396.1 GE/5–3054: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Dulte 134. Personal for Murphy. Probably the major part of this conference will be wound up by the end of next week. Eden is leaving within a few days. I believe Molotov will leave as soon as the military experts get started to work under the general terms of the British proposal of yesterday. In any event, things are likely to move very fast. Please emphasize to all concerned that Departmental instructions received after the event, as was Tosec 307,1 are of very little help.
[Here follows the portion of this message relating to the Korean phase of the Conference; for the text, see page 324.]
Next, and equally important, is the vital matter of the Indochina control authority, particularly its composition. Discussions on this will begin on Monday. The Communists will probably propose a counterpart of the NNSC, possibly offering India as a fifth. The British will probably propose India in association with a European country (Norway is India’s choice). The Communists would not accept Thailand or the Philippines, and India would not accept association with them. The realistic element in the problem is the necessity for troops—about 30,000 of them. I hope you will continue to take this fact into [Page 982] consideration, as well as the fact that the period referred to in Tosec 3022 as “for time being” is likely to be very short unless I am to be continually exposed to pressures from several Foreign Ministers who are becoming very impatient, and irate.
Therefore, while I am glad to know what our initial position should be, I also need most urgently to know, if it can now be estimated, what our final position may be on this important question. I am still of the opinion that the Colombo powers, in association with a neutral European nation of their selection, would be the best solution. I did not, in my previous message on this subject, imply that the US should propose it.
The other important matter which will come up in few days is the question of international guarantees, either by the nations represented at this conference, or by some other body such as the UN. I very much need to know the Secretary’s views about this, and I hope you will get them to me at the earliest.3 The Communists will insist on consultation and collective action which builds in a veto. We might accept consultation, but should maintain the principle that action shall be taken “jointly or severally” on receipt of a plea from the supervisory authority.