Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Indochina”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

top secret
personal and private

Geneva, April 30, 1954—12:15 p.m.

Memorandum of Conversation With Mr. Eden

I said to Mr. Eden that I was greatly disturbed over the present position and its bearing upon the cooperation of our two countries. We had, I thought, agreed to sit down with other directly interested countries to try to work out a common defense for the southeast Asia area, but now the British were unwilling to go ahead with the agreement which Mr. Eden and I had reached at London.² On top of that was the fact that in the face of the vicious attacks by Molotov, Chou En-lai and Nam Il on the United States for what it had done in Korea,³ there was not a single Western European power which was prepared to get up and say a word in defence of the UN or United States position. The only speakers on the non–Communist side had been South Korea, Colombia, the United States and Australia, and no one else was inscribed to speak.

I said it was particularly galling to the United States to have to accept this attack on it as being an “imperialist” power. I said that the United States was eager to beat the Communists at their own game and to sponsor nationalism in the independent colonial areas, which was in accordance with our historic tradition, but that we were restrained from doing so by a desire to cooperate with Britain and France in Asia, in North Africa and in the Near and Middle East. This, however, did not seem to be paying any dividends because when the chips were down there was no cohesion between us. Here at Geneva we were presenting a pathetic spectacle of drifting without any agreed policy or purpose. The United States had presented a program which, after it had been apparently accepted, had been repudiated and there was no alternative offered.

I said as far as the Korean problem was concerned, we were being forced by our western allies to abandon our original position of backing the UN resolutions so that western leaders could show how generous they were at south Korea’s expense. I thought, however, that it was rather pathetic that we had to make our concessions to our allies before even starting to negotiate with the Communists, where the concessions might have some negotiating value. If the effort to develop a united position with reference to southeast Asia collapsed, we would be faced by the problem of going it alone. This would probably mean increasing the close relations with Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, who, whatever their defects, were at least willing to stand strong against the Communists. I mentioned that there was considerable pressure for the United States to complete a mutual security treaty covering Formosa.⁴ This had been deferred and I felt that its negotiation at the time of the Geneva conference and after my proposal for a united defense of southeast Asia might be embarrassing. However, if there was to be no united defense for southeast Asia and no agreed program for Geneva, then we would have to consider who there was upon whom we could depend.

I emphasized that despite what I gathered the British might have inferred from Radford’s talks,⁵ the United States was not seeking either war with China or a large scale intervention in Indo–China. In fact these were the two things we were seeking to avoid and thought could be avoided if we had a show of common strength.

I greatly feared that if I return to Washington under present conditions and had to meet with the Congressional Committees and give explanations as to what had happened, the consequences would be disastrous for the close UK–US relations which we wanted to maintain.

Mr. Eden then handed me the memorandum, a copy of which is annexed. He said that they had been working very hard to prevent the Colombo Conference from taking a strong anti–Western position, particularly in relation to Indochina, and he felt that they had been quite successful.

I referred to the paragraph in the UK memorandum calling for immediate and secret joint examination between the US and the UK. I said that this might be useful, but certainly it would not be useful if that was all there was, because we had already invited other countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand to share in creating a southeast Asian defense; and the two first had definitely agreed and the two latter were interested. I also said I was confident we could not now rebuff them without serious consequences for the future. They would have to be brought in on some discussions, although probably not those of the intimate nature which were customary between the US and the UK. I referred to the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty had developed progressively, the first conception being the Brussels Pact, then the addition of the US and Canada, then the addition of Scandinavian countries, then the addition of Portugal and Italy, and most recently the addition of Greece and Turkey. I said that surely any southeast Asian arrangement would have to include at least Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the US, the UK and France, and the Associated States; and I did not see why we could not get started with that nucleus and let it develop as seemed natural. Mr. Eden made no reply.

Mr. Eden then said that he felt that the Western Powers had not participated in the general debate because they did not want to get tied to the South Korean election formula. I said that the issues in the general debate far transcended this rather minor technical point,—that the burden of the speeches of Molotov and Chou En–lai had been that Asia was for the Asians, and that all Western influence should be eliminated, particularly that of the US. Also, they had viciously attacked the UN, and made the most grotesque falsifications of history. Surely, I said, that presented issues to which the Western Powers could address themselves if they believed in the UN and believed that the principle of solidarity extended beyond Europe. Mr. Eden said he would give thought to the possibility of his making some speech.

We then discussed the details of the Korean matter. I said I was not hopeless of the possibility of an agreement, because we had an asset to use that we had not had in Berlin. At Berlin we could not pull out US and UK troops because this would collapse the forward strategy of NATO. In Korea there was no general allied strategy, and US troops could be pulled out in exchange for a united Korea, which would have sufficient demilitarization in the North so as to constitute no threat to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Mr. Eden suggested that we might have a restricted meeting of the Four Inviting Powers plus China and North Korea and South Korea to try to get into this matter before I left. I said I would not be indisposed to have such a meeting on Saturday afternoon.⁶

I told Mr. Eden that I was seeing Molotov at 11 on Saturday morning on the atomic energy matter. I was disposed not to seek a joint communiqué which would indicate that the President’s Plan had been rejected. I felt that to throw this into the present international situation would greatly aggravate and deteriorate affairs, and would particularly cause a deep resentment in the US. Mr. Eden agreed to this handling of the matter.

I reminded Mr. Eden that I had had no reply from him with reference to our economic aid to Egypt. He said he would talk to me about this before I left.

John Foster Dulles

[Annex]

⁷

secret

South–East Asian Defence

1. Communism in Asia cannot be checked by military means alone. The problem is as much political as military; if any military combination is to be effective, it must enjoy the widest possible measure of Asian support.

2. We should aim to get the support of Burma as well as Siam as the immediate neighbours of Indo–China. But Burma will not come in unless the project commands some sympathy from other Asian countries, particularly the Asian members of the Commonwealth.

3. If we cannot win the active support of all the Asian countries of the area, it is important that we should, at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality.

4. To secure this widely based Asian support, we must prepare the ground carefully for what is, in any case, intended to be a lasting defensive organisation, not a hastily contrived expedient to meet the present crisis.

5. This does not mean that we desire to delay. On the contrary, we have already been actively using our influence, particularly with the Asian members of the Commonwealth, with encouraging results. Pakistan and Ceylon have already promised not to oppose a South-East Asian Collective Defence on the lines we envisage, and we have succeeded in diverting Mr. Nehru from his original intention of condemning it root and branch. We have thus averted the danger that the Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo would unite in condemning our project, and have grounds for hoping for the actual support of some of them.

6. Mr. Nehru’s latest statement⁸ shows that his ideas have moved closer to our own. With persistence, we may even secure his endorsement of the kind of negotiated settlement in Indo–China that would be acceptable to us.

7. While we do not believe that a French collapse in Indo–China could come about as rapidly or as completely as the Americans appear to envisage, this danger reinforces the need to lay the foundations of a wider and viable defence organisation for South–East Asia.

8. We propose therefore that the United States and the United Kingdom should begin an immediate and secret joint examination of the political and military problems involved in creating a Collective Defence for South–East Asia, namely:

(a) nature and purpose;

(b) membership;

(c) commitments.

This examination should also cover immediate joint measures to stiffen Siam.

April 30, 1954.

1. Memorandum of conversation transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 33, Apr. 30, 1954. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 264).
2. Apr. 13. For a résumé of their final meeting, see the extract of telegram 4523, p. 514.
3. Reference to speeches made by Nam Il, Chou En-lai, and Molotov in the Second, Third, and Fourth Plenary Sessions of the Geneva Conference (Korean phase), Apr. 27, 28, and 29; for summaries, see pp. 148, 153, and 157, respectively.
4. For documentation on this pact, see volume xiv.
5. For information on Admiral Radford’s discussions with British officials on Apr. 24 and 26, see volume xiii. See also McCardle’s memorandum to Dulles, Apr. 30, p. 629.
6. May 1.
7. The U.K. memorandum was transmitted to the Department in telegram Dulte 30, Apr. 30. (790.5/4–3054)
8. Made on Apr. 25 in New Delhi; see telegram 339 from Colombo, Apr. 29, p. 610, and memorandum from Stelle to Bowie, Apr. 30, p. 635. For Prime Minister Nehru’s proposals transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1596 from New Delhi, Apr. 25, see volume xiii.