PPS files, lot 65 D101, “Indochina”
Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal) to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Robertson)
top secret
[Geneva,] April 29, 1954.
Subject:
- Current Indochina Situation
Here are my views on the Indochina situation.
- 1)
- The Franco–Vietnamese military effort (which we have supported) and the Franco–Vietnamese political effort to create a stable Vietnamese Government with effective popular support are bankrupt or nearly.
- 2)
- A further application of force from the outside against the purely Vietnamese Viet Minh army, supported as it is with Communist Chinese material aid, would not produce political results with which we could live, i.e., a victory through the application of overwhelming outside force would not bring about a satisfactory Western–oriented government in control of Indochina enjoying the consideration of other Asian nations and able to maintain itself in power without an almost indefinite commitment to the area of outside force.
- 3)
- Nevertheless, our best card at Geneva is uncertainty as to whether we and other likeminded countries will in fact take measures to intervene effectively with armed force in Indochina should no acceptable solution be found at Geneva. It is essential that that uncertainty be kept alive just as long as possible.
- 4)
- Using that uncertainty as a major asset, we must support a
solution at Geneva which would involve as its major features the
following:
[Page 615]
- a)
- A cease fire in Cambodia and Laos and withdrawal of outside forces (except possibly as provided in Franco–Laotian military treaties) and the installation in these countries of peace observation machinery, perhaps under UN auspices, to see that their territorial integrity and internal security are respected.
- b)
- A cease fire in Viet Nam, as nearly as possible along the line of the Laniel proposals. Since these do not reflect the relative military position of the two parties we may have to be flexible here. The question of controls is of course vital. We should be able rapidly to develop our thinking on this point when we receive the plans and views of the French Government which have been promised us on an urgent basis.
- c)
- Provision for a rapid disarmament under international control of the armed forces of both sides in Viet Nam to a point where they will be within the means of Viet Nam to maintain.
- d)
- A phased reduction of foreign forces in Viet Nam over a stated period of time (perhaps three to four years) with their eventual status to be determined in agreement with the definitive government of the country.
- e)
- A period of transition for the restoration of political normality. During this transition period there would be in fact a political division of the country corresponding very roughly to the present military division.
- f)
- A reconstruction program for Viet Nam to be conducted both directly by France, the US and the UK and perhaps also through the UN.
- g)
- An announced date for the holding of national elections to form a definitive government for all Viet Nam. We might propose July 1, 1957.
The purpose of this program is to see whether we can not, under the threat of further armed intervention, create conditions under which our side could continue the struggle against Communism under relatively peaceful conditions with some chances of success.