Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

FE files, lot 60 D 330, “Position Papers”

Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference¹

secret
GK D–4/9

[Washington,] April 14, 1954.

General United States Views on Korean Phase of Geneva Conference

purpose of conference

1. In accordance with Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the Berlin Communiqué of February, the two belligerent sides are to meet to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia. It will be a two-sided conference.

2. We are confident that all the allies are agreed our primary purpose at Geneva is to seek Korea’s unification on terms that would not result in turning Korea over to the Communists and thus lose at the Conference table what we fought so long to prevent in Korea.

objectives

1. Maintain position of strength and stability in free Korea, avoid confusion, weakening of morale, or public turmoil within the ROK, and take account ROK fear of abandonment.

2. Maintain the constitutional framework of the ROK State and the validity of past UN resolutions to the greatest extent possible.

3. Maintain a united front at the Conference among the allies, the United States and the ROK in the tactics of presentation and proceedings, and work out suitable procedures for consultations among Allies at Conference.

4. Determine whether the Communists will insist on controlling part or all Korea, or renounce any special position in Korea in order to set up “a united Korea for free Koreans”, and unmask Communist intentions.

5. Emerge from the Conference in a strong moral and political position by presenting proposals commending themselves to the world at large and which if not accepted by the Communists will make clear their responsibility for failure to reach agreement at Geneva.

basic considerations

1. The Communists at Geneva will do their utmost to broaden discussions on deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact, lessening of tensions and recognition of the independence and security of all states. The Communists will not agree to a “united Korea for free Koreans” or any plan of unification acceptable to us on Korea.

2. Allied proposals must take into consideration the fundamental interests and position of the ROK in the future unification of Korea. The ROK is a sovereign state and not a pawn. Without the endorsement and support of the ROK, proposals or agreements at Geneva on Korea will be ineffective and invalid.

3. It is essential, from the United States point of view, to preserve the framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity of the ROK State in principle. Proposals based on this principle would:

(a) preserve the integrity of the nation and people which fought, with much allied and United Nations blood and treasure, for three years against Communist aggressors;

(b) emphasize the interrupted efforts of the United Nations since 1947 in good faith to establish the independence and unity of Korea.

(c) give voice to the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of the Korean people; and

(d) not put the ROK on a par with the North Korean regime.

4. The situation in Korea is substantially different from that in Germany so that the exact parallel of unification plans for Germany do not apply rigidly as a precedent for Korea.

united states proposals

1. Continuation of United Nations Resolutions. We believe we should begin the Geneva Conference with proposals in the general spirit of the United Nations plans for unification of Korea which the Communists frustrated by political opposition and aggression. We have in mind specifically the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, October 7, 1950, December 1, 1950, and August 28, 1953. The principal points of these resolutions are:

(a) The United Nations has frequently attempted to assist the Korean people in re-establishing their freedom, independence and unity which are the urgent and rightful claims and that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people.

(b) National independence of Korea should be re-established and foreign forces withdrawn thereafter.

(c) Elections should be held on the basis of adult sufferage and by secret ballot and the number of representatives from the voting districts should be proportionate to population; elections should be observed by an international commission with freedom to observe and consult throughout Korea.

(d) The ROK is the only lawful sovereign government in any part of Korea in so far as the United Nations is concerned.

(e) The United Nations has in being a commission with personnel and experience to carry out the terms of reference on Korean unification established in the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950.

(f) The United Nations has in being an agency to rehabilitate all Korea once it is unified.

2. Variant Plans. There are two general formulas for obtaining a free and united Korea by peaceful means:

(a) to carry forward the plans contained in existing UN resolutions by completing the constituent act of elections in North Korea, within the framework of the constitutional structure of the ROK State.

(b) to start completely de novo by holding elections throughout Korea supervised by an international commission to set up a constituent assembly, draft and adopt a new constitution, and form a new national government. The United States favors the first formula. It would (a) avoid turmoil and disorganization in ROK, and (b) provide some negotiating flexibility.

3. Elements of Unification Plan.

(a) International Commission with authority to move throughout Korea to observe elections and advise local authorities thereon.

(b) Minimum Conditions for Free Elections.

(c) Elections in North Korea, or possibly also in South Korea, in such a way as to retain the constitutional entity of the ROK State.

(d) Establishment of an all-Korea National Assembly on basis proportional to population in South and North Korea.

(e) Assembly would have right and authority by terms of new elections to retain, amend or replace ROK constitution.

(f) Phased withdrawal of foreign forces before and after elections to be completed “X” months after all-Korean Assembly and President elected.

(g) Possible election of President simultaneous with elections for National Assembly.

1. A cover sheet indicated that this paper was used by Johnson for the oral presentation of the U.S. position at the meeting with the representatives of the 16 nations on Apr. 13 described in circular telegram 362, infra. It was also used by Johnson at Geneva; see telegram Secto 17, Apr. 27, from Geneva, p. 146.