Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

238. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State¹

New York, May 4, 1955—8 p.m.

750. For the Secretary and Key (IO). Re American fliers in China. I called on Hammarskjold today at my request, following my conversation with the Secretary.² I began by recalling that he had said his trip to Stockholm would be a “climax” in his effort to secure release of the US fliers.³ I asked him whether he thought there had been such climax.

He said he felt his trip to Stockholm had brought the whole matter closer to the “ultimatum stage”, that Chou had clearly indicated he had made up his mind in January to settle the question, but had laid the delay to US over-flights in connection with the Tachen evacuation and the incident of the plane to Bandung. Chou had done this with both himself, Hammarskjold, and Prince Wan and had gone even farther with Wan and said his intention had not changed.

At present, Chou had not replied to two sets of communications, which Hammarskjold felt he must reply to. The first were the letters from the families of the fliers, and the second was the question which Hammarskjold asked the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm: “Is there anything that I (Hammarskjold) can do to facilitate the release of the prisoners”? Hammarskjold emphasized this question was based on the fact the Chinese Communist Ambassador was talking about “how” and not “whether” the fliers should be released. He felt it was clear to the Ambassador that Hammarskjold’s question was based on the assumption that Chou intended to release the fliers.

In reply to my questions, Hammarskjold said he had made it clear that the Chinese Communists understood that they were expected to provide a reply in writing to his question. He felt Chou could not reply by a simple yes or no. He now either had to say he was going to release the fliers or say how Hammarskjold could help him do so. If Chou should not answer, Hammarskjold, as a result of his Stockholm talks, could increase the pressure and demand to know why Chou had not gone ahead and released them, since he had not replied. He said that he felt there was a 99 percent probability of the Chinese Communists’ intention to release the fliers.

I said that an intention to release was all well and good, but the question of time was very vital, that maybe it was true that in China time was not a factor, but in this country, time was a factor and we could not wait forever. I therefore asked him what further steps he contemplated.

He said that a report to the GA was a “must”. I dwelt on this and said: “you mean you definitely intend to file a report which will lay it on the line”? He said emphatically: “of course, of course”. He would intend to do it “in due time” before the GA, although, he said, “maybe the report will be much earlier”.

He feels his trip to Stockholm has brought the whole thing much closer. He said if there was no reply before he went to Europe, which is May 21, he would then send a message to Chou by the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping. “I will tell him that I must make a report”, Hammarskjold said, “if there is no answer by June 1, then I will feel constrained to report that it has been a failure”.

In reply to my question, he said he had no objection to our mentioning the fliers at the same time we negotiated for release of civilian prisoners, but cautioned that we should make it clear that the fliers were in a different category than the civilians and that the fliers were military POWs.

When I asked him how he felt about using intermediaries such as India or Pakistan to bring moral pressure to bear on the Chinese Communists, he said, “not on the fliers just now. I have as much chance as the US has to get India or Burma or Thailand into play and I have had no response at all from India or Burma to my request. After this next phase is over, it may be opportune”.

I said that we were drawing near to the end of our rope here in the US and the situation could become ugly. I pointed out that for a people that was as intense as the American people, we had shown great self-control from the beginning of this whole episode. I pointed out that men of very different political viewpoints had now joined in active condemnation of the retention of the fliers.

He said he was well aware of this. He recalled that on his return from Peking in January I had said that what he wanted me to do was to prevent politicians from acting like politicians and newspapermen from acting like newspapermen.⁴ He thought that a lot had been achieved and that both politicians and the press had shown great forebearance. He gave every impression of being determined not to let all of his efforts go to waste and not to let the matter peter out. I believe that he intends, if his efforts fail, to say so in a candid manner.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/5–455. Secret; Priority.
2. In telephone conversations earlier that day, recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau, dated May 4. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
3. Telegram 691 from New York, April 14, reported that the Secretary-General told C. Stanton Babcock, Counselor of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, that he had requested the meeting with the PRC Ambassador in Stockholm on April 23 at which he intended to make a “much sharper démarche” than he could do in writing and that “he wished his trip to Stockholm to create in Chinese Communist minds impression of kind of climax.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/4–1455)
4. On January 13; see Document 11.