213. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, Washington, April 22, 1955, 4:25 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Under Secretary Hoover
- Admiral Carney
- Captain Mott (?) USN2
I joined the meeting when it was about half over. Discussion centered on possible formulas for controlling the sea area between Formosa and the Chinese mainland, in connection with questions left by Admiral Radford and Secretary Robertson on their departure—the idea apparently being to avoid the use of the term “blockade,” because of its closely defined international significance, in favor of a more flexible term such as “maritime zone.”
There was discussion of the military feasibility of instituting and maintaining such control, with mines, surface vessels, air support, etc.—this in conjunction with the feasibility of and support requirements for any attempt to evacuate ChiNat forces under ChiCom attack from the forward islands. There was also discussion of the legality of the “maritime zone” proposal. It was brought out that the proposal could only be effective with full cooperation of Chiang.
The President indicated that the considerations are so elusive that the matter is difficult to put into writing. He is hoping that Chiang comes to see the value of changing his stand voluntarily; Chiang must realize that his greatest asset in his present situation is U.S. public opinion. He felt that the “maritime zone” proposal could not be considered, except after a voluntary evacuation from the offshore islands or their capture after serving as out-posts. The President stressed, however, he did not wish to force Chiang into anything for which the U.S. would then be responsible, but wanted Chiang’s decision to be made voluntarily. He regarded the islands as being fairly valuable and appropriate for defense with small forces, supported to the maximum with mines and obstacles and other artificial items, and given ChiNat air support in case of ChiCom attack.
Colonel, CE, US Army
Staff Secretary