110.11 DU/5–854: Telegram
Smith–Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 7, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State
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Dulte 54. Repeated information Paris 220. Had long talk yesterday afternoon with Bidault. He was dog-tired but thoroughly lucid and wanted to cry on somebody’s shoulder. Told him that Dien-Bien-Phu, while tragic loss,1 was not military disaster and need not be psychological one. Question now was what could be saved in Indochina and what any of us could do to help.
Bidault said it was hard to forecast psychological reaction in France. He had asked his government to give him instructions to be firm but his draft proposals were being made vaguer and he was seriously disturbed by word Jacquet had brought back (Secto 133, repeated Paris 2152). He would be talking with Laniel by phone and if he did not get the instructions he wanted, he would be much tempted to go to Paris to try to get them by personal persuasion. He felt it would be easier to get a firm position from government on Saturday than on Monday3 but was not sure whether his trip to Paris at this time would produce instructions he wanted or be straw that would break government’s back. Man in street in France was beginning to count hours until ceasefire could be arranged.
I asked him how nearly alone he was in his fight. He said others felt the same way but he was almost only one to speak out. He had been accused in press at least three times of having imposed his will on Cabinet and was not sure he could do it fourth time. He would under no circumstances surrender but he might lose his hide. Pressure would be very strong to agree to a cease-fire and then see what could be done. Even if he could get government to reject this approach, pressures would develop for worse solutions.
I agreed present moment was critical but thought that if he could persuade the government not to capitulate immediately, things would shortly get better. I hoped he would be able to propose something we could support. He interjected that if French position was something we could not support, he would not himself present it. I reiterated that [Page 713] if he could steer his government through this immediate period, future would be much better. He remarked on difficulty of trying to fight Indochina and EDC battles at same time. Obtaining support for continuing fight in Indochina required appeals to elementary patriotism, whereas support for EDC required rejection of simple patriotism. EDC required support of Socialists who were in entirely wrong camp on Indochina.
I reiterated fall of Dien-Bien-Phu should not mean loss of all of Vietnam let alone southeast Asia. US was seeking additional ways to help and possibilities of more active support. I told him that you were making good progress since your return and that US was more determined than ever to organize some form of collective security in southeast Asia. We were convinced that some form of southeast Asian NATO was necessary but that would take time. Could French provide it? Bidault said he would gladly give us time but was not sure his colleagues would give it to him. Proposals for partition could not be entertained. He thought we would probably have to accept military conditions under which Vietnamese would not be in control of all Vietnam territory but we could not tolerate establishment of Communist state in any part of Vietnam.
I remarked that tragic as was loss of Dien-Bien-Phu, its loss had at least deprived Communists of powerful lever upon French opinion. Bidault said he would do his best to obtain firm intructions.
I told Eden of foregoing talk and he is considering what British can do to encourage Bidault and strengthen his position.