396.1 GE/5–754: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 132. Repeated information Paris 214, London 132, Saigon 37. Re Secto 106 from Geneva, 5 May.1 Following is informal translation of paper given us last night containing French proposals as sent Paris by Bidault. In giving it to us, Lacoste stated that delegation had considered adding proposal based on “Eden plan” for Germany with respect to future elections but was currently inclined not to do so on grounds it would be merely needless complication. Chauvel discussed paper with Vietnamese representatives last night and reports their agreement to it.
- “(1) It should be pointed out first that what is presently called ‘the Indochina problem’ is essentially a problem of internal order. Thus neither the existence of the state of Vietnam nor its territorial integrity are at stake. What is involved, during the hostilities in progress, is the allegiance of the population of that state to this or that regime.
- “(2) It is only recently, and somewhat as a side issue, that a new element has been introduced into the Indochinese question, the fact of the invasion of the other two states of the peninsula, that is to say Laos and Cambodia, by armed forces foreign to those two states.
- “(3) As a result, however, of that extension of hostilities to Laos and Cambodia, the establishment of peace in Indochina envisaged by the Berlin communiqué should include the termination of hostilities in the territory as a whole of each of the three states.
“(4) This being the goal—re-establishment of peace in one country, Vietnam, ravaged by a war whose primary characteristic is that of being a civil war, and in two countries, Laos and Cambodia, victims of an external aggression, a foreign aggression, there remains to be settled the conditions under which peace should be re-established.
“The cease-fire which must necessarily mark the beginning of the first step of the return to peace cannot in itself suffice to insure peace. It must be accompanied by the immediate and effective putting into operation of provisions of both a military and administrative nature destined on the one hand to insure the security of the troops on the [Page 715] spot and the population, and on the other hand to guarantee each of the two parties in conflict against an abusive utilization of the cessation of combat by the other party.
“(5) It follows that the cease-fire can take place only following the signature of armistice conventions in which would be included clauses whose purpose has just been defined and whose coming into effect should coincide with the cease-fire.
“With the aim of avoiding the risks of hostilities breaking out again accidentally or otherwise, partially or generally, other stipulations should be written into the armistice conventions having the effect of regrouping in separate noncommunicating and strictly delimited zones the military forces of both parties.
- “(6) Finally, the armistice conventions should establish an international control which would become effective at the same time as the conventions themselves. The particular situation in Vietnam, in Laos and Cambodia being different in each of these states, separate conventions should be concluded for each of them.
- “(7) Once hostilities are terminated by the entry into force of these different conventions, the political and economic problems whose settlement would be necessary to insure a stable character to the peace, can be examined.”