396.1 GE/7–1854: Telegram
Smith–Do–Chuong Meeting, Geneva, July 18, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 652. Repeated information Paris 93, Saigon 62. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and Tran Van Chuong called on me this morning. Burden of conversation for Vietnamese was carried by Chuong. Latter referred to meeting with Secretary in Paris and memorandum which he presented at that time.
I expressed our sympathy for present difficulties Vietnam, but emphasized that any division of country was forced by harsh military necessity and that US could only consider such arrangement to be of temporary nature. I said US would not guarantee or recognize a partition and would not associate itself with statement accepting partition as such. However, US would not use force to upset an armistice agreement. I reiterated that no more could be gained at conference table than on battlefield.
In discussion of post-armistice need for Vietnam to maintain and strengthen army, Chuong brought up need for continuing US aid. I [Page 1427] said, in view probable Communist insistence no foreign arms or instructors, it would appear necessary emphasize non-foreign character French Union assistance Chuong objected to US aid being channeled through French, to which I replied that aid could go through French directly to Vietnamese Army. I recalled that I had told Bao Dai to insist to French that Vietnam be permitted reorganize and form autonomous army, but he had not done this.
Choung noted that Ngo Dinh Diem‘s request to General Ely for arms for Catholic militia in bishoprics for self defense had been met by French military withdrawal from those provinces. I replied that as military man I understood necessity of French decision in face of Viet Minh strength. It was too bad that better organized autonomous Vietnamese Army had not previously been created; this fault of neither Vietnam nor US, but it was too late to accomplish this in north.
Chuong asked US reaction to situation brought out in his note to effect that Vietnam, after accepting principle military regrouping zones, now being faced with partition. I repeated US does not accept partition, only temporary division through armistice agreement. To Chuong‘s question about need for military and political build-up of south during division period, I replied it was imperative if there to be any hope for success in eventual elections. Previous to elections south should be cleaned of Viet Minh and strengthened, while during this same period population of north would have had taste of living under Communist rule. After two years, there was hope that elections would turn out favorably.
Chuong asked if Vietnam could count on US aid; I countered by asking if Vietnam would remain in French Union, to which Chuong replied that necessary conditions were full independence and right to leave if they wished. I again made point that Communist insistence on no foreign military assistance might require such aid to go through medium of French Union.
Chuong then went through customary exercise of blaming presence French for strength of Communists. He said Vietnam would use this conference to gain real independence from France.
When I asked if this might not mean departure French troops, he said that was wish of Vietnamese Government; without French, they could successfully appeal to Nationalists and fight Communists. I replied that in such circumstances Communists would walk through the country.
I ended by noting that US would not obstruct conference by insisting on US right to give direct military assistance and training, and that [Page 1428] US certainly not prepared to fight for this principle if Vietnamese refused French channel.