790.5/5–754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation 1

top secret

Tedul 48. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 512 and 533 Tedul 364 and 37.5 Eden’s proposal reflects considerable progress in providing UK and French participation in some visible form of collective planning prior to conclusion Geneva Conference. But even as modified (Dulte 53) it contains major defects from our point of view. The most serious is that the five powers represented on the Staff Agency are all non-Asian. If this becomes nucleus of military, political and economic planning, this will be resented by Asian public opinion as recalling colonial past, despite provision for possible participation by invitation of certain Asian countries. Communist propaganda machine can be expected to concentrate on absence any Asian charter membership. Incidentally we note absence specific mention Philippines in Eden draft which exclusion would not be acceptable to us.

US admittedly faced by dilemma resulting from (1) our desire quickly to establish common front with Western powers directly concerned with problem defense Southeast Asia for earliest possible establishment collective defense for that area and (2) our desire which UK apparently does not share to avoid planning during Geneva Conference which would imply Associated States have been written off. To counter with argument that France would represent and speak for Associated States would merely underline in Asia existing skepticism as to their independence.

In the light of this dilemma, our objective must be to handle the discussions for a regional grouping in such a way as (1) to move forward rapidly to creation of minimum coalition, if Indochina should be lost, and (2) in so doing to avoid creating impression that Associated States are already written off and (3) to leave question of [Page 746] actual inclusion or exclusion of some or all of Associated States to be decided in light of outcome at Geneva.

In practical application we would propose to pursue two parallel lines concurrently.

The first would be five-power staff talks concerned exclusively with development military plans (hence our unwillingness to attach political and economic experts to such agency) which plans would be regarded as for benefit of all countries directly threatened by developments in Southeast Asia.

The second line would be the continued effort at political level to construct a collective defense grouping of the Western and Asian countries. As latter assumes definite form, five-power military group would contribute results of its work to entire group.

At its special meeting on May 8 NSC 6 again considered this question and reached decision (superseding that contained Tedul 36) “Agreed that the United States should be willing to participate in an examination by the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand of the military situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that: (1) the purpose of such examination is to explore, through secret and existing military channels in Washington, means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves. (2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the US to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086-b or 1104-b and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping.”7

FYI. Reference in quoted NSC decision to “secret and existing military channels” reflected desire results of work would be secret but not intended preclude public knowledge such planning was under way. End FYI.

Form of public announcement, if any, of five-power military planning activity is of course crucial, particularly from point of view Asian public opinion. Hence we are most anxious to see soonest suggested draft of such announcement. It may prove better, as suggested your Dulte 53, to avoid any formal public statement. Radford favors Washington because the talks here could be less ostentatious and avoid the degree of speculation inevitable in converting to high-level five-power military talks at Singapore.8

[Page 747]

Meanwhile, we intend to continue consultations here with Ambassadors of those countries with whom I originally talked. I saw Munro of New Zealand May 89 and expect separately to see representatives of Australia, Thailand and Philippines May 10. Since only competent representatives Associated States are now in Geneva, you should talk to them having in mind that present talks are primarily to keep the idea alive pending outcome of exchanges of views with UK including your talks with Eden.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by the Secretary of State and MacArthur. Repeated to London as telegram 5969, eyes only for the Ambassador.
  2. Dated May 5, p. 698.
  3. Dated May 7, p. 710.
  4. Dated May 6, p. 705.
  5. Dated May 6, p. 706.
  6. The 196th meeting of the National Security Council, May 8; for the memorandum of discussion, see volume xiii .
  7. Regarding these two NSC Actions, see footnotes 4 and 5, p. 705. Regarding the five-power examination of the situation in Southeast Asia, see volume xii .
  8. For additional information on Radford’s views, see Merchant’s memorandum of a conversation held on May 9, printed in the regional compilation in volume xii .
  9. For the memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Ambassador Munro, May 8, see volume xiii .