795.00/4–1854: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
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1022. Repeated information Tokyo 613, Saigon 30, Taipei 97, Paris 9. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. My immediately preceding message.1 Delivered President’s letter at 9 this morning to President Rhee in presence Foreign Minister Pyun and Mrs. Rhee, Pyun and I having traveled from Seoul last night. After reading letter I conveyed orally two points concerning dependence on Congress for funds, and dependence of program on continued collaboration by ROK. Pyun took notes.
Rhee expressed warm satisfaction with contents President’s letter insofar as it relates expansion US military aid and forthcoming assignment General Van Fleet. “Please tell President”, said Rhee, “that by that alone he has assured us happy Easter in Korea”. After further tribute to Van Fleet, Rhee said hoped General could come here soonest and he would like make announcement here simultaneously with Washington. Rhee asked date of announcement be soonest because of favorable effect that would have and also because of speculation and danger of leaks. (I agree sooner announcement made the better.)
President went on to say his satisfaction Van Fleet assignment should not be interpreted as implying lack of confidence in General Hull, referred to by President Eisenhower in connection Van Fleet visit, for whom Rhee said he has highest regard.
[Page 112]Rhee referred in that connection to his last conversation with Hull on February [April] 14 which he said had been helpful to him in formulating ROK position (see Embtel 1015, April 16).2
Turning to Geneva, Rhee said Pyun would head delegation and would leave within 48 hours. Rhee still doubts whether any good will come of conference, but he noted President Eisenhower himself had stated in letter he under no illusions about dealings with Communists. Rhee declared Pyun would do his best collaborate with Secretary Dulles and that Rhee appreciates consideration American Government has shown in connection with problems Rhee faces in seeking improve prospects Korea’s future.3
With regard announcement ROK Geneva participation it was decided this would be made Seoul 9 tomorrow morning, April 19, and Rhee thereupon showed me draft statement prepared day before, of course without reference to President’s letter. Draft was pessimistic, contentious and generally unhelpful, and after reading it I told Rhee effect could hardly fail be unfortunate insofar as Korea’s relations with Allies concerned, and by emphasizing differences among us would certainly give comfort to Communist enemy. I urged ROK statement avoid re-hash past argumentative declarations about Russia as sponsor, conference not two-sided, etc.
[Page 113]After considerable discussion Rhee agreed and it was left that Pyun and Rhee’s American advisor Glenn (chief editorial writer for Korean Republic who drafted original text at Rhee’s direction) would return with me to Seoul and prepare revised ROK statement. During trip back, Glenn, Pyun and I accordingly rewrote statement to approximately 50% original length and also toned down contents. Final text, assuming Pyun introduces no more problems, follows separate telegram.
Only other subject raised by Rhee in connection with conference was situation in Indochina regarding which Rhee expressed profound concern, stating that way things now going he discouraged over prospects any settlement short of Communist victory unless French agree to complete independence at very early date to three Associated States. “French,” said Rhee, “must go. Unless French leave, I shall be tempted suggest amalgamation of all anti-Communist elements in Indochina in move to get rid of French because so long as French there, problem of colonialism exists, and with colonialism, indigenous effort against Communism will be half-hearted and feeble.” He declared population Indochina will not fight to help French or keep French in Indochina. (My interpretation these observations is that Pyun at Geneva is likely plunge into Indochinese question at drop of hat.) Although neither Rhee nor Pyun referred except as above to ROK attitude toward Southeast Asia problems, question of “exclusion” of Korea from possible collective declaration or action will undoubtedly remain sensitive subject. In this connection statements made yesterday to Ambassador Yang (Deptel 835)4 will be helpful in future talks with ROK officials.
- In telegram 1021, Apr. 18, Ambassador Briggs reported that he had delivered President Eisenhower’s letter to President Rhee in the morning and that the Republic of Korea would announce its intention to attend the Geneva Conference at 9 a.m. on Apr. 19 (396.1–GE/4–1854).↩
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Not printed. In it, Ambassador Briggs said that he had talked with Hull prior to the latter’s meeting with Rhee at which time Hull and Briggs agreed that Hull should mention the Geneva Conference to Rhee if a suitable opportunity arose. In view, however, of recent statements by Korean officials as well as Rhee’s comments to Hull, Briggs did not feel that the Republic of Korea would decide on the question of attendance at Geneva until a reply was received to Rhee’s letter of Apr. 8 to President Eisenhower. (795.00/4–1654)
In an unnumbered telegram of Apr. 14, General Hull reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his meeting with Rhee. Hull said that he had offered Rhee his personal opinion that it would be a serious mistake for the Republic of Korea to refuse to participate in the Geneva negotiations. Hull’s conclusion, after the talk, was that Rhee would agree to participate without further argument if he could find any face saving device in the form of some sort of reassurance from the United States on the matter of further aid to Korea. (Department of Defense files)
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In telegram 1028, Apr. 19, Ambassador Briggs sent the following message to the Department of State:
↩“Reference Deptel 829, repeated Tokyo 2292 and Embtel 1022, repeated Tokyo 613.
“With reference to observations made orally in accordance instructions to President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun yesterday in connection delivery President’s letter, I considered it desirable confirm in writing statement on dependence of program of assistance on Congressional implementation. I accordingly sent Pyun following confidential letter dated April 18:
‘My dear Mr. Minister: It occurs to me that it may be convenient for you to have written confirmation of an observation which, under instructions from my government, I made to President and you in presenting President Eisenhower’s letter to President Rhee this morning.
‘In that connection I reminded you that final action on plans for assistance to our allies, and specifically projects described in President Eisenhower’s letter, rests in US Congress, so that such plans can only be implemented when Congressional action is completed.
‘I am et cetera.…’” (396.1–GE/4–1954)
- Not printed. In it, the Department of State reported on a conversation between Ambassador Yang and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs Everett Drumright; for the memorandum, see volume xii. In reply to Yang’s expressions of concern over Korea’s exclusion from collective defense arrangements in Southeast Asia, Drumright pointed out that these were only in a preliminary stage and that Indochina was now a most critical area; he also suggested that Korea indicate more interest in collective action by expressing its intention to attend the Geneva Conference. (790.5/4–1654)↩