396.1 GE/5–2554: Telegram
The United States
Delegation to the Department of
State
top secret
Geneva, May 25, 1954—9
p.m.
Dulte 113. Limit distribution. In
conversation with Eden this
morning, he showed me in great confidence, message from High
Commissioner in India,1 the text of which is given below,
which is illuminating and shows some of the considerations which are
conditioning United Kingdom thinking regarding our maneuvers with
respect to Southeast Asia:
- “1. Indians realise that if Geneva Conference fails,
dangerous situation will arise throughout Southeast Asia
and the Far East, carrying with it whole series of
alarming possibilities. These are seen as ranging in
order of gravity from large scale Western intervention
in Indochina (involving another ‘Korean’ campaign with
every risk that this time the conflict could not be
localised) to abandonment of Indochina, but formation
under Western auspices of a collective defense
organization designed to safeguard neighboring
territories. In Indian eyes, former at best, would be a
tragedy, not least for the people of Indochina
themselves; at worst, it would be suicidal as opening
way for general war. Latter might enable peace to be
preserved for a while, but in Indian estimation, further
clash would only be a matter of time. And either course
would involve renewed Western domination in a large part
of Southeast Asia which would not only offend Asian
nationalist sentiment everywhere, but would, in Indian
view, be a futile and self-defeating policy. They are
convinced, indeed, that peace can never be established
on any lasting basis, unless Western powers keep their
hands off Asia and leave Asian countries on a basis of
full independence to settle their affairs amongst
themselves.
- “2. But while such considerations may be at back of
their minds, Indians have not yet brought themselves to
think seriously of possibility of failure of Geneva
Conference. It is all-important to them
[Page 931]
that it should succeed,
and they view progress to date, though slow, as not
unsatisfactory. They feel that there is now good hope of
a ceasefire. Once that stage is reached, the rest
should, in their view, be much easier, even though
negotiations for a political settlement are bound to be
prolonged.
- “3. In the above circumstances, any new deal between
the United States and Siam on the lines indicated in
your telegram would be regarded here as quite
disastrous. It would be looked on as a new attempt by
the United States to sabotage the Geneva Conference and
one which almost certainly would have that result. All
hopes built on present negotiations would be shattered
and it would be felt that last opportunity for peaceful
settlement has been wantonly thrown away. American
stock, already very low here, would sink to rock-bottom
and political reactions would be very serious.
- “4. Apart from impact on Geneva Conference, proposal
would be bound to cause indignation from India’s own
standpoint. With United States/Pakistan deal on one
side, and United States/Siamese deal on the other, India
would feel herself being contained by United States and
her associates; distrust and suspicion of United States
motives would be magnified, and there would be serious
risk of anti-American feeling taking an anti-Western
form.
- “5. From the angle of this post, therefore, I must
hope that advantage will be taken of any opportunity
that arises to impress on Americans extreme unwisdom of
pursuing any such proposal while Geneva Conference is in
session. If Conference fails, whole situation will no
doubt have to be considered de
novo, and this might be part of the defensive
measures that may then become necessary. But if trouble
here is to be avoided, it is essential that current
negotiations should be given every chance before there
is any airing of measures which, from Indian standpoint,
are bound to appear provocative to the other
side.”
