Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/4–1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

confidential

Seoul, April 19, 1954—5 p.m.

1034. Re Deptel 817.¹ During conversation with Foreign Minister Pyun this morning he requested information regarding probable US position on substantive questions at Geneva. I informed him I understood it to be view of US Government that most logical means of effecting unification of Korea would be to proceed with implementation of existing GA resolutions on Korea by holding UN-supervised elections in those parts of Korea in which UN not previously able observe elections. I added that I believed our thinking on troop withdrawal was that there should be phased simultaneous withdrawal begun before elections and completed within specified time thereafter. I explained however that so far as Embassy aware US had not reached agreed position with its other allies and that until it had done so it would be impossible to know exactly what US position at conference would be.

Insofar as elections concerned, Pyun said US position appeared be entirely compatible with that of ROK. Re troop withdrawal, however, he said position his government was that Chinese Communists, since they were acknowledged aggressors and also since they entered Korean conflict after UN forces, must be withdrawn from North Korea not only prior to elections but also prior to withdrawal UN forces from South. I told Pyun I believed it unrealistic to believe there existed any chance obtaining acceptance such withdrawal plan by either side, and that, whatever timing might be, I believed withdrawal would have to be simultaneous.

From viewpoint ROK cooperation at Geneva, believe it desirable initial US position on unification procedures be along lines alternative A, Document GK D–4/B April 5.² Should Communists reject this proposal as anticipated, US could move by gradual stages toward proposal for supervised elections throughout all Korea. ROK likely object vociferously at each modification but might reluctantly accept them as only possibility early unification, if convinced US has no intention backing unification by force. From past experience in negotiations with ROK appears we must resign ourselves to bitter bargaining, probably punctuated by irresponsible public outbursts whenever these seem to ROK advantage.

President Rhee’s willingness entrust his political fate to de novo elections throughout Korea may to some extent be influenced by outcome May 20 elections,³ particularly if latter produce clear-cut electoral decision either for or against his supporters.

Briggs

1. Not printed. In it, the Department of State had requested the Embassy’s views on what positions the United States should take with the Republic of Korea, if and after the Koreans accepted the invitation to the Geneva Conference (396.1GE/4–1454).

2. For the text of Document GK D–4b, dated Mar. 27, see p. 62. This document called for all-Korean elections for a constituent assembly, and a new national government. Following the drafting of subsequent position papers, this proposal became known as Alternative C. See GK D–4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

   The tenor of the comments here would appear to indicate that the reference should be to Document GK D–4/7, Apr. 9, p. 82, known as Alternative A, which called for elections in North Korea and incorporation of that area into the Republic of Korea.

   For Alternative B, see Document GK D–4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

3. Reference is to the elections for the Korean National Assembly. For documentation on related developments, see volume xv.