Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

175. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 28, 1955, 4:30 p.m.¹

Washington, March 28, 1955, 4:30 p.m.

PRESENT

• The Secretary
• Mr. Hoover
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. Phleger
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Bissell (FOA[?])
• Mr. Hanes
• (Arrived later, as indicated, Robertson and Allen Dulles)

The Secretary began by outlining a proposed new Resolution for the Security Council,² and indicated that it was designed to try and break our present stalemate which resulted largely from Great Britain’s refusal at this time to honor her earlier commitment concerning “Oracle”. He said that the purpose of the Resolution was (a) to restrain the Chinese Communists from an attack or (b) gain allied support for our position if the ChiComs did attack.

Mr. Bowie, emphasizing that the important thing was to line up the free world behind the defense of Formosa as opposed to the offshore islands, said that he felt the operative paragraph in the Resolution calling for a statement of “intent” by the ChiComs was dangerous (a) because they would not give such a declaration and (b) because someone might then call for a declaration of “intent” by the ChiNats, which they also would never give.

(Mr. Robertson came in at this point)

The Secretary commented that we do not, of course, know the JCS war plans for China, if there should be an attack on the islands or other hostilities in that area. He made the point, however, that atomic or thermonuclear weapons would undoubtedly figure in these plans, and he wondered whether Chiang might not have a feeling that an atomic attack on the mainland as a beginning would be a poor way to gain the support of the Chinese people for his cause. He emphasized that Chiang might, of course, be bothered by no such feelings, but he felt that this idea might profitably be explored with the Gimo.

Mr. Phleger said that we should consider the true and ultimate effect of this Resolution. Either of two things might happen:

(1) The ChiComs would agree not to attack Formosa. In this event, we would effectively be giving them Quemoy and Matsu for such a declaration, and would be placing ourselves in a better moral position at a later date when the ChiComs actually attack Formosa. (This assumes, naturally, that a ChiCom agreement not to attack Formosa is meaningless.)

(2) The ChiComs refuse to agree to any guarantee concerning Formosa (as is most likely). We are then virtually placed in a position where we have to defend Quemoy and Matsu, by having had our alternative suggestion rejected.

Mr. Phleger pointed up the need for a broader decision as to the ultimate ends we wish to achieve before we can profitably speak of tactics.

The Secretary agreed with Mr. Phleger’s conclusion that, if the ChiComs rejected the Security Council Resolution, as is likely, this would virtually commit us to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu; and pointed out that our world position would then be that we were defending these islands only because, and clearly because the ChiComs would not agree to say that they are not going to attack Formosa. It would be clear to the world that all the ChiComs had to do to stop (or not start) a war is to say that they are not going to attack Formosa. Therefore, this entire course of action, the Secretary agreed, would probably result in a military engagement in defense of Quemoy and Matsu, but under optimum conditions of world opinion.

Mr. Bowie felt that this was forcing us into an unnecessarily rigid position, and reverted to his theme that our most important objective should be to line up free world support behind that part of our policy which it would support—namely, the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. He felt that we should and could line up such support by holding out the bait of a peacefully controlled evacuation of the offshore islands which would be accomplished at our recommendation and under our protection.³ He said he felt that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and quite probably even Britain, might be induced to come out and give a specific guarantee concerning Formosa under these circumstances. In this connection, he pointed out Morrison’s⁴ recent statements, indicating his support of the continued freedom of Formosa, and said that this led him to believe that the Conservatives could take such a position, even before an election, without serious fear of making it an election issue.

The Secretary then raised the question of the desirability of placing certain United States ground forces on Formosa—possibly a Marine Division. He commented that some felt this would be a powerful aid to ChiNat morale, as an indication of our intention to stay and to defend that island; and that this would also be an effective anti-subversion weapon, in that a local commander might be willing to deliver over an army if he felt that no fight would be involved, but he would be much more hesitant if he knew that this would mean a full-scale battle. If we had troops there this would unquestionably mean a full-scale battle with American troops.

He also pointed out that when this question had been raised last Saturday in his meeting in Defense, Admiral Radford had raised a number of objections, largely on matériel and logistic grounds: the already crowded conditions in Formosa, the high comparative pay of American troops vis-à-vis Chinese, and resultant social and morale problems.

Mr. Bissell concurred that although the danger of subversion from the top was probably ever-present in the Chinese Army, the prospect of a hard fight would undoubtedly make a real difference in preventing the delivery of an army to the enemy. It would not be any deterrent to the defection of a General as an individual, but this is, of course, a far less serious problem.

He raised the possibility of having Anzus troops, and possibly Philippine troops on Formosa, as well as our own.

The Secretary then threw in for discussion the additional possibility of a blockade of the China Coast.

Mr. Phleger felt that PL 4 granted sufficient authority to institute a blockade.

The Secretary agreed, and indicated that such a blockade must include a major portion of the China Coast, and specifically all the great ports such as Shanghai and Canton.

Mr. Bissell asked if such a blockade would be directed primarily against the ChiCom buildup endangering Formosa.

Mr. Phleger pointed out there is no such thing as a limited blockade, except in geographical terms. Within the blockaded area, all cargoes are stopped. However, he conceded that the most direct and noticeable advantage from our point of view would probably be in terms of crippling the ChiCom buildup endangering Formosa.

He pointed out that a blockade is an act of war.

The Secretary then reverted to the more general theme, and emphasized his unwillingness to get forced into the position wherein the time, the place and the manner of fighting all belong to the enemy. He pointed out that such would be the case if we were to fight in direct defense of the offshore islands, and specifically if we extended the fighting on to the immediately adjacent Chinese mainland which has (presumably) been fortified, built up and prepared by the ChiComs for just such an eventuality. The Secretary asked how we could get away from this position in the present situation.

Mr. Robertson commented that morale is a two-sided matter and that we here are dealing not only with ChiNat morale, but also with ChiCom morale, which has already been fed an exhilarating diet of success, and might well become completely euphoric if given any more success—specifically Quemoy and Matsu. He also pointed out that Quemoy and Matsu are more defensible in military terms than was Berlin; but that Berlin was saved by the resolution of the free world.

The Secretary then threw out the idea of making our response to an attack on Quemoy and Matsu a generalized rather than local response. He said that we might destroy the great POL dumps in China (which, incidentally, can be done with conventional weapons), cut bridges, rail lines and communications generally …; and generally engage in a severe punitive action across the length and breadth of China.

Mr. Phleger again raised the question of where this ultimately end us up, what kind of a permanent solution it produces, and what kind of a permanent solution we are seeking.

The Secretary emphasized that it would be a deterrent to a ChiCom attack on the islands if they knew that our reaction would not be limited in area. He felt that it was no particular deterrent to such an attack for them to be convinced that we would fight, but in a limited area where they are well dug in and prepared.

The Secretary emphasized that another factor not to be ignored was that we cannot splurge our limited supply of atomic weapons without serious danger to the entire international balance of power; and therefore any use which is made of them must be very carefully planned and thought out. The Secretary complained that he felt that none of these things had been adequately thought out in connection with this situation—he had the feeling that we are drifting in very dangerous waters without an adequately prepared chart—that we have not given sufficient thought to the most effective deterrents to a possible war originating in this area. He pointed out, in support of his feeling, that a limited defense of the islands was no great deterrent, that such a limited defense might have to be done two or three or even more times—and it obviously provides no permanent solution. … All of these matters should receive much more consideration and thought.

Mr. Robertson commented that he saw no difference in principle, assuming the islands were attacked, if our retaliation was in the vicinity of Amoy or in the vicinity of Canton—both were on the mainland of China. He would feel that such retaliation should be in the area calculated to produce the greatest effect, rather than the area of closest proximity to the attack.

Mr. Bowie pointed out that if such a policy of generalized punishment were adopted as our reaction to an attack on the islands, this would mean that the islands themselves would probably be lost.

The Secretary agreed, and emphasized that the islands must not be allowed to become a psychological symbol, as in the case of Dien Bien Phu. He outlined his theory of X and 2X—that any time the enemy wished to attain X, we would exact a cost of 2X from them.

Mr. MacArthur said that he had grave worries as to the political and psychological effect of such a “generalized retribution” policy against the mainland of China. He said that if, in response to a local attack, we send our bombers ranging China (and particularly if we use atomic weapons) our purpose may be felt by our allies (and possibly by our enemies) to be the destruction of the Chinese Communists’ regime, rather than the repelling of an attack on the islands. Our allies are confident that any genuine threat to the integrity of the Chinese Communist regime would bring the Soviet Union to her aid, in a military sense, which would mean the beginning of a world war. Any such policy of ours would, therefore, cause our allies to back away, not only in the Far East but probably in Europe, in Africa and all over the globe.

Mr. Hoover commented that our allies have been backing away from our Far Eastern policies in any case, and will probably continue to do so anyway whenever we take a firm line.

The Secretary agreed to an extent, and cited the recent case of the British in Laos, when they undermined our encouragement to the Laotian Government by telling that Government that they felt no outside aid would be forthcoming in the event of a Vietminh invasion of Laos, assuming that such invasion was caused by the Laotians militarily seeking to regain their two Northern provinces.

He reverted to the matter of the new Security Council draft, and raised several questions: Do we want to take any UN action? If so, is this a good draft? The Secretary commented that he thought it was, and he felt it would improve our position—but he agreed that it would only be effective and should only be put forward if we were actually prepared to react to an attack on Quemoy and Matsu, assuming one came. If we were prepared to react to such an attack, however, the putting forward of this Security Council Resolution, he felt, would better our legal and moral position before the world, both in present circumstances and under such an eventuality.

Mr. Bissell commented that if we make a decision to make our reaction to any attack on the islands general across China, rather than specific in defense of those islands, we should take certain specific actions: (1) we should reduce the island garrisons, so that their loss will not be so severe. Such reduction of garrisons will also serve notice that we consider these as outposts rather than as defensible positions. (2) We should institute an obvious air buildup in other parts of the general area, which will demonstrate our intention and preparedness to make such a generalized reaction.

The Secretary commented that, of course, it was essential that if we intended to make such a generalized reaction, we should see that the enemy was fully informed of our intention, as otherwise such a decision would be no deterrent whatsoever.

. . . . . . .

(Mr. Allen Dulles came in at this point)

The Secretary outlined certain portions of the foregoing for Mr. Allen Dulles’ benefit.

Mr. Robertson commented that if we are (if the President is) going to change our (his) mind about defending these islands, we have an awful lot of work to do on Chiang. Mr. Robertson pointed out that we have given Chiang a commitment that we would defend the islands under present conditions.

Mr. MacArthur demurred and said he felt we had given no such commitment.

Mr. Robertson reiterated that we had given such a commitment to his own certain knowledge.

The Secretary emphasized that he did not want this discussion interpreted to mean that the President had necessarily changed his mind. He pointed out, however, that the President is intensely disturbed by the entire situation, and wants every possible avenue of action leading to a possible peaceful and successful conclusion explored thoroughly.

Until now, much of our thinking has been in terms of the presumption that a “declaration of intent” on our part to defend the offshore islands was sufficient to deter an attack, and therefore effectively to achieve their defense. The Secretary feels that this may no longer be a valid assumption, and we must therefore think in other terms.

Mr. Phleger once again brought up the question of our basic objectives. He cited our mutual defense treaties with Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia and other areas of the Far East and of the world; and he pointed out that this situation is a current test of what was actually to be done to defend a threatened area, at least part of which was a treaty area. What type of permanent over-all solution are we striving for in this area and within the context of our treaty obligations in this area—and therefore, by implication, in all other endangered areas within our treaty framework. What are our basic objectives? Which of these possible courses of action we have been discussing best furthers our achieving them?

J. W. Hanes, Jr.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Hanes. In the list of participants Bissell is identified with the Foreign Operations Administration, presumably this is Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Special Assistant (for Plans and Programs) to the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Reference is apparently to a draft resolution dated March 27, which bears no indication of the drafter but was based on several previous drafts by Phleger with extensive revisions in Dulles” handwriting. The operative portion reads as follows:

   “Calls upon the People’s Republic of China promptly to make clear its intent not to attack Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghus (Pescadores) with force, and to abstain from any such attack;

   “Calls upon the Republic of China reciprocally to abstain from using Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghus (Pescadores) as a base for armed attack against the Mainland of China;

   “And declares that it remains seized of the question.” (Ibid.)

3. Bowie recommended this course in a memorandum of March 28 to Dulles. (Ibid.)
4. Herbert S. Morrison, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the United Kingdom.