Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/4–854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

secret

Washington, April 8, 1954—6:59 p.m.

797. Afternoon April 7 Robertson presented informal paper² and discussed general US views on substance and tactics Korean phase Geneva Conference with Australia, Canadian, New Zealand and UK representatives along following lines:

1. Noting we had studied various Commonwealth proposals, Robertson stated US and Commonwealth in general agreement basic objectives seek agreement from Communists on independent, united Korea; withdrawal foreign forces from Korea with adequate safeguards and in connection with Korean unification; maintain strong united allied and UN position; emerge with moral and propaganda victory; and take only positions at Geneva which maintain position of strength for UN in Korea.

2. US proposes seek allied agreement to begin Geneva conference with proposals for resuming UN plans for Korean unification which Communists frustrated by political opposition and aggression. Such plans based on GA resolutions of November 14, 1947,³ October 7, 1950, December 1, 1950,⁴ and August 28, 1953.⁵

3. To preserve legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity ROK, US conceives unification as completion these resolutions by constituent act in North Korea under UNCURK observation. This would bring area of North Korea by new constitutional act under ROK. Such arrangements would safeguard UNC security requirements in Korea. Such proposal would be combined with phased withdrawal foreign forces staged before and after elections and establishment single national government for Korea. For several legal and practical reasons situation Korea different from Germany in terms applying tripartite unification formula at Geneva automatically to Korea.

4. In discussion tactics US position Robertson emphasized (a) importance principle maintaining integrity ROK and not liquidating it constitutionally without its consent and starting de novo as Commonwealth proposes; (b) no agreement at Geneva valid as practical matter without joint US-ROK endorsement; (c) ROK has primary interest Korean unification and at opening stage would violently oppose Commonwealth generalized plan for elections and new government; (d) in negotiations with Communists dangerous begin conference with final fixed formula since Communists always oppose initial position; and (e) US proposal on Korea in general better to combat possible Communist proposals on Indochina.

5. US Government strongly feels undesirable, dangerous and unwise at this stage anticipate seeking extensive compromises with Communists on any ameliorating arrangements less than unification after failure reach agreement on unification.

Commonwealth representatives indicated their Governments would (a) dislike US approach either as matter of tactics or principle; (b) prefer generalized plan for all-Korea elections which would be defensible to advance at beginning conference and stand on firmly and (c) do not recognize sovereignty or authority ROK in North Korea (and neither does US), and uncertain GA Resolutions cited definitely support preserving and extending ROK integrity by new constituent act.

Robertson emphasized principle safeguarding UN resolutions and ROK integrity and need for earliest possible consultations with ROK if ROK decides go Geneva determine how far it will go towards Commonwealth viewpoint eventually at Conference.

Amembassy Seoul: Foregoing for your information only, at this stage.

US informal paper and memorandum of meeting being pouched.⁶

Dulles

1. Repeated to Canberra, London, Ottawa, Wellington, and Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
2. Not printed.
3. Text in Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vi, p. 857.
4. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 410 (V), establishing the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA); text in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. ii, p. 2585.
5. Text ibid., p. 2676.
6. Not printed. On Apr. 9, U. Alexis Johnson met with Jean Daridan, Minister of the French Embassy, and Pierre Millet, Counselor, setting forth for them the U.S. position generally as outlined by Robertson above (396.1–GE/4–954). Johnson, American Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, was previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until late 1953, and had been recalled to Washington to coordinate work on the Geneva Conference.