212. Message From the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford), at Taipei1
[Message No. 2.] The President returned to Washington and in conversation expressed himself along the following lines:
He reiterated that your mission is to find in conversation and mutual exploration some solution to the Formosa–Quemoy–Matsu problem that will be acceptable both to Chiang and to US. Beyond doubt the Generalissimo recognizes that a strong and favorable American public opinion is necessary to his continuing existence and future success. While the point could be made on your own initiative [Page 502] that the participation by the United States in conflict merely to save the offshore islands would cause a serious damage, if not a loss, of American public opinion, it is highly desirable that we avoid the position of urging upon him a solution which he cannot accept.
The President is anxious that an area of understanding be reached that politically and psychologically avoids any indication of a lessening of our interest in the Generalissimo and at the same time achieves his recognition of the fact that the United States cannot be committed because of reasons important both to him and to this country to going to war in defense of the offshore islands. If the Generalissimo thought it necessary or desirable, he probably could reorganize the island defense so as to diminish markedly the numbers involved and depend mainly on field fortifications and intensive firepower for the islands’ defense supported by his own air and naval forces. With such an arrangement and with United States forces contributing to the defense of Formosa proper he could inflict tremendous losses on any attackers of the offshore islands.
Under no circumstances should there be allowed to develop an atmosphere which could preclude further conversations and negotiations, nor should there be any appearance of trying to force the Generalissimo to adopt a course which is unacceptable to him.
The President further asked me to convey his warm personal greetings to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, and to tell them how intensively and sympathetically he has studied this and its related problems.
FYI In connection with the conversation outlined above, there is, I am assured, no intention to alter instructions transmitted to you by Secretary,2 but rather an amplification of certain points already covered. I will of course immediately discuss with Secretary upon his return Monday.3
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4–2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 222043Z from CNO to Chief MAAG, Formosa. A memorandum of April 23 from Hoover to Dulles, not sent, records the origin of this message. It states that on April 21 the President discussed with Hoover the instructions given to Robertson and Radford and dictated a message, attached to Hoover’s memorandum, labeled “President’s 1st Draft” and dated April 21. It reads as follows:
“The President wants me to reiterate that your mission is to induce the Generalissimo to propose some solution to the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu problem that will be acceptable both to him and to us. Beyond doubt he recognizes that a strong and favorable American public opinion is necessary to his continuing existence and success. While the point could be made on your own initiative that the participation by the United States in conflict merely to save the offshore islands would cause a serious damage, if not a loss, of American public opinion, it is highly desirable that we avoid the position of urging upon him a solution in which he himself does not believe. The President agreed to the general purport of the paper that Secretary Dulles gave to you before your departure but he, the President, goes back to the proposition that politically and psychologically, we should lead the Generalissimo into making a proposition that will neither commit the United States to war in defense of the offshore islands nor will constitute an implied repudiation of the Generalissimo by this government.
“These are the reasons that the President has so much favored an outpost conception for the offshore islands, highly organized and well supported by Chiang’s main forces and with assurances to him of the additional American help, as well as other general commitments, that you already know about.
“Under no circumstances should there be allowed to develop an atmosphere which would preclude further conversations and negotiations.”
“The Secretary’s message will emphasize the need for sympathetic understanding in dealing with Chiang.”
Hoover’s memorandum states that he thought that “there were so many inconsistencies between this message and the instructions which had been given to Robertson and Radford, that it would be impossible for them to carry out their mission without an entirely new approach.” He and Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson redrafted the message and gave it to the President, who made further revisions in it. This draft, as revised by the President, is also attached to Hoover’s memorandum, labeled “2nd draft” and dated April 22. Hoover, Murphy, and Phleger made additional revisions in this draft, and Hoover cleared the final message with the President. (Ibid.) A copy of the Hoover–Anderson draft is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.
↩ - Neither any written instructions nor any record of oral instructions given to Robertson and Radford before their departure has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library. Robertson apparently took with him to Taipei both the document printed as Annex “E” (attached to Document 207) and the draft policy statement of April 8 (Document 194). Both are in the file sent to Dulles with Robertson’s April 27 memorandum, cited in footnote 1, supra.↩
- April 25.↩