Office of the Historian

396.1 GE/5–754

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Getz)1

secret
Geneva, May 7, 1954.

Participants:

  • Ambassador Heath
  • Mr. McBride
  • Mr. Getz
  • Mr. Dac Khe—Minister of National Democratization Member of Vietnamese Delegation
  • Mr. Buu Kinh—Adviser to the Vietnamese Delegation

Subject:

  • Vietnamese Views on the Indochina Phase of the Conference.

Mr. Dac Khe entertained the above members of the US delegation at dinner.

Dac Khe opened the conversation by expressing to Ambassador Heath the very strong Vietnamese view that they did not want this conference; they expected and wanted the conference to be a failure; but they would do nothing to “sabotage” the gathering.

Dac Khe and Buu Kinh, apparently as a result of the story in the Herald Tribune this morning,2 expressed some anxiety over the possibility of the US “writing off” Viet-Nam and concentrating on saving Cambodia and Laos from the Communists. They were assured that this was not the intention of the US.

The main point upon which Dac Khe dwelt for most of the evening was that the Vietnamese delegation firmly believes that a military solution to the Indochinese problem cannot be separated from a political settlement. He is afraid that the French are so taken up with the serious military problem that they might accept a cease fire without political guarantees. He returned time and time again to this subject, and stated that this was the firm view of Bao Dai.

The Vietnamese “plan” would be:

1.
The French proposal must include the negotiations of an armistice as part of a complete military-political program.
2.
The Laniel program3 was acceptable as a basis provided it was expanded providing for UN inspection teams along the Chinese border. The Viet-Minh forces would disbar [disband?] and lay down and surrender their arms to the Vietnamese Government under an amnesty declaration which would be guaranteed and supervised by a [Page 718] United Nations Commission. Sometime after the armistice had been concluded national elections would occur under United Nations supervision. If the elections so resulted a coalition Government might then occur, but not before. He said that he had discussed in general terms this Vietnamese “plan” with the French but had not mentioned the United Nations supervision which he feared was unacceptable to the French.

When asked by Ambassador Heath as to Vietnamese [views?] on UN action, both Buu Kinh and Dac Khe [stated?] the belief that this would be desirable, but that it should be under the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. In the Security Council, they said, they could count on the veto of the US or Nationalist China to block any undesirable Russian proposals, and would not risk the possibility of Indian leadership in General Assembly with probable unfavorable results. Mr. McBride pointed out that because of this veto power the Security Council had become a rather sterile organization, and that the necessary majority in the Assembly for any desirable proposal could probably be attained with very little risk. The prestige would be much greater in this forum. The Vietnamese, however, persisted in believing the Security Council offered the greater insurance.

The discussion then turned to tactics in the conference. Dac Khe stated that the Vietnamese delegation was of the opinion that they should let the Viet-Minh representatives speak first; in this way, the Vietnamese, twenty-four hours afterwards could both rebut and attack in their first speech. This would also permit them to let the Viet-Minh take the blame for initiating name-calling and the abuse, to which they would have no hesitation in responding. Dac Khe agreed that it might be best to let either the Cambodians or the Lao lead off for our side.

Ambassador Heath stressed the importance of having good English translations of their speeches ready to hand out to the press immediately after they speak, and said that members of the US delegation would be pleased to assist in this work. Dac Khe said that he had translators, but hoped that we would be able to check their work.

  1. Summary of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 144, May 8. (396.1 GE/5–854)↩
  2. A reference to press reports of the Secretary’s meeting with Congressional leaders on May 6. See telegram Tedul 37, p. 706.↩
  3. Laniel’s proposals made on Mar. 5. See telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, p. 435.↩