Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

207. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Augusta, Georgia, April 17, 1955, 12:30 p.m.¹

Augusta, Georgia, April 17, 1955, 12:30 p.m.

I showed the President a draft of a statement of position with reference to the defense of Formosa. The paper which I gave him was a copy of the annexed paper marked “A”.² This paper in turn was a slight variant from the annexed paper marked “B”, which had been prepared by Anderson, Radford, Hoover, Robertson and myself on Saturday,³ which I had shown to Mr. Allen Dulles on Sunday morning.

We discussed this paper at some length.

The President was hesitant about giving up his idea of a temporizing holding of Quemoy and Matsu by the Chinese Nationalists as “outposts”. He said he disagreed with Radford’s view that this was impractical. He said that Malta had held out.

I expressed the view that if we were not going to allow the Chinese Nationalists to attack Chicom build-ups before they were completed and if we were not going to help the Chinats after they were completed, then it would be better to encourage a clean break and a substitute of the sea “interdiction”.

The President finally agreed that we would leave this up to the Chinats. He was very insistent that we should not be in the position of exerting coercion upon them, but that we should make clear that we were not willing to have our side strike the first major blow as between Formosa and the Mainland, and that also we would not defend merely Quemoy and Matsu.

The President personally interlined on page 1 of Annex A a suggested rewording of paragraph 2. This page with the President’s handwriting on it is annexed hereto as “C”.⁴

The President also felt that before we had gone into the program of paragraph 5,⁵ there should be a paragraph emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the Chinats and ourselves to win US and world opinion. He outlined what he had in mind, and I dictated it as a new paragraph 5. See Annex “D”.

The President expressed some doubts about the “blockade”. I said that I felt that this could clearly be justified as a measure of self-defense, particularly after Quemoy and Matsu had been evacuated so that there could be no question but what the Chicom build-up was for an attack against Formosa, and so long as we made clear that if the Chicom Government renounced the effort to take Formosa by force, the interdiction would be lifted.

After some discussion on this matter, the President agreed.

Also, the President suggested that paragraph (a) and (b) of the program should be reversed so that the “interdiction” paragraph should come after a paragraph indicating that the Chinese Nationalists would first take the decision as to whether or not to attempt to hold Quemoy and Matsu under the conditions indicated. Paragraph 5 and the renumbered paragraph 6, with subparagraphs (a) and (b) reversed, I dictated to Miss Bernau in the President’s presence. They are in the above-referred-to Annex D.

The President approved this with a couple of linguistic changes indicated in pencil. Thereupon, the entire paper was retyped by Mrs. Whitman as “E”.

After the President read over this document, he raised a question as to whether the stationing of atomic capabilities on Formosa should be done “with public knowledge”. He put parentheses, with a question mark, around this phrase on the original.⁶

With reference to the proposed restatement of US policy, the President indicated that he would be prepared to make this, although he believed that in the long run, unless the unexpected happened, it might be necessary to accept the “Two China” concept. He spoke of “5–10 or 12 years.”

With reference to the “high level meeting” [6(e)],⁷ I said that this might require him to go somewhere to meet the Generalissimo. He asked where I had in mind. I said possibly Honolulu. He suggested San Francisco as [was?] as far as he would care to go; but later on indicated that he would not absolutely hold out against Honolulu. He recognized that this meeting would be important from the standpoint of the Generalissimo’s prestige.

The President and I had a little discussion about the question of procedure and timing. He said he did not think there was any necessity for Admiral Radford or Mr. Robertson to come down to Augusta to see him, but that he thought they should proceed promptly to Taipei. We both recognized that time was of the essence. I said that at some stage, it would be necessary to feel out the Congressional leaders, and I might in a vague way mention the project to Senator George at breakfast next Monday morning (April 18),⁸ but that in general I did not think there should be any disclosure until it was found out whether the idea was acceptable to the Generalissimo. The President asked whether I thought of mentioning it to Roger Makins. I said that I might hint at it, but that I doubted whether it was wise to push the UK on this matter at this stage, particularly when they were very sensitive to their domestic political situation.

I expressed the opinion that in fact the program outlined would immeasurably serve to consolidate world opinion, and the President said that he shared that view.

The President authorized me to proceed accordingly.

JFD

[Annex] “E”

1. Since January the Chicoms have been engaged in an intensive build-up of an arc of jet air fields in and surrounding the Fukien area opposite Formosa. This build-up, unless checked by heavy, continuing and costly air attack by the Chinats, will soon (perhaps by June) create a situation such that the Chicoms would, in all likelihood, dominate the air over Matsu and Quemoy.

2. It is the United States view that the military disadvantages of this build-up should be accepted at this time rather than that the United States now be responsible for initiating active hostilities which could readily spread into a major war. It is believed that the moral and political advantages of this avoidance of the fighting initiative offset the military disadvantages. A principal reason is the certainty that such initiation of hostilities would react unfavorably, perhaps to a decisive degree, upon American public determination to support Chiang. Neither is it part of American policy to engage in hostilities merely to defend Quemoy and the Matsus.

3. The Chinats cannot properly complain of this decision. In connection with our Mutual Defense Treaty, it was agreed:

(a) that Quemoy and Matsu would not be included in the treaty area;

(b) that the use of force from the territories under Chinat control would be a matter of joint agreement subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense;

(c) that military elements which were a product of joint effort and contribution of the two parties, and which are needed for the defense of Formosa (such as the Chinat air force), will not be used outside of Formosa without mutual agreement.

4. The problem is how to meet the situation without seriously impairing the defensibility of the treaty area through either (a) loss of the value of Quemoy and Matsu as defensive outposts; (b) loss of Chinat troops and equipment; (c) loss of “face” to Chinats and United States.

5. In this connection it is important that the leaders of the Republic of China should recognize that our common interests require the recognition that public opinion in the United States, in particular, and the other friendly countries, in general, should be favorable to them and that this in the long run is indispensable to the realization of their aspirations; that this opinion is now gravely disturbed about Quemoy and Matsu; and that the United States and the Republic of China need to cooperate to bring about a more acceptable posture.

6. Accordingly, the following program is suggested:

(a) If, under the conditions outlined in paragraph 2, the Chinats desire to evacuate Quemoy and Matsu, the United States would provide air and naval cover for the orderly evacuation of the Chinat troops and equipment and, to the extent the civilian population desire, for their evacuation, all as in the case of Tachens.

(b) If Quemoy and Matsu are thus evacuated and unless and until the Chicoms in good faith renounce their avowed purpose to take Formosa by force, the United States will, as a measure of self-defense, join with the Chinats to institute and maintain an interdiction of sea lanes along the China Coast from and including Swatow in the south to approximately Wenchow in the north, so far as contraband is involved. This would be designed to prevent the seaborne receipt by the Chicoms of supplies, which would promote their aggressive build-up on the Mainland opposite Formosa.

This interdiction would serve a triple purpose: it would replace Quemoy and Matsu as defensive blocks to the staging of a seaborne attack on Formosa from Amoy and Foochow harbors; it would materially curtail the present heavy seaborne movement of POL and like supplies into the Fukien air field area—an area which cannot be easily supplied by land; it would demonstrate that the United States is prepared to take strong measures in the defense of Formosa.

(c) In order further to reinforce its serious intentions regarding Formosa, the United States would station on Formosa, (with public knowledge,)?⁹ atomic capabilities in the hands of U.S. units, additional anti-aircraft equipment, an air wing, and forces of United States Marines.

(d) Further to avoid any inference that there is weakening political support of the Republic of China, President Eisenhower would publicly reaffirm the present policy of the United States not to recognize the People’s Republic of China and to continue to seek to prevent its admission to the organs of the United Nations, and, in this connection, his willingness to invoke, if necessary, the veto power in the Security Council. (This would be a statement of United States policy, not a bilateral commitment.) Furthermore, the United States would seek further diplomatic and treaty support for the Republic of China.

(e) A high level meeting will be arranged to confirm the foregoing, if this seems desirable.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 18.
2. Of the five annexes, only Annex “E” is printed.
3. April 16.
4. The President did not reword paragraph 2 but added two sentences. The first two sentences of paragraph 2 of Annex “E” are identical with paragraph 2 of Annex “A”; the last two sentences of paragraph 2 of Annex “E” appear in the President’s handwriting on Annex “C”.
5. Similar in substance to paragraph 6 of Annex “E”.
6. The President’s copy, labeled “President’s Draft” and marked as here indicated, together with several earlier drafts, including preliminary notes in Dulles’ handwriting, are in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda.
7. Brackets in the source text.
8. A memorandum of conversation by Dulles dated April 18 states that he told Senator George the President’s view that the Nationalists should not be authorized to attack the mainland airfields. The Senator said “he supposed that was the correct course although he himself was not entirely clear but what we should let the Chinats attack the Chicom buildup” and expressed concern that Quemoy and Matsu could become a “generally divisive force” in the United States. Dulles then told the Senator in confidence that the President planned to ask Radford and Robertson to go to Taipei to discuss the problem with Chiang and that “we were seeking a solution which would minimize the Quemoy and Matsu aspect of the matter.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Senator Walter George)
9. On the source text, the question mark appears above, rather than after, the words in parentheses. The parentheses and question mark were added by hand to the typed copy, just as on the President’s copy (see footnote 6 above).