Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

154. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, March 14, 1955, 3:05 p.m.¹

MTW MC–3

Washington, March 14, 1955, 3:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Australia
• Robert Gordon Menzies, Prime Minister
• Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador to the United States
• Arthur Harold Tange, Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs
• United States
• John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State
• Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Prime Minister Menzies opened the conversation by asking the Secretary to outline the area of differences between his position and that of Australian Foreign Minister Casey and of Eden with reference to Formosa and the offshore islands. The Secretary replied that the differences were compounded of two elements. First, a misunderstanding of the United States approach to the problem and, second, the question of judgment as to the best way of achieving the same objective.

The Secretary said there cannot be at this time a categoric assertion that we are or will not defend Matsu and Quemoy Islands. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, our obligation is to defend only Formosa and the Pescadores. The Senate Resolution (PL 4) gives the President authority and discretion to defend such related areas as he considers to be necessary to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. It was not possible to say in advance what kind of action by the Red Chinese may be judged as the beginning of an attack on Formosa. Under present conditions, with Red propaganda emphasising that the “liberation of Formosa” is the objective of its present action, it would be difficult to say that an attack on Quemoy and Matsu was not in fact the predecessor of an attack upon Formosa. When there is a change in these circumstances, we have no obligation to defend the islands per se. The Secretary stated that he felt sure that Eden understood the United States position but that it seemed to be difficult for the English Public to do so.

In the second place, it seems to be the feeling in the House of Commons that the defense of Formosa could never be aided by the defense of Quemoy and Matsu and therefore these islands should be promptly given over to the Communists. It is all very well, said the Secretary, to speak of putting 100 miles of blue water between the Red Chinese and the United States on Formosa but it would be even safer in the eyes of United States isolationists if we put 6500 miles of blue water between the Red Chinese and the United States. If it were possible to renounce the islands with no other factors involved, that would be one thing, but in reality we could not ignore the psychological effect upon the Army and Government of the National Republic of China which would be involved in a succession of retreats in the face of Communist threats. Furthermore, the mainland of China is the ancestral home of the Chinese on Formosa. Hope of being able to return is a tremendous factor in maintaining morale. Any action fostering a spirit of defeatism and loss of hope might well be the cause of serious defection both in the army and possibly in some elements of Government. The United States does not have the troops to take the place of those on Formosa and it is essential that we do everthing possible to bolster and maintain the morale of Chiang, his troops and his government.

The Secretary referred to the political rivalry on Formosa and mentioned the Generalissimo’s son Chiang Ching-kuo as the possible leader of anti-American defection. (Robertson does not agree with CIA intelligence casting doubt upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s allegiance to the free world nor does Ambassador Rankin.)

The Secretary referred to his conversation with Chiang dealing with the role of Free China in which he emphasized that in his opinion the constant talk about an armed reconquest of the mainland minimized the continuing and important role that his government must be prepared to play. Opportunities might arise and probably would arise but they could not be created by the Republic of China alone. Rather, they probably would be created by happenings on the mainland, such as, splits between the Communist leaders as had taken place in Soviet Russia, the possibility that the Chinese people might be goaded into revolt and the further possibility that Chinese Communist aggression might precipitate a general war against China. Chiang agreed with this reasoning and that his government must be kept strong in order to take advantage of such eventualities but stated that this long-range approach presented a most difficult problem from the morale standpoint.

The Secretary went on to emphasize to Menzies the effect which a succession of withdrawals might have upon the morale on Formosa and the possibility of being faced with a situation which would make difficult the defense of Formosa itself. Under present circumstances, he pointed out, we cannot take a positive position as to what we will defend and will not defend. It seemed to us that the British were inclined to look at the problem from the military viewpoint alone, despite these very real political and psychological aspects. Everyone should now understand, said the Secretary, that we do not want to get into a war with Communist China. We were in one in Korea and took great pains to get out. However, we intend to defend Formosa and it seems to us that our friends should be willing to accept our judgment as to the best method of doing so.

Menzies stated that he wished to clear up two points. One, Chiang’s army was sometimes referred to as an aging army. Does this mean that there are no recruits? The Secretary replied that until recently this was true but now recruiting was being made from the Formosans. Both agreed that this was a stabilizing factor. Mr. Menzies’ second question was what would be the effect on the morale of Chiang’s forces if, as a quid pro quo for giving up the Offshore Islands, a group of nations joined with the United States in guaranteeing the defense of Formosa. The Secretary replied that he had suggested a similar proposition to Eden but had had no response. The Secretary asked Robertson his opinion as to the effect on morale. Robertson replied that as the UK recognized Red China as the legal government of China, Chiang might interpret such an arrangement as limiting his role to Formosa and for this reason, he thought that the Generalissimo would be opposed. The Secretary, however, said that if the UK, Australia and New Zealand would join with the United States in guaranteeing Formosa, this might perhaps enable Chiang to give up the Offshore Islands. Menzies thought that such an arrangement should help Chiang’s morale in that it would be assurance that the fall of the Islands would not be a first step to the fall of Formosa but in reality would represent the last step which the Red Chinese could take. The Secretary agreed with Menzies that the Islands were vulnerable to attack and stated that in his opinion they could not, in the last analysis, be held without the use of atomic weapons. Certainly, if the Islands could be abandoned without seriously affecting morale, it would be highly desirable to do so.

The Secretary reiterated again that constant retreat was likely to have a disastrous effect not only upon the morale of Formosa but upon public opinion of all Southeast Asia as well, citing the uneasiness created in the Philippines and Magsaysay’s statement that he could not accept President Eisenhower’s invitation to visit the US during the Formosa crisis. The Secretary said he had been thinking hard of some way to offset the unsatisfactory aspects of the situation and he thought Menzies’ suggestion had merit. Did he (Menzies) think the UK would be likely to go along? He, the Secretary, did not think so. Menzies agreed saying that he thought Eden’s political opposition at home would prevent his doing so at the present time.

Ambassador Spender asked if there was any evidence of a buildup around Matsu and Quemoy. The Secretary replied that guns were being moved into position around Quemoy but there was no great indication of preparation for an immediate invasion. As to the Matsu Islands, the Reds were apparently bringing into position long-range Russian guns which could reach the Islands.

The Secretary said that he would like to give further thought to Menzies’ suggestion. Menzies emphasized that while public opinion in Australia would likely be in favor of holding Formosa, there would be no support for going to war over the islands. He was impressed, however, with the Secretary’s point that the morale factor not only involved Formosa but Indochina, Malaya and all Southeast Asia, as well.

The Secretary said that he was impressed on this last trip by the fear which had been inspired by the power of Communist China.

A discussion followed as to the military capability of Red China. Menzies said he thought Churchill under-estimated its strength whereas countries around the perimeter over-estimated it.

The Secretary referred to the different problems posed by public opinion in the UK, Australia, and the United States. Menzies said that Australian opinion would support a war fought in the defense of freedom. There would be no support for a war in support of governments per se and certainly no support for going to war over the offshore Islands. The Secretary replied that the United States is not going to fight for Quemoy and Matsu either. Whatever we do will be done as part of our defense of Formosa. Menzies said that he understood our position and further, if the United States gets involved in a great war, we could count on Australia being in it too. But, he said, there is a great difference in reaching that position by the full support of public opinion and of getting into the war with a half-hearted support.

The Secretary asked what would be the feeling in Australia on the question of a blockade of the China coast as a possible substitute for the defense of Matsu and Quemoy. He pointed out the serious situation posed by the Aruba with jet fuel oil and 36 other vessels now on the way to Red China ports with strategic war materials. Menzies asked if we would propose to indicate to Mao that if he attempted to take the islands by force we would impose a blockade. The Secretary said that might be one consideration but we might also suggest to Chiang a blockade in lieu of a defense of the islands. Tange inquired whether this would be an act of belligerency or whether it could be based on the UN resolution barring strategic materials to Communist China.² The Secretary said that he did not know whether the present resolution would cover this case or not.

[Here follows discussion pertaining to Indonesia and Malaya.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 439. Secret. The source text bears no indication of the drafter. Robertson’s draft, with handwritten revisions by the Secretary, is ibid., Central Files, 793.5/3–1655. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Resolution 500(V), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on May 18, 1951; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1988.