Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/7–1854: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

secret

Geneva, July 18, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 656. Repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 65. Tonight after restricted session, at Tran Van Do‘s request, Bonsal and Getz met with him and Ngo Dinh Luyen at Vietnamese villa.

Principal Vietnamese concern was explanation statement made at today’s meeting (Secto 654¹) and proposal contained Secto 633.² Do emphasized they did not wish to sabotage Mendes-France or possibility of conference agreement. Vietnamese delegation feels that in present state of military inferiority they must carry fight to Viet Minh on political grounds. To do this, they have chosen strong stand against partition, which will contrast with Viet Minh willingness to reach agreement on this basis. This stand, they believe, will evoke extremely favorable response of Vietnamese people, and permit Diem Government to attract popular support in post-armistice period.

This new “position” of Vietnamese delegation intended as primarily psychological move which will not prevent their acceptance agreement based on US-UK seven points, which they consider minimum. They intend speak with all friendly delegations tomorrow morning, beginning with French to make sure there is complete understanding.

Bonsal expressed understanding their difficult position but stressed hard realities with which we are faced along lines Under Secretary’s talk with Do this morning (Secto 652³). Conversation ended on friendly note with Do explaining delegation could not return to Vietnam without having made this stand.⁴

Smith

1. Dated July 18, p. 1431.
2. Dated July 17, p. 1418.
3. Dated July 18, p. 1426.
4. The U.S. Delegation transmitted an additional report on this conversation in telegram Secto 658, July 19. It read as follows: “During conversation with Tran Van Do (Secto 656), Bonsal asked Do purpose Tran Van Huu‘s visit to Geneva last week. Do said Huu had seen Pham Van Dong to sound out possibilities of coalition government. When Bonsal expressed surprise, Do said Huu would do anything to get into power. Do said he realized impossibility coalition government from experience in 1946. Even one Viet Minh in coalition would lead to disaster.” (396.1 GE/7–1954)