396.1 GE/5–1654: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 228. Repeated information London 171. Limit distribution. Eden spoke to me briefly regarding talk he had time his call on Chou En-lai morning May 14. Allen gave Johnson detailed account Saturday and let him read UK’s summary conversation made following meeting during which no notes were taken.
Allen stated Chou very reserved and formal, unbending only slightly toward end of meeting. Eden opened by stating he wished first as co-chairman Indochina phase discuss how conference could get down to negotiations, particularly on Indochina and suggested [Page 820] possibility restricted sessions next week. Chou responded with formal style statement that if everyone wanted peace, solution could be found that would be “honorable, fair and reasonable by both sides”. Chou stated had studied Eden’s questions on Indochina as well as Eden’s points on Korea and would discuss restricted Indochina sessions with USSR and Viet Minh. Stated China supports North Korea and Viet Minh views and complained French had not answered Viet Minh political proposal, leaving political questions to Vietnam.
Eden then stated that as Foreign Secretary he wanted to do what he could to decrease tension between “five great powers”, and a settlement was necessary to achieve this. Chou responded by referring to preamble recent Chinese Communist agreement with India on Tibet which set forth principles Chinese Communist foreign policy, that is, mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence. Chou then stated China wished to obtain recognition as a great power but “was not making this a condition for any settlement”.
Eden then referred to dangers if Ho Chi Minh persisted in asking too much. He might feel that he could get it, and he “might even be able to get it”, however wider considerations should be borne in mind or position could become dangerous. Chou responded by terming “Bao Dai’s” proposals as unrealistic and his claims to absolute authority throughout Indochina as “absurd” as position taken by Chiang Kai-shek during the Civil War in China. He added that far eastern experts like Dennis Allen and Trevelyan who were present, would be fully familiar with the situation that had existed in China.
Eden suggested it would be better to discuss military armistice upon which Chou asked for explanation Eden’s first question. Eden replied that if the fighting were to be stopped it would be necessary that the forces both sides be disengaged, and this would require some redeployment on their part. Chou said he could see that this might well be first point for discussion and would study situation.
Chou then made statement with regard to necessity both countries working for improvement of relations, implication being China would do little toward normalizing relations with UK until there was change in UK attitudes toward Communist China.
Eden then mentioned conversations between Trevelyan and Huan Hsiang, upon which Chou indicated he was closely following their conversations and giving detailed instructions to Huan Hsiang.1 Eden then stated it is important both countries also “bring other countries along too”, to which Chou replied that it was in main British who could do this.
[Page 821]Allen characterized conversation as not offering much hope any change Chinese Communist attitudes or policies.
Eden told me that while term UN was never mentioned in conversation, implication he drew from Chou’s remarks and general approach was that Chou was asking obliquely whether if Chinese behaved they would be admitted to UN. Eden said he made it very clear this was not a question to be handled by “deals”, and that he was not making a proposal of any kind.
He also told me that just before leaving he had said he must add a word of caution about pushing the US too far—that we were “slow starters” but that when we did start we went all the way. This is not reflected in the memorandum.