Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

194. Draft Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State¹

[Washington,] April 8, 1955.

FORMOSA

I. Basic U.S. Interest in Taiwan (Formosa)

1. The security of Taiwan (including the Pescadores) is essential to the best interests of the United States and the Western world. In unfriendly hands, it would seriously threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific.

2. The U.S., as a matter of enlightened self-interest, is resolved to help to maintain a Free China Government on Taiwan. This is a fundamental position. It is based not only on loyalty to a faithful ally and a sense of responsibility to the people of Taiwan, but also on the desire to see the restoration of freedom to the Chinese people on the mainland. We believe that opportunities to restore freedom will arise, and that they can be most effectively used if there is a Free China Government on Taiwan.

3. For a year or two after the Chinese Nationalists had gone to Taiwan, when the Communist revolution had not yet fully consolidated its hold on the mainland, hopes could realistically be held of an early overthrow of the Communist régime by armed invasion of the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists on their initiative. This possibility seems now to have disappeared. The Communists have had more than five years to consolidate their position and entrench their police system. Now, the Republic of China may have to await an opportunity of a different character and one that cannot be wholly of its making or timing.

4. While the precise nature and timing of such opportunities cannot be forecast, they might arise from:

(a) a schism within the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, of the sort shown by Soviet and Chinese experience to be chronic in societies which have no orderly means of effecting a change in government;

(b) uprisings by the Chinese people against the economic or other hardships to which they are subjected by the Communist régime;

(c) a Communist attack upon Taiwan of such a character that the effort, coupled with the inevitable reply, would dislocate the inadequate sea and land communication system of mainland China and break the hold of the Chinese Communists on all or important parts of the mainland; or

(d) the outbreak of a general Far East war through Communist armed attack which would bring into play the Manila Pact or bring about renewed warfare in Korea, thus engaging the Chinese Communist forces on more than one front.

5. An alert and well-placed Free Chinese Government, with power at its disposal and with influence on the mainland by reason of its conduct and example, might be able to profit from these opportunities. That the ChiComs are aware of this fact is shown by the intensity of their antagonism toward the Republic of China.

II. U.S. Policies with Respect to Taiwan

6. The U.S. has given support—moral, economic and military—to the Republic of China on Taiwan in an ever-mounting degree. Total economic aid over the last five years amounts to $527,000,000, and military aid can be valued at $948,000,000. Both economic and military aid are now at a new peak.

7. In 1950, after the Communist aggression in Korea, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was ordered to protect Taiwan against possible attack. It is true that at the same time it was ordered to prevent attack from Taiwan against the mainland, but this provision was withdrawn in February 1953, while the orders to the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan remained in force.²

8. In 1954, the U.S. concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, so as to bring its treaty relations with that Republic into harmony with the system of mutual defense treaties linking the U.S. with other countries of the Western Pacific area.

9. The U.S. has continued to recognize the Republic of China as the Government of China and its influence in this respect has doubtless been an important factor in leading to the continuance of such recognition by some forty other countries. The U.S. has also taken the lead in preventing the substitution of the Chinese Communist régime for the Republic of China in the U.N.

III. U.S. Position with Respect to the Offshore Islands

10. The U.S. has never considered that retention by Nationalist China of the offshore islands was essential to the U.S. interests described in Section I and the U.S. policies described in Section II.

11. The U.S. did not agree to the proposal of the Republic of China that these coastal positions be included in the treaty area defined by the Mutual Defense Treaty, and that position was in turn accepted by the Republic of China. In consequence, the only treaty obligation of the United States to the Republic of China is to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores and to react to an armed attack “directed against” those islands.

12. Public Law 4, which authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the United States in the Taiwan area, conforms to the treaty. It authorizes the defense of areas related to Taiwan only if their defense is judged by the President to be “required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores”.

13. It follows from the foregoing that it would be very difficult for the President to make an unconditional decision to defend the coastal positions. If, for example, future developments should lead the President to judge that the Chinese Communists did not have the intention of taking Taiwan by force, he would not be justified in using the armed forces of the United States to defend the coastal positions.

(#14 deleted)³

IV. Factors Favoring U.S. Participation in Defense of the Offshore Islands

15. The offshore islands are useful, though not essential, to the defense of Taiwan itself. They block exit from two harbors, Amoy and Foochow, which would be natural points for the staging of a sea invasion of Taiwan. Possibly, however, this function could largely be replaced by an increased use of naval craft which could blockade the two harbors.

16. The principal military reason for seeking to hold the two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon morale in Taiwan. That morale and the military efficiency of the Chinese National Army are essential to the defense of Taiwan. From the combination of recent military operations, negotiations, public statements and military understandings the Chinese Nationalists may well have the impression, and certainly have a strong hope, that the United States would participate in an active defense of the islands. The risk exists, therefore, that for us to refuse to participate in the defense of the offshore islands and to seek to persuade Chiang to adopt any other plan than all-out defense, would result in a collapse of morale on Taiwan and the loss to the free world of that bastion of strength.

17. Further retreat in front of the Chinese Communists could result in mounting aggression on the part of the Chinese Communists and the discouragement of Asian opposition to the spread of communism. Loss of the Matsus and Quemoy—if attributed to our timidity—might create doubts in Japan and concern among our friends in Asia, particularly in Thailand, the Philippines and Korea.⁴

V. Factors Against U.S. Participation in Defense of Offshore Islands

18. Geographically, the offshore islands are difficult to defend. Their location minimizes rather than maximizes the usefulness of our overwhelming sea strength, which would be particularly effective in defending Taiwan. The offshore islands are subject to constant harassing and concentrated destructive artillery fire from the mainland, and are so situated that an amphibious attack against them could be carried forward to the landing stages during the hours of darkness of a single day. In view of the overwhelming land forces available to the Red Chinese and the strength of the bombardment that could be brought to bear on the islands, any successful defense would necessarily require counteraction against the mainland of China itself. For the U.S. to undertake their defense would commit our military prestige to a campaign under conditions favorable to the attacker.

19. It is the view of U.S. military advisers, based on recent intensive study, that a defense of the coastal islands cannot be assured without the use of atomic weapons. It seems likely that certain of the major offensive capabilities of the Chinese Communists as against the coastal positions could not be nullified without so considerable a use of atomic weapons that there would be risk of large civilian casualties through after-effects, and indeed the inhabitants of Quemoy and even Taiwan might not be immune under certain atmospheric and wind conditions. Aside from the effects on U.S. interests, it would seem doubtful that the long-range interest of the Republic of China would be served by a defense of the coastal positions involving a use of atomic weapons with consequences which might destroy any hope of good will and future favorable reception of the Republic of China by the Chinese people.

20. Even though a defensive effort might be temporarily successful, it would in no way stabilize the situation or remove the existence of the permanent threat. Both the U.S. and Nationalist Chinese governments would be led to immobilize more and more military strength for the single purpose of defending the offshore islands. A disproportionate amount of our disposable, mobile reserves would be held down indefinitely to this one spot, because our prestige would have become involved, even though involuntarily.

21. The islands are not important for a return by the Chinese Nationalists to the mainland, assuming opportunities as described in Section I above should make this feasible. The mainland area immediately opposite Taiwan is largely separated by mountains from the portions of China which are economically and politically significant, and there are few means of communication. If it were intended to have a landing operation from Taiwan to the mainland, a direct operation, preferably south of Amoy or north of Foochow, would be more appropriate. Yet, as long as Chiang has significant forces deployed on these offshore islands, he is committed to full-out defense. He is gambling his whole position in Taiwan and his future as a useful agent in helping to drive communism from China against a local and possibly temporary success in a precarious defense of two island groups which are militarily weak.

22. The Taiwan problem cannot be considered in a vacuum; it is not isolated from the rest of the world. Western opinion appears to back the American determination to assist the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of the main position, that is, Taiwan. But world opinion preponderantly questions outside intervention to resist any Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. Because the world generally regards the coastal islands as part of the mainland, our active participation would forfeit the good opinion of much of the Western world, with consequent damage to our interests in Europe and elsewhere; it could affect very disadvantageously our treaties with Japan and in the Southeast Asia region. We have ample forewarning of the adverse character of world reaction that would follow any such action on our part, especially if we felt compelled to use atomic weapons. Moreover, there is much opposition in our own country to becoming involved militarily in defense of the offshore islands, and in the event of such involvement our people would be seriously divided at the very time when increased risk of global war would underline the need for unity. If conflict in that region should spread to global proportions, we would be entering a life and death struggle under very great handicaps.

23. It is desirable that the Chinese Nationalists rather than the United States assume the burden of any fighting near the China mainland. There are two important reasons for this:

(a) It is the Chinese Nationalists, not the Americans, who are contenders for the support of the Chinese people. It is the discipline, loyalty, and will to fight of the Chinese Nationalists which has been consistently disparaged by Communist propaganda. A battle which they won, on their own, or even a battle which they lost under conditions which would reflect high honor on the vanquished in the face of overwhelming odds, would be far more advantageous to the Chinese Nationalists than a defense which could be sustained only by United States might, particularly if that was expressed in atomic terms.

(b) It is furthermore of the utmost importance that the issue should not take on the appearance of a struggle between races. A strong effort is being made by the Chinese Communists to create all-Asian sentiment against the white West. This anti-Western attitude was strongly reflected by Nehru’s recent speech. It is important that if there is fighting around Taiwan, it should be primarily a fight between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, and not a fight between the “white” Westerners and the “yellow” Chinese.

VI. The Basic Problem

24. Analysis of the above factors leads to the clear conviction that militarily and politically we and the Chinese Nationalists would be much better off if our national prestige were not even remotely committed to the defense of the coastal islands, and if greater force, ready to take advantage of unforeseen opportunity, were concentrated on Taiwan and the Pescadores.

25. It is in the interest of the Republic of China, as well as in our own, that the Republic of China not commit its prestige to the defense of these perhaps indefensible positions so deeply that, if they should be lost, all future possibilities now represented by the Republic of China would also be lost. The lesson of Dien Bien Phu should not be forgotten. Originally conceived to be an outpost of transitory value, it gradually became converted into a symbol, so that when it fell, all else fell with it. The same mistake should not be repeated in regard to Quemoy and Matsu, islands which without U.S. aid are probably indefensible, and even with it may not be defensible except by means which would defeat the larger common purpose.

26. The only logical course of action is to attempt to bring about reasonable changes in the situation rather than to remain inert awaiting the inevitable moment of decision between two unacceptable choices.

27. The real problem is to determine:

(a) What solution would be most advantageous to the U.S. from the standpoint of treaty obligations for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, solidifying American and free world opinion behind us, sustaining the morale of Chiang and his forces on Taiwan, and securing the approval and support of friends in Southeast Asia and in the neighboring islands?

(b) What can we do to bring about, in cooperation with Chiang, the essentials of such a solution?

VII. Proposed Course of Action

28. The offshore islands should be regarded as outposts to be held so long as there is advantage in doing so. Whether they should be evacuated or held, and if held, how strongly held, should be decided in these terms. The islands should, however, be regarded as subject to relinquishment if and when this will serve the major cause: the defense of Taiwan. The U.S. should seek to persuade Chiang to adopt this point of view.

29. Without suggesting that the offshore islands should now be abandoned, it should be made manifest that neither Chiang nor the U.S. is so committed to the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus that, if they should fall, there would be danger of a collapse of the free world position in the region.

30. If Chiang prefers an outpost role to evacuation, the offshore islands should be garrisoned in accordance with the requirements of outpost positions: vigilant reconnaissance, a maximum of protective works, properly sited automatic weapons and light artillery, together with effective obstacles, defensive mine systems, etc., all reinforced by adequate stores of ammunition, food and medical supplies, thoroughly protected and available to the garrison as needed. Excess personnel (except such civilians as might decline to leave) should be removed from the islands.

31. The Nationalist forces on Taiwan should assist these garrisons by aerial and sea reconnaissance and fighting support. Plans for defense should be fully coordinated between the forward units and the mobile elements in Taiwan. Adequate plans should be made for determined and persistent defense. Evacuation should take place (if this finally becomes necessary) only after the defensive forces had inflicted upon the attackers heavy and bloody losses.

32. The process of concentrating, equipping and training of troops on Taiwan itself should be expedited. The United States should continue to help in this process, in order to give to Chiang the greatest possible strength in support of his outpost troops on Quemoy and the Matsus, and in preparing and sustaining the bulk of his forces for the defense of Taiwan and ready to take advantage of any favorable political, military or economic circumstances on the mainland.

33. Certain additional elements of American forces should be stationed on Taiwan, particularly of the kinds useful in the protection of that island against external attack and to maintain internal morale. For example, the U.S. could: (a) increase the aircraft squadron presently there to a wing, thus allowing Chiang’s own air force to devote its exclusive attention to the support of the forward positions; (b) station some additional anti-aircraft artillery for the protection of fields, allowing Chiang’s units to be devoted to the protection of cities; (c) station there a couple of regiments of Marines; (d) support all these forces with certain logistic formations. The presence of these forces would have a very salutary effect in giving visible evidence to all that the United States is irrevocably committed to the defense of Taiwan, would be of great assistance in speeding up the training of Chiang’s forces and making certain of prompt replacement of losses, particularly in the air force, and would enable our own naval units to take a more active part in defensive arrangements, allowing Chiang’s forces to be devoted more to active support of the forward positions.

34. To protect the prestige of Chiang and the morale of his forces, any alteration in military and political planning should obviously be developed under his leadership; above all, there must be no basis for public belief that the alterations came about through American intervention or coercion.

35. An essential ingredient of success will be the skill of the American negotiator picked to present the whole matter to Chiang. The crux of the negotiations must be that Chiang must convince himself of the validity and value of the suggested program. This means that the negotiator must be a man whom Chiang trusts and who is himself convinced of the soundness of this program.

VIII. Benefits of Proposed Course

36. The worldwide political advantages of such an arrangement would be incalculable. These advantages are so clearly implied in the earlier parts of this memorandum that it is not necessary to enumerate them. For ourselves one of the greatest advantages would be a practically solidified public opinion in the U.S. As for the Republic of China, Chiang and his government would be assured of a much firmer political support throughout the free world than they now enjoy.

37. While it is true that under this proposal one or more of the forward positions might eventually be lost, such loss would occur only after the defending forces had exacted a fearful toll from the attackers, and Chiang’s prestige and standing would be increased rather than decreased as a result of a gallant, prolonged and bitter defense conducted under these circumstances. His own losses would be inconsequential both in personnel and in material—the losses of the Communists should be very great indeed.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The document, labeled “Draft”, was a revision by Dulles of an April 7 draft prepared in the Policy Planning Staff, which combined Eisenhower’s April 5 memorandum, Document 189, and Dulles’ April 4 memorandum. Concerning the latter, see footnote 3, Document 188. (April 7 draft with Dulles’ handwritten revisions: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda; copy of April 8 paper: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China) The draft was sent to the President with a covering note of April 8 from Dulles stating that he planned to discuss it with Radford at lunch. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda) The source text is filed with a note by Ann Whitman, April 9, stating that the Secretary discussed it with the President and was to confer with Walter Judd and possibly General Wedemeyer. The document was not revised as was apparently intended; see Document 207.
2. See the extract from President Eisenhower’s message to Congress of February 2, 1953, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 140.
3. Parenthetical insertion in the source text.
4. The statements in paragraphs 16 and 17 go beyond the agreed intelligence estimates. Alternative paragraphs based on those estimates are being prepared. [Footnote in the source text.]