181. Memorandum of Discussion at the 243d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 19551
Present at this meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Others present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley for the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Postmaster General (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel, the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 2–6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 2–6); the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Cutler, Dodge and Rockefeller; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Press Secretary (for Item 1); Mr. Dillon Anderson, NSC Consultant; Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Items 1–4); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
[Page 432]There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1–4: “Importation of Communist Periodicals,” “Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions,” “Review of Military Assistance Program,” and “Government Employee Security Program.”]
5. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security
[Here follows Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles’ briefing of the Council with comments relating to Germany.]
As the second item in his briefing, Mr. Dulles read the current report of the IAC Watch Committee2 on the situation with respect to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. There was no indication, according to the report, of a major assault on any of these islands in the near future.
The National Security Council:
Noted an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to (1) the imposition by the East German Government of new taxes on trucks entering Berlin from West Germany; and (2) the Watch Committee’s current estimate with respect to the possibility of Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands.3
6. Presentation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Radford briefed the National Security Council on the kind of war plans which the United States might resort to if it became involved in hostilities with Communist China in the Formosa and related areas.4 He described the status of the Chinese Nationalist forces and the change in priorities for U.S. equipment for these Nationalist forces since the situation had become serious last September. He went on to describe both the Chinese Communist and the Chinese Nationalist order of battle before going into the plans of the United States.
At the conclusion of Admiral Radford’s report, Secretary Dulles expressed considerable concern about the political repercussions of [Page 433] the proposed use of atomic weapons against Chinese Communist military targets which would be used against the offshore islands and Formosa. Admiral Radford replied that precision atomic weapons would be used, and that except in one or two instances no large cities or concentrations of civilian population were involved in the targets.
Secretary Dulles then inquired about ways and means of “taking out” Chinese Communist artillery emplacements in areas adjacent to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Admiral Radford thought that these might be taken out by resort to conventional weapons, but that such a decision would have to be taken by the Commander-in-Chief.
General Ridgway suggested the desirability of a coordinated intelligence estimate as to the probable number of civilian casualties which might be estimated if the plans outlined by Admiral Radford were to be implemented.
The President said that he could not help but feel that we are underestimating the sanity of the Chinese Communists. It seemed to him that our very great military capabilities against them should surely give them pause before they undertook a resort to military measures to seize the offshore islands in defiance of the United States.
Governor Stassen said that he was quite sure that if the Chinese Communists clearly understood the intentions of the United States they would not move.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.5
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 1.↩
- The Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee was an interagency committee with the mission of providing the earliest possible warning to the U.S. Government of hostile action by the Soviet Union or its allies endangering U.S. security. The report under reference has not been found in Department of State files.↩
- This constitutes NSC Action No. 1369. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)↩
- A memorandum dated March 26, from Cutler to the President stated that Admiral Radford would present the “Formosan matter” at the March 31 NSC meeting. Cutler sent a copy to Secretary Dulles with an attached copy of Section III of his March 11 memorandum, quoted in footnote 6, Document 150. The attachment bears a note in Cutler’s handwriting, “as sent by me to Radford for whatever assistance it may be”. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2655)↩
- This sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 1370. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)↩