396.1 GE/6–1454: Telegram
Heath–Dac Khe–Bonsal Meeting, Geneva, June 14, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 437. Repeated information Paris 430, Saigon 164. Dac Khe, Vietnam Minister of Democratization and Deputy Chief of Geneva delegation, talked to Ambassador Heath and Bonsal this morning.
In Dac Khe’s view, there was a course of action which could save Vietnam from complete takeover by the Communists. That would be for Bao Dai to return immediately to Vietnam to be with his troops and to back up a new government presided by Ngo Dinh Diem, in a campaign of official austerity, honesty of pitiless severity against past [Page 1135] and present governmental grafters. That was the first step. The next step must, in Dac Khe’s view, be a program of real agrarian reform and social betterment for the peasant 9/10ths of the population. The American economic aid program should be revised to serve exclusively needs of the agricultural population. A third step, which Dac Khe personally favored, was creation of a consultative assembly of limited legislative powers but inclusion the right to legislate on the budget.
A major reason that Viet Minh had made progress was general disbelief in the various Bao Dai governments to date. If elections were held at present, Viet Minh would win it. If really free supervised elections were held six months from now, neither the Viet Minh nor Bao Dai would gain a majority. But this situation could be changed substantially for the better in a matter of days or weeks. The new regime should arrest and send to Poulo Condor, the grafters, of which the government has already a list, preferably shooting the 4 or 5 most guilty.
There would be time successfully to initiate these reform measures Dac Khe thought. In spite of French desires for a cease-fire, it would be almost impossible for the French to arrive at a negotiated cease-fire in the immediate future in view of Viet Minh intransigence and Vietnamese resistance to such a move.
Bao Dai’s stock had fallen in Vietnam since 1949, Dac Khe said, but so had Ho Chi Minh’s. Bao Dai had retained, however, a residual prestige which could be improved.
Dac Khe said that while Bao Dai lacked character, he, nevertheless, could be persuaded to undertake the decisive action necessary, but only the United States seconded by France could “persuade” Bao Dai to go into action.
There had to be plain talk of a firmness that neither France nor the United States had yet used with Bao Dai. It would be a most disagreeable interview for both sides because the past failings of Bao Dai and his governments would have to be frankly reviewed. Dac Khe suggested that Bao Dai would accept Heath’s criticism and recommendations because of his belief in the latter’s friendship.
Heath and Bonsal listened to all this without comment. When Dac Khe said, however, that Bao Dai would probably insist on assurance of American backing if he took the action requested, Heath remarked that some weeks ago when Bao Dai said he would insist on autonomy for Vietnam national army, Dac Khe had said to him that was a request to be made from the field of battle and not from Cannes or Paris. Heath asked why the same observation would not apply for a request for foreign backing; viz., if Bao Dai and his regime showed improved [Page 1136] performance and action on the ground, then would be the time to ask their friends for support. Dac Khe agreed.
Returning to Diem, Dac Khe said he would be an excellent man to lead off in exterminating corruption but would not be good in rallying the peasants. Diem was essentially a mandarin of the ideal type described by Confucius. Diem’s criticism of Bao Dai’s regimes was that there were too many mandarins of the bad type. Diem was an honest mystic of an age that had passed. Diem did not believe in agrarian reform except of an administrative mandarin type. He did not believe in a popular assembly. Both these measures, particularly the first, in Dac Khe’s opinion, were absolutely necessary. The latter personally favored calling a selected peasant congress to determine the general lines of an agrarian reform. A strong government could guide the deliberations of such a congress and not let it get out of hand as did the “national congress” of last October.