396.1 GE/5–254: Telegram

Restricted Session of the Seven Powers on Korea, Geneva, May 1, 3:30 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State 1

confidential

Secto 69. Repeated information Seoul 31, London 106, Paris 166, Tokyo 19, Moscow 37. Pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Restricted meeting held yesterday afternoon in small conference room at Palais from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Secretary, Pyun, Bidault, Eden, Nam Il, Chou En-lai and Molotov present, each accompanied by three or four [Page 175] assistants. General Smith, Robertson and Johnson accompanied Secretary. Secretary suggested and Molotov agreed to Eden as informal chairman on basis his turn chairman of the day. Seating was informal, non-Communist group contiguous.

At opening Secretary expressed satisfaction ability hold informal talks on assumption all were seriously seeking solution to problem faced by conference. Secretary then distributed “memorandum of principal points to be resolved in connection with the creation of a united and independent Korea”2 containing following:

(1) Elections to be under UN auspices; (2) scope and character of elections; (3) disposition of foreign troops in Korea; (4) provision to protect Korean independence, including the demilitarization of border areas. The Secretary stated that these points seemed to be controversial aspects which would have to be resolved. In explanation memorandum, stated there seemed to be agreement on election some sort in some area, and it was important they be under auspices of UN. Whether the elections be only in North Korea or be nation-wide in scope was one of points of difference. We thought elections only in North Korea were required.

Then there was a question of foreign troops in Korea; that is, the UN forces in the south and the Chinese Communist forces in North Korea, and what should be done about them and the timing of their evacuation if they were to be evacuated in whole or in part.

There was then question of when Korea had achieved unity and independence, how maintenance could best be assured. In this regard might include demilitarization border areas both sides so as prevent any sudden attack and maintenance of no troops in areas having proximity to sensitive areas on either side.

Secretary then welcomed any suggestions as to whether this useful analysis, questions possibly being discussed in the order suggested, in some other order, or simultaneously in subcommittees.

Molotov stated he believed would be useful hear views North and South Korea. Nam Il then made long statement along lines his statement in plenary, rejecting any international supervision or observation of elections reiterating North Korean proposal and stressing elections throughout Korea, and withdrawal of foreign forces, stationing of any foreign troops in Korea being “foreign interference”, UN and Chinese forces to be withdrawn “simultaneously” within six months. In this statement and several other times during course of meeting he asked how “renewal of war is to be prevented” if foreign troops not withdrawn.

Pyun stated preferred hear others before making statement. Molotov then made statement referring his speech at plenary and reiterating [Page 176] support of North Korean proposals, stressing Korean problem should be solved by Koreans themselves. He stated all foreign troops should be withdrawn “at least three months before elections”. Chou En-lai then made statement supporting North Korean proposals saying that “they could become basis for discussion in reaching agreement”. Criticized Secretary’s memorandum on basis did not list divergent views nor include “concrete proposals”. He repeated line on Koreans solving own problems and all-Korean elections, rejecting elections under UN auspices or while foreign forces in Korea. He reiterated Nam Il’s statement wthdrawal of forces should be within set time limit and simultaneously.

At close Chou statement Bidault asked how volunteers could be withdrawn “when they have not been sent”. Chou replied with some heat Mr. Bidault failed recall armistice was signed on our side by UNC and on other side by DPRK and Chinese People’s volunteers and that if armistice valid, why would agreement for withdrawal troops not be valid?

Molotov then made reference belligerent status UN in Korea and rejected elections under auspices of UN. At this point Secretary referred to draft Soviet resolution October 2, 1950,3 observing that at that time Soviet Union apparently saw no incompatibility in UN having forces in Korea and its ability observe elections in Korea. Molotov obviously caught by surprise and did not recall resolution. After Secretary passed him our copy there was prolonged huddle in Soviet delegation while resolution being translated for Molotov and discussed. During huddle by Soviets, Eden made statement that while it was inescapable UN was party to dispute in Korea, everybody recognized elections must be supervised. Mentioned precedents for UN supervision and stated there must be UN supervision “in some form or other” if results to commend themselves to world opinion.

During this period Chou reiterated belligerent status UN in Korea, stating Communist China and DPRK “had no relation to UN” and stated if DPRK proposal accepted, question “representation DPRK in UN would not arise until after establishment unified Korea”. During course of meeting Chou several times reiterated “this conference has nothing to do with UN”.

Molotov finally replied Secretary’s query by stating October 2, 1950 Soviet resolution had “provided indispensible participation of states bordering on Korea” and asked whether it was “now a question of such a commission”. In reply Secretary stated question could possibly [Page 177] be discussed, but in meanwhile Chinese Communist regime had been declared aggressor, and therefore probably disqualified itself for such a role. Molotov replied with some heat branding UN resolution as “shameful, unjust and taken behind back of China”, thereby disqualifying UN for any role in elections.

Chou then made flat statement that Korean war started by US, which also occupied Formosa and therefore US was aggressor. Passage of UN resolution had made UN lose moral authority. Eden replied UK could never accept fact disarmed South Korea had attacked North Korea or that US, which had withdrawn its troops from Korea had somehow become aggressor, and former UK Government had voted for resolution because it considered it in accordance with facts.

Pyun then asked whether commission proposed by North Koreans contemplated representation by population ratio or equally between north and south, pointing out population South Korea above 24 million, and asking Nam Il for population North Korea. By persistent questioning Pyun finally obtained clear statement from Nam Il that representation on commission would be equal between north and south and any decisions would require agreement both sides. Nam Il gave no answer on North Korean population.

Toward close of meeting Pyun made careful and reasoned statement reiterating ROK position, to which Nam Il and Chou replied and Pyun rejoined, there being considerable fencing as to who would have last word.

Secretary stated meeting had been “enlightening to US” but that he could not say he had been encouraged.

Eden expressed opinion had not gotten very far, to which Molotov replied that there had been “little effort toward getting together”.

It was agreed no decision as to any further meeting would be taken until plenary Monday.4 It was agreed that in pattern restricted meetings at Berlin, no statement would be made to press other than fact meeting had been held and countries attending. Secretary stated Eden would brief other 12 on confidential basis.

Meeting to brief 12 on today’s meeting scheduled 10 a.m. Monday. In meantime US liaison officers will, as occasion arises, informally inform other delegations negative results of meeting.

Comment: No cracks apparent in solid Communist front nor slightest indication any willingness whatever modify their positions. Molotov was obviously sitting back letting Chou and Nam Il take the lead.

Dulles
  1. A set of minutes of this meeting (SP Verb Min/1) is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The seven powers in attendance were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This was the only restricted session held on Korea.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Dulles was referring to U.N. document A/C.1/567; for documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, pp. 835 ff.
  4. May 3.