Secretary said that the U.S. Government had been seeking a cease-fire arrangement for some time. He was aware that the Chinese Government had a somewhat different view of the problem. The views of the two Governments were not fully in accord on the question of the desirability of a cease-fire in the area. The New Zealand initiative in the Security Council had not been followed up because the Chinese Communists had refused to appear. The President, in his message to Congress on the Joint Resolution on the defense of Taiwan, had said that he hoped a situation of stability could eventually be created in the area so that it would not be necessary to fight. If we could get a commitment from the Chinese Communists not to use force, naturally we would be glad to receive it. There is no present program for following up the Chou En-lai offer. Several foreign government representatives on their own initiative are trying to find out what Chou En-lai meant. The United States Government is not pursuing the matter.

Ambassador Koo said he had heard of efforts by the British, the Pakistani, the Indians, and the Indonesians to follow up the Chou En-lai initiative. He asked if he was correct in understanding that there had been no action by the United States Government in response to the Chou En-lai statement.

The Secretary said that this was correct. He referred to the President’s statement that we should “wait and see”.³

Mr. Robertson said he assumed that the Ambassador had read the Secretary’s remarks at his press conference of April 26.

The Secretary said that he was surprised that the press had construed his remarks as being in conflict with the Department’s press release of April 23. The Secretary said there was nothing in his statement which was in conflict with the Departmental release. The Secretary felt that the press interpretation of his reaction was misleading. He had not contradicted the Departmental statement concerning the necessary role of the Chinese Government in any discussions where its interests were involved. On the contrary, he had confirmed this. His statement had emphasized that we were concerned with ascertaining if there was any good faith in Chou En-lai’s offer, and he had tried to make it clear that the items mentioned in the Departmental statement were not preconditions for talks. We are still seeking a cease-fire. If the Communists agree to a cease-fire, naturally we will be very happy.

Ambassador Koo said he was pleased to hear this explanation. He observed that a cease-fire agreement is usually considered to require more than one party. He did not understand precisely how a cease-fire agreement could be achieved when there would be only one contesting party involved in the talks.

The Secretary said that the Ambassador’s point was well taken. The term “cease-fire agreement” was loosely used. What we wanted was a Chinese Communist assurance that they would not attack Taiwan and Penghu, Quemoy or Matsu. We would be glad to have such an assurance.

Ambassador Koo said it was clear that his Government would not be a party to any cease-fire talks or arrangements with the Chinese Communists. His Government was the other party in the hostilities, not the United States. He asked how the United States could participate in cease-fire talks when it was not engaged in hostilities?

The Secretary said that what the United States wants in effect is a unilateral renunciation of the use of force by the Chinese Communists. He doubted if we would get it. He thought that a situation of de facto cease-fire might be achieved. The Chinese Communists might refrain from a major assault. But he did not expect to get any signed document embodying a cease-fire pledge from the Chinese Communists. He said that we have no present plans to take any initiative as to talks with the Chinese Communists. We have not authorized any representative of any other Government to act in our behalf. He stated that the United States Government did not know in advance of Trevelyan’s recent attempt in Peiping to explore the Chinese Communist offer.⁴

Ambassador Koo asked if he could take it that the United States has not asked any one to act as an intermediary in this matter?

The Secretary confirmed that this understanding was correct.

Ambassador Koo observed that Chou En-lai after his first statement appeared to have retracted part of it. He had made a differentiation between discussions on the easing of tensions, and the “liberation” of Taiwan. He appeared not to have given any ground on the latter, stressing that it was a domestic issue and not subject to any outside interference.

The Secretary mentioned that he had noted this matter in the course of his press conference.

Ambassador Koo asked if the Department had received any reports from representatives of other Governments which might throw light on the Chou En-lai offer.

The Secretary read from a confidential report of a representative of a friendly Government who took part in private conversations with Chou En-lai at Bandung. The extract read by the Secretary quoted Chou En-lai as having said that negotiations must lead to the “liberation” of Taiwan. If the negotiations went forward peacefully, there would be no war. Chou En-lai was further quoted as saying the Chinese Communists would not be intimidated. The report attributed to Chou En-lai a statement that the Chinese Communists in accordance with a saying, “do not act but rather react”.⁵

Ambassador Koo then took up his second topic, asking if the Secretary planned to discuss China issues in Paris the following week?

The Secretary said that at the NATO Council there would be a general report on the world situation. The general statement would include something on the Far East. Mr. Robertson was going to Paris because Indochina matters, especially the Viet Nam problem, would be taken up.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that Taiwan was not on the agenda. But he anticipated that foreign government representatives would ask about developments in the Taiwan area, just as so many Ambassadors in Washington do.

Ambassador Koo said that all sorts of speculations regarding Taiwan were current. His Government was glad that U.S. officials had not contributed to the speculation. He said his Government took it that there was no intention on the part of the U.S. Government to alter its China recognition policy.

The Secretary confirmed that this was correct.

Mr. Robertson said that he was going to Paris solely to discuss Indochina matters.

The Ambassador said he felt that with both Macmillan and Pinay⁶ present, and with Britain and France both interested in Taiwan questions, discussions related to China would be difficult to avoid.

Mr. Robertson said that China matters were not on the agenda.

The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that the Chinese Government had explicit assurances that no negotiations involving the essential interests of the Chinese Government would take place without that Government’s participation. The Secretary said he did not wonder that the Chinese Government was occasionally somewhat anxious. Many meetings and conversations necessarily take place without the presence of Chinese representatives. The Secretary told the Ambassador that the U.S. Government intends to work with the Chinese Government and when there is anything of a concrete nature to discuss, it will be taken up with the Chinese Government.

The Ambassador said his Government was always ready for consultations under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Secretary recalled that there had already been two such consultations under the treaty: The first when he was in Formosa in early March and the second when Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford made a special trip to Formosa in late April.

The Ambassador said in leaving that he believed that he could confidently report that “there would be no second Yalta”.

The Secretary indicated that there should be no grounds for concern along this line on the part of the Chinese Government.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–555. Secret. Drafted on May 10 by McConaughy. Initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.
2. Reference is to the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris, May 9–11; see Document 246.
3. At a press conference on May 4; for text of his remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 459–475.
4. Trevelyan saw Premier Chou on May 9; see Document 248.
5. Reference is to a report by Lebanese Ambassador Charles Malik of an interview with Chou on April 25 which Malik had given to Dulles during a meeting earlier that day. Malik stated that Chou gave him permission to report the substance of their conversation in detail. According to Malik’s report, he responded to the statement summarized here by asking if Chou envisaged, as a result of the proposed negotiations, a complete U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan area. Chou replied that that would certainly be the Chinese proposal and that the United States would doubtless have a counter-proposal. Chou objected to the Department of State press release of April 23, declaring that the Department was laying down conditions for negotiations—the presence of Chiang at the negotiations and the acceptance of a cease-fire—which his Government could never accept, because Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan was involved and because the quarrel with Chiang was an internal matter. Malik told him that the U.S. Government was complex and required time to reach a final decision; he urged Chou not to regard any response as definitive until it came from the President or the Secretary of State. A copy of Malik’s report, bearing a notation in President Eisenhower’s handwriting that it should be returned to Dulles, is filed with a covering memorandum of May 10 from Special Assistant to the President Dillon Anderson to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 683A.93/5–1055) Dulles’ May 5 conversation with Malik, an exchange of views of the Bandung Conference, is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. (Ibid., 670.901/5–555)
6. French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay.