751G.00/4–3054: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
priority
Dulte 34. Eyes only for Acting Secretary for the President from Secretary. Bidault saw me alone after this afternoon’s meeting. He spoke clearly and concisely. Eden subsequently joined us and Bidault went over more briefly in his presence what he had told me. Gist was as follows:
Our tactical position, and particularly his own, had deteriorated sharply as result of dissipation of uncertainty as to possibility of international and particularly US intervention. Moderation of recent US statements, notably French interpretation of President’s press conference,1 coupled with Churchill’s speech2 and obvious reluctance British carry through on Eden–Dulles communiqué,3 removed most [Page 639] of Communist uncertainty as to possible Western intentions. Premature publication of Bao Dai’s willingness to attend had incidentally further removed any possibility of bargaining with Viet Minh on their participation. He felt he had little solid support at home.
As things now stood, he saw nothing to prevent a Communist victory throughout whole area. There was nothing to stop or moderate them. If this disaster happened, effects would not be limited to Indochina or even to EDC but would threaten whole NATO structure. Next French Government would give lip service to NATO but no more and might not even give that very long. He was going to Paris Tuesday4 to appear before the Assembly but would refuse to answer any questions and state merely that they could either express confidence in him or remove him as Foreign Minister.
I said that as far as US was concerned, situation would not be finalized until after I returned. I was not without hope that UK could be brought with others into discussions which would at least revive Communist doubts as to Western intentions. Also, I said I was not confident that the military had completely exhausted the possibilities in the situation. They did not seem to me to be very ingenious. Something might be done short of total surrender to get the war on to a basis which would reduce expenditure of French manpower and not involve bringing in US and UK manpower, by permitting certain positions to be held and indigenous people to be trained to resume the struggle. Bidault said this thinking was not without merit.
After Bidualt’s departure, I told Eden I thought we should at least announce the beginning of discussions on what would be done if the conference failed to produce a satisfactory solution. He reacted rather negatively, but said he would think about it.
- For a message to Secretary Dulles from President Eisenhower, May 1, regarding the President’s press conference of Apr. 29, see p. 640.↩
- Prime Minister Churchill delivered a policy statement on Indochina and the Geneva Conference in the House of Commons on Apr. 27, which included the following remarks: “Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indo–China in advance of the results of Geneva. We have not entered into any new political or military commitments. My right hon. Friend [Eden] has, of course, made it clear to his colleagues at Geneva that if settlements are reached there Her Majesty’s Government will be ready to play their full part in supporting them in order to promote a stable peace in the Far East.” For the complete statement, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 526, cols. 1455–1456.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 514.↩
- May 4.↩