180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 30, 1955, 3:35 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Operation Oracle
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, International Organization Affairs
- Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
- Mr. G. R. Laking, New Zealand Minister
. . . . . . .
The Secretary observed that we also were “not enamored” with the proposals. The situation, as he saw it, was that there were now three main courses open to us: (1) We could go ahead and table a resolution under circumstances which, however, might compel the UK publicly to dissent; (2) we could accept the Eden proposal which, in the Secretary’s opinion, was evidence that Mr. Eden had moved forward to a certain extent, or (3) we could do nothing.
The Ambassador asked for the Secretary’s view about the possibility of moving ahead in April when the USSR is in the Chair. The Secretary replied that he would not consider this an insurmountable obstacle: On previous occasions it had been possible to obtain action in the Security Council when the Soviet was in the Chair and Sobolev appeared to be more reasonable than some of his predecessors.
The Ambassador then asked whether the Secretary felt as strongly as he had previously about proceeding in the Security Council.
The Secretary replied that he would be inclined to go along with Mr. Eden’s view that it would be inadvisable to stir up a row in the Security Council before the Bandung Conference. It would, of course, have been preferable had a resolution been tabled since this would have enabled our Asian friends to point at something definite when the subject of Formosa is raised at Bandung. It would have enabled them pointedly to ask why the Chinese Communists were opposed to a cease-fire. However, in the present circumstances, the Secretary felt it would perhaps be better to sit it out a bit longer.
The Secretary stated that consequently we are trying to bring our viewpoint to the attention of free Asian governments since there appears to be little doubt that the Chinese Communists will speak about U.S. aggression on Formosa in the Bandung Conference. Our Asian friends would be given a good briefing. They would be reminded for example that under the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty no benefits inured to non-signatories and that consequently so far as third powers are concerned, the title to certain islands still remains with Japan. This had purposely been placed in the treaty because of the Kuriles but of course it applied equally to Formosa so far as Chinese Communist pretensions to title might be concerned.
The Secretary stated that if a big-scale attack looked imminent then we would want to move in the Security Council.…
. . . . . . .
[Page 431]The Secretary expressed doubt whether it would be possible short of coercion to persuade the Chinese Nationalists to relinquish the off-shore islands. Certainly this would not be possible unless there were some adequate makeweight and even then there would remain doubts about the morale and reaction of the Chinese forces on Formosa.
The Secretary repeated that for the moment he thought it would be best to defer any action at least until we had heard from Australia about the Menzies proposal2 and he suggested therefore that for the time being no action be taken on Eden’s proposals.…
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–3055. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- Document 154.↩