Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

176. Message From British Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State¹

[London,] March 28, 1955.

Thank you very much for your further message about the offshore islands.² My colleagues and I are grateful for your willingness to defer action in the Security Council at the present moment. Please do not think we do not understand the difficulties of your position. We recognise the danger that the Chinese Communists may precipitate a conflict. That incidentally is one reason why we are anxious to find some means of getting Chiang Kai-shek out of the coastal islands before an attack can develop. Meanwhile we are at one with you in wanting to deter the Communists from attacking. But I do not consider that action in the Security Council will deter them. Our Chargé d’Affaires at Peking thinks that it is more likely to cause them to attack than to restrain them.

As regards the wording of the draft resolution, a number of things have happened since our minute of January 26 was agreed. The Chinese have shown us clearly that they are not prepared to agree to any cease-fire and the Soviet Union have equally made clear that they do not think any solution can be found through the Security Council. Moreover, in my statement of March 8³ I stated Her Majesty’s Government’s position on this whole question. It would be very difficult indeed to debate this issue without any reference to our formally expressed views. Pearson’s recent speech⁴ shows how the free nations differ over Quemoy and Matsu. We share the Canadian’s views. Thus any debate in the Security Council far from rallying world opinion might only serve to reveal our differences. No amendment of the wording of the resolution could avert this danger.

You are worried about Bandung. I agree. The Chinese will certainly do all they can to get the conference to give them its approval and we must try to stop this. But I believe that if we initiate a debate in the Security Council the Asians will simply regard us as expressing Western views and as trying to forestall them at Bandung. I am sure that the effect on Nehru and U Nu for example would be bad. I think we would do far better to work on the Asian leaders themselves to warn them against giving the Chinese the green light and to urge them to press for the renunciation of force. This is likely to appeal particularly to the Asians. Pressure from the Asians is likely to be more effective in deterring the Chinese than anything we can say in the Security Council, which they have discounted already. I have therefore instructed Her Majesty’s Representatives in the countries in which I think we may have some influence to urge this on the Governments to which they are accredited. It would be very helpful if your Ambassadors could do the same.

In all this I do not want you to think that we are trying to exercise a veto on you. We are not. We are concerned only about the best means of achieving our common objective. I understand your desire to bring in the Security Council at the shortest possible notice if there should be a flare-up. It occurs to me that the New Zealanders might help in this now by instructing their delegate to send a letter to the President of the Council on the following lines:—He had hoped for a meeting of the Security Council at which all interested parties would have been represented; since this could not take place he thought that his colleagues would be interested to see the resolution which he would have put forward had the meeting happened; he was therefore circulating it but he was not asking for it to be discussed at present, particularly since fortunately no fighting was now taking place. If something like this were put forward I have it in mind that it might enable you to claim the necessary priority for the resolution to be discussed first at a later meeting if the need arose. If you think there is anything in this perhaps our experts in New York could examine the idea more closely. I assume of course that we would not press the issue to a debate without further consultation as envisaged in paragraph 5(D) of the Working Party’s report. Will you let me know what you think of this? It might go part way to meet your objective though I still think the less action we take in the Security Council before Bandung the better.⁵

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret. Received with a covering note of March 29 from Scott. A copy, attached to a memorandum of conversation by Key, dated March 29, is also in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2955.
2. Transmitted in Document 171.
3. See footnote 3, Document 144.
4. In a statement on March 24 in the Canadian House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Pearson had stated the Canadian view that a distinction could be made, politically and strategically, between Formosa and the coastal islands and had urged a peaceful solution to the crisis. The text of the statement is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda.

5. Telegram 5023 to London, April 1, transmitted the following message for delivery to Eden:

   “Dear Anthony:

   “Thanks for your message of March 28. We are considering the suggestion that the present Resolution should be submitted by New Zealand in a letter to the President of the Council. I appreciate that in making this suggestion you have gone a considerable way to meet our point of view and for this I thank you. On the other hand I see difficulties in explaining why this curious and novel course is being followed. Foster.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4–155)