177. Letter From President Eisenhower to British Prime Minister Churchill1
Dear Winston: I have no doubt that you and your Cabinet find it necessary, just as we do, to ponder daily on the world situation and to calculate as carefully as you can every move to be made as you strive to straighten out some specific portion of the tangled mess that we call international relations.
Of one thing I have always been completely confident—that you are as fully dedicated as I am to promoting between our two governments and our two peoples clear unity of purpose and common understanding of the obstacles we face so as to double our strength as we push forward in the search for an honorable peace.
It is because of this confidence in our common intent—indeed, I hope I may say our indestructible personal friendship—that I venture to bring up an apparent difference between our two governments that puzzles us sorely and constantly. Although we seem always to see eye to eye with you when we contemplate any European problem, our respective attitudes toward similar problems in the Orient are frequently so dissimilar as to be almost mutually antagonistic. I know that you could make the same observation regarding us; possibly this fact troubles you and your associates just as much as it does us.2
[Page 419]I beg of you not to think of this letter as a complaint, or as any effort to prove that we are right and you are wrong. In writing to you in this vein I am interested in one thing and one thing only—how can we and our two governments come closer together in our thinking so as to achieve a better result in matters that are serious and fateful for both our nations? I know that frankness on my part will not be interpreted as accusation or recrimination.
I assume that the existence of the differences I mention is so clearly, even sadly, recognized on both sides of the water as to require no elaboration. The words Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu typify them today, as Manchuria did in 1931.
The conclusion seems inescapable that these differences come about because we do not agree on the probable extent and the importance of further Communist expansion in Asia. In our contacts with New Zealand and Australia, we have the feeling that we encounter a concern no less acute than ours; but your own government seems to regard Communist aggression in Asia as of little significance to the free world future.
As I once explained to you, we are not interested in Quemoy and Matsu as such. But because of the conviction that the loss of Formosa would doom the Philippines and eventually the remainder of the region, we are determined that it shall not fall into the hands of the Communists, either through all-out attack or, as would appear to be far more likely, through harrassing air attacks, threats and subversion.
The only way in which pressure of the latter type can be successfully resisted is to sustain a high morale among Chiang’s forces. The danger of internal subversion and consequent collapse in Formosa is always present; Chiang feels this keenly and we believe it necessary to help him combat it.
[Page 420]In fact, we feel this is vitally important to the interests of the entire Western world.
Of course I would personally be very happy, both as a political leader and as an ex-soldier who may have a bit of competence in the strategic field, to see Chiang, voluntarily and in accordance with what he believed to be his own best interests, withdraw from Quemoy and the Matsus.
But I am just as unwilling to put so much pressure on him that he might give up the entire struggle in utter discouragement. It’s at this point that you and ourselves seem to part company. But we cannot understand how the free world can hold Formosa except as Chiang provides the necessary ground forces.
Another apparent difference between us that added to our bewilderment occurred in connection with Foster’s recent visit to the Far East. He urged the Government of Laos, while it still has the ability to do so, to clean out the areas in that country where Communist elements are establishing themselves in some strength. The Laos Government is fully justified in taking such action under the terms of the Geneva agreements. When Laotian officials expressed to Foster some concern lest such action on their part provoke attack from the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists, he assured them that aggression from without would bring into play the Manila Pact. This would mean assistance from the other signatories of the Pact to preserve the territorial integrity of Laos.
Some time after this conversation, we heard that both the British and the French Ambassadors in Laos informed that Government that under no circumstances could Laos expect any help against outside aggression, under the terms of the Manila Pact, if such aggression should result from their own efforts to rule their internal affairs.
As a result, we have a situation in which the Communists, in the affected areas of Laos, grow stronger and stronger, and we face a possibility of ultimately losing that entire territory to the Communists, just as we lost North Vietnam.
Another point bothers us. This country believes that the existence of the ChiNat Government confers upon all of us one advantage that is not often publicly noted. Throughout the Far East there are great numbers of “émigré” Chinese. These people, in most cases, possess sort of a dual citizenship—one pertaining to the country in which they reside; the other to China. Up to date, millions of these people have preserved their allegiance to Chiang and have not become Communist cells menacing the countries where they are now residents. This affects the Philippines, Indonesia and, of course, other areas such as Malaya and Hongkong.
This is another fact that points to the very great desirability of sustaining Chiang’s prestige and the morale of his followers. If the [Page 421] Chinese National Government should disappear, these émigré Chinese will certainly deem themselves subjects of the Chinese Communist Government and they will quickly add to the difficulties of their adopted countries. Indeed, where their numbers are quite strong, I believe that their influence might become decisive and that no outside aid that any of us could bring to bear could prevent these regions from going completely Communist. Do not such possibilities concern you?
As we consider such developments and possibilities, it seems to me we cannot fail to conclude that the time to stop any advance of Communism in Asia is here, now.
We have come to the point where every additional backward step must be deemed a defeat for the Western world. In fact, it is a triple defeat. First, we lose a potential ally. Next, we give to an implacable enemy another recruit. Beyond this, every such retreat creates in the minds of neutrals the fear that we do not mean what we say when we pledge our support to people who want to remain free. We show ourselves fearful of the Communistic brigands and create the impression that we are slinking along in the shadows, hoping that the beast will finally be satiated and cease his predatory tactics before he finally devours us. So the third result is that the morale of our friends crumbles.
Of course it is easy to say that this is a gross overstatement of the case. Because the ChiComs have no great fleet and cannot now attack across the seas, it is natural to underestimate their potential strength and the fearful eventual results of the crumbling process. So I believe it critically important that we make a sober estimate of what we are up against.
Two decades ago we had the fatuous hope that Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese war lords would decide, before we might become personally involved, that they had enough and would let the world live in peace. We saw the result.
Yet the Communist sweep over the world since World War II has been much faster and much more relentless than the 1930[’s] sweep of the dictators. I do believe that all of us must begin to look some of these unpleasant facts squarely in the face and meet them exactly as our Grand Alliance of the 40’s met our enemies and vanquished them.
You and I have been through many things where our judgments have not always been as one, but, on my part at least, my admiration and affection for you were never lessened. In this long experience, my hope is rooted that the two of us may bring up some thought or idea that could help us achieve a personal concord that could, in turn, help our two governments act more effectively against Communists everywhere.
[Page 422]My warm greetings to Clemmie, and, of course, my very kind regard to yourself.
As ever
Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A memorandum of conversation by Secretary Dulles, dated March 29, 1955, reads in part as follows:
“I went over with the President the draft of his letter to Churchill about Far Eastern matters and suggested one or two minor verbal changes on the passage dealing with Laos.
“We discussed a memorandum of George Humphrey about Formosa and I pointed out that it would be quite unrealistic to demand formal acceptance by the Chinese Communists of the persistence of the Nationalist régime on Formosa and that while this gambit might be good from the standpoint of domestic opinion, it would almost surely be treated as an insincere effort on the part of foreign countries. I pointed out that I had several times said that we would not require the Chinese Communists to renounce their claims to Formosa, but merely to renounce the effort to take Formosa by force.” (Ibid., Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)
The memorandum under reference has not been found.
↩In a letter dated March 22, to Prime Minister Churchill, the President made the following comments relating to the Far East:
“As you know, I am dedicated to the idea that unless the free world can stand firmly together in important problems, our strength will be wasted and we shall in the long run be ineffective in our struggle to advance freedom in the world and to stop the spread of Communism. I believe it to be especially important that we seek to understand each other’s viewpoints in Southeast Asia, because in that region we have a very delicate—sometimes dangerously weak—situation and one to which the future welfare and fortunes of the free world are definitely related. If we can achieve the kind of common understanding and thinking that we should, then I feel that there will never be any doubts as to this country’s readiness to stand firmly by the side of any other free nation opposing aggression in that region. We have no possessions in that immediate area. Consequently, we cannot be accused of any support of colonialism or of imperialistic designs. We recognize situations that have been properly and legally established and we certainly want to halt Communism dead in its tracks.
“To do this, one of the essentials is a strong and continuous land defense of Formosa. This can be done—certainly under present conditions—only by Chiang Kai-shek and his troops. This in turn means that their morale and their vigor, their training and equipment, must all be adequately assured. Until the time comes that they themselves feel that their morale can be sustained, even though their forces are withdrawn from all of their outlying positions, we must be exceedingly careful of the pressures we attempt to apply to Chiang to bring about such a result.
“Except for this one feature, I agree entirely with the thoughts you have expressed in your former letters on this touchy subject, and I hope also that you have no difficulty of seeing the importance of this morale feature in Formosa.” (Ibid., Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
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