Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

179. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, March 30, 1955, 12:30 p.m.¹

Washington, March 30, 1955, 12:30 p.m.

BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LUNCHEON MEETING²

THE FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT:

• President Eisenhower
• Rep. Carl Albert
• Rep. Leslie C. Arends
• Rep. Clarence Cannon
• Rep. Robert B. Chiperfield
• Rep. Thomas S. Gordon
• Sec. Dulles, State
• General Persons
• Rep. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
• Rep. John W. McCormack
• Rep. Sam Rayburn
• Rep. James P. Richards
• Rep. Dewey Short
• Rep. John Taber
• Rep. Carl Vinson
• Rep. John M. Vorys

Agenda—The President pointed out that the meeting had no formal agenda but would be a full and free discussion of any and all problems pertaining to our foreign relations. He emphasized his desire to conduct our foreign relations on a truly bipartisan basis and stated that he and his people are always willing and eager to have the comments and suggestions of anyone on both sides of the Aisle.

[Here follows a summary of Secretary Dulles’ presentation concerning European developments and a possible four-power conference.]

Formosa—Mr. Dulles then discussed fully and frankly the situation with respect to Formosa. He indicated that he had returned from his recent trip with great concern as to the Formosan situation—that the Chinese Communists were arrogant and more or less drunk with power because of their recent successes in that part of the world. He mentioned, in this connection, the following:

a. The Korean War when the Allies were on the Yalu River at the time of entrance of the Chinese Communists—and concluding that war in control of virtually half of Korea.

b. Spectacular success at Dien Bien Phu—resulting in communization of a large portion of Vietnam.

c. Evacuation of Tachen Islands by the Nationalist Chinese for which the Communist Chinese take the credit.

He indicated that in their mind (Chinese Communists) these and other successes had been obtained with practically no interference on the part of the Allies and are almost an indication that the free world was not only taking reverses but “almost asking for more.” Mr. Dulles quoted a diplomat as saying that Chou En-lai had made the following statement: “There will be a war with the United States and we may lose as many as one hundred million men (Chinese) but there will still be four hundred and fifty million left.” Mr. Dulles pointed out that this sort of statement may be for propaganda purposes, but on the other hand might well indicate the thinking of the people who are now heading the Chinese Communist movement. He was frank in saying that we did not know just what the Soviets are thinking and doing with possible respect to the encouragement of the Chinese Communists in their intentions to capture of Formosa. He made it clear that all the Communist propaganda had been directed to the capture of Formosa and the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek, but that none of it had been specifically directed to the capture of Quemoy and the Matsus as such. He stated that the men in the Kremlin might well be considering the idea that a move to capture Formosa by the Chinese Communists would serve the purpose of engaging the United States in that area, causing us to use atomic weapons with the resulting great propaganda value to the Communists that would come out of such an approach. He pointed out that the artillery replacements [emplacements], etc., now being constructed by the Chinese Communists could be knocked out only with atomic weapons and that the use of these weapons could well result in a “fall out” which in turn might kill many thousands of Chinese. Mr. Dulles further pointed out that we must consider the effect on our atomic stockpile of any appreciable use of atomic weapons in such a manner. On the other hand, he indicated that the Soviets must recognize the fact that a war on Formosa would require them to greatly step-up their delivery of military equipment and supplies to the Chinese Communists and that they may not be ready to do this.

In bringing out the factors that must be considered in an effort to determine the Soviet intentions, he referred to a visit last winter of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Peiping on which occasion Khrushchev made a ringing speech in denunciation of the United States for interference in the Formosan situation and the necessity of Formosa being made a part of the Chinese Communist State.³

In discussing the possible timing of an attack on Formosa, Mr. Dulles spoke of the coming Asio-African conference and indicated that the Chinese Communists might well like to attend such a conference as “a great peace loving nation” and consequently not take any action until after the conference was completed. He further indicated that one good factor in assessing what might take place was the propaganda line being put out by Peiping—that before any new move on their part, the Chinese Communists usually went to some length to condition their people and the world through very strong propaganda. He stated that, whereas the propaganda aimed toward an attack on Formosa had until very recently been 25% of the total propaganda being put out, it now had dropped to roughly 5%.

Formosa Resolution—Mr. Dulles pointed out that the resolution which the Administration had requested of the Congress and which the Congress had practically unanimously approved was deliberately made to indicate that we were going to assist in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. He emphasized that these areas and only these areas were included in the resolution and that the United States has no specific obligations as such to assist in the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus. He stated that this was done so that the Flag and the prestige of the United States would not necessarily be involved in any operations pertaining to these islands. He further indicated that this line of action was taken so as not to make known to our enemy just what our plans and moves would be in case they took offensive action. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the speedy and practically unanimous approval by the Congress of the Formosa resolution was in his opinion one of the greatest factors in deterring military action on the part of the Chinese Communists and in building up free world morale in that area.

Quemoy and the Matsu Islands—Mr. Dulles indicated that our allies really had comparatively little knowledge of the intricacies of the situation which we face with respect to Quemoy and the Matsus. They look on them as comparatively contiguous islands which by nature belong to the mainland. They fail to consider the tremendous morale effect that the loss of these islands might well have on all the peoples in that part of the world—that we also have to consider most seriously the morale effects of the loss of these islands on the ChiNats on Formosa—that there are adequate troops available to defend Formosa unless there are some internal defections in Chiang’s Army. We must remember that all of his people came from the mainland and left their families there in many instances and hope sometime to return to the mainland. Mr. Dulles indicated these as some of the factors involved in the decision we would have to make with regard to Quemoy and the Matsus in case they were attacked. In reply to a question, he indicated that the only way in his opinion there could be a withdrawal before hostilities from Quemoy and the Matsus without incurring most serious morale reaction would be for Chiang Kai-shek to decide on his own that such a withdrawal is in the best interest of the Chi-Nats—otherwise, the morale reaction on the ChiNats and other people in that part of the world would be very bad.

Questions

After Mr. Dulles’ presentation, the President opened the meeting to questions—indicating that he and Mr. Dulles would attempt to answer as fully and frankly as possible any questions anyone might have. Practically all of the ensuing questions were directed to the Formosan situation with particular emphasis on our possible participation in the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus.

Speaker Rayburn stated his understanding of Mr. Dulles’ remarks to indicate that in the event of an attack on Quemoy and the Matsus, the United States would find itself participating. The President elected to answer this question. He stated that actually we have not made that decision and will not make it until we are in possession of the particular circumstances surrounding such an attack. He stated that it is a problem that he and Mr. Dulles live with 24-hours a day and actually is the most difficult problem with which he has been faced since he took office. The President further discussed the possibilities, depending upon the type of attack. He stated that if an attack developed of such proportions that there was a reasonable chance of the Chi-Nats winning it by themselves with the equipment which we have and will make available to them, he personally would hold off and give them the opportunity. He feels that such a victory by the Chi-Nats would have a tremendous morale effect not only on Formosa but throughout that part of the world. On the other hand, he indicated that it would be necessary for the Chinese Communists to either capture or neutralize the islands before carrying out an attack on Formosa, as these islands blocked the two most important harbors from which an attack could be launched.

Mr. Richards asked Mr. Dulles how much consideration was being given to the morale effect on Formosa and that part of the world in case we let Quemoy and the Matsus fall into Communist hands. Mr. Dulles emphasized that this is one of the most important factors involved in the entire situation and again reiterated that it is a factor that is not understood by our Allies. He spoke of his efforts to clarify this on his recent visit to Canada.

Speaker Rayburn indicated that our Allies are not giving us any support in that part of the world. The President brought out that in his opinion the British and the French and our other Allies would support us wholeheartedly in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and that there are no indications that they would be just lukewarm about it, but that the question bothering them was the possibility of beginning a war over Quemoy and the Matsus.

Mr. McCormack stated that he was not sure in his own mind just what should be done, but he recognized that the Congress had put the matter in the hands of the President and that whether or not he (Mr. McCormack) agreed with the President’s decision when made, he certainly would support it.

Mr. Gordon and Mr. Vorys asked questions similar to the foregoing on the Formosan situation.

Mr. McCormack told the President that he would like to ask a question but that he would understand the President’s reasons if the President did not feel he was in a position to answer such a question. The question was: “Have developments in the international situation caused any change in the Administration’s proposal to reduce the size of the Army?” The President stated that he would be glad to answer such a question. He stated frankly that there had been no change in his plans to reduce the size of the Army. He felt that such a reduction was justified. He indicated that in the kind of warfare in which we would find ourselves engaged, he foresaw no chance to transport divisions to overseas bases in the early stages of such a war. He indicated his strong hope for a ready Reserve but went on to state that such Reserve, as well as the National Guard troops, would undoubtedly find itself initially in the position of restoring order around our major cities after an attack. He further stated that if there were a desire to spend an additional $2 or $3 billion on defense he (the President) felt that this money could be used to much greater advantage in extending and improving our early warning service (even with the knowledge that the equipment would become obsolete at an early date), and the procurement of more aircraft. He went on to say that he has given great consideration to the particular matter of the size of our Armed Forces and that his decision comes in part from his experience acquired as an infantry soldier.

The general discussion was free and frank. All the questions indicated a genuine concern and there were no efforts made to put anyone on the spot. Everyone was permitted to ask any questions that he might have, and the meeting was not broken up until Speaker Rayburn indicated to the President that it was necessary for the Members of Congress to get back to the House Floor.

Possible Remarks to the Press Re Meeting—Regarding what might be said to the Press as the meeting was breaking up, Speaker Rayburn stated that he didn’t propose to say anything to the Press and didn’t think that anyone should say anything unless the President himself wished to do so. The President indicated that he would not make a statement but he saw no reason why any member of the group should not tell the Press that the group had discussed all matters of interest with respect to the foreign situation.

L. A. Minnich, Jr.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. According to a note on the source text, Minnich prepared the memorandum from notes supplied by the office of Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (retired), Deputy Assistant to the President.

2. A similar luncheon meeting with Senate leaders, held on March 31, was recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Minnich. (Ibid.)

   Participants listed below not previously identified include: Carl Albert of Oklahoma, House Majority Whip; Clarence Cannon of Missouri, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee; Thomas S. Gordon of Illinois, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; John Taber of New York, ranking minority member of the House Appropriations Committee; and John M. Vorys of Ohio, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

3. Reference is to a speech made by Khrushchev in Peking on September 30, 1954; see telegram 483 from Moscow, October 2, 1954, in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 674.