246. Editorial Note
The situation in the Far East, especially with regard to Taiwan and the offshore islands, was a subject of discussion at the May 10 sessions of the North Atlantic Council, during the ministerial meeting of the Council in Paris, May 9–11, 1955. Secretary Dulles gave an exposition of United States policy, stating that the United States was not committed to defend Quemoy and the Matsus unless an attack on them was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores but noting that the Chinese Communists had never made any distinction between the offshore islands and Formosa. He expressed the hope that a situation would develop in which both the Communists and the Nationalists continued to assert their claims but neither side tried to pursue them through the use of force.
During the subsequent discussion, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak asserted that opinion in Europe differed from that in the United States on two points: 1) Europeans saw a great difference between the defense of Formosa, the juridical status of which was at least debatable, and the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, which were clearly Chinese; and 2) they differed with the United States view of Chiang Kai-shek, considering that his role in Asia was over and that his statements were frequently dangerous. Spaak suggested that recognition of the People’s Republic of China was inevitable. It would be necessary to deal with Chou En-lai to resolve the Formosa question, just as it had been necessary to deal with him to make peace in Korea and Indochina.
In reply, Dulles again noted that the Communists did not accept any distinction between Formosa and the offshore islands and declared that, in case of an attack on the offshore islands, the decision as to whether the attack was directed against Formosa would be made by the President. He defended Chiang Kai-shek as a man of personal integrity, sincere anti-communism, and loyalty to his friends and commitments. He also pointed out that Chiang had made a formal agreement not to attack the mainland except in the case of imminent necessity of self-defense or in agreement with the United States. Records of the discussion (NATO Secret Verbatim Records (C–VR(55)20 and 21)) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 444. The discussion was summarized in Poltos 2279 and 2282 from Paris, May 11 and 12, 1955. (Ibid., Central Files, 790.5/5–1155 and 790.5/5–1255, respectively)
In his report to the National Security Council on May 19 concerning the Paris meetings, Secretary Dulles stated, according to Gleason’s memorandum of the discussion, that “he had had a quite lively conversation with Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, on the [Page 561] subject of U.S. policy in the Far East, of which M. Spaak had inclined to be critical.
“The President inquired in what respects Spaak had been critical of our policy in this area. Secretary Dulles replied that Spaak did not hold a high opinion of Chiang Kai-shek. In response to this point of Spaak’s, Secretary Dulles asked the Foreign Ministers if they thought highly of Chou En-lai. Secretary Dulles said he then went on to defend Chiang Kai-shek as a stalwart Christian, a man of personal probity, and a statesman who had been consistently loyal to the engagements and commitments he had made to the United States. While there were, of course, many European statesmen who were thus loyal, they were relatively few in Asia. Secretary Dulles commented that this exchange had been productive of healthy results.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, dated May 20; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)