Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

790.00/4–2954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Colombo, April 29, 1954—4 p.m.

339. Repeated information Geneva priority 1. For Secretary of State. Prime Minister Ceylon¹ as token of personal esteem has shown me copies of official transcript yesterday’s sessions South Asian Colombo conference. He told me these not shown anyone else and I therefore request greatest secrecy use and source information. Summary is as follows:

Conference² agreed discuss Indochina and hydrogen bomb as first two topics.

Nehru explained his six point proposal re Indochina³ as follows:

(1) “Climate of peace”. Cease–fire necessary sooner or later and the sooner the better. Military situation Indochina has now worsened but there also indications that belligerents had begun giving serious thought cessation fighting.

(2) Cease–fire. Obvious first step was cease–fire. Burma, Indonesia, Canada, and even France, as well as several other nations had agreed to this. Cease–fire should have priority Geneva agenda.

(3) Independence. France and US have agreed complete transfer of sovereignty in Indochina.

(4) Negotiations, Nehru then quoted stating he did not say to whom and in what form sovereignty should be transferred. This matter of agreement between parties concerned. He did not say French should withdraw their forces immediately and leave vacuum in Indochina. These matters to be discussed by principal parties to conflict which was substance his fourth point. He did not say settlement of issue should be completely divorced from Geneva Conference but visualized machinery for direct negotiation between French and Indochina might proceed, as it were, through Geneva Conference as “sort of subcommittee of Geneva Conference.”

(5) Non–intervention. He called for non–intervention in Indochina in any form by the great powers, UK, US, USSR and China. There was no doubt that both US and China were intervening in Indochina and they have in effect not denied this. He felt that if problem could be localized by reducing all possibilities of intervention of outside powers the onus of finding a settlement could be thrown on the parties in conflict themselves.

(6) UN. He explained it was intended to bring UN into picture as there might be need for broad supervision by UN of implementation of any settlement.

Prime Minister Burma⁴ stated afraid of vacuum being created in Indochina. He recommended there must be careful approach so that neither side could derive any advantage from it. He thought that conference should be quite explicit on this point and that whatever agreement was reached there should also be statement elaborating desire Asian countries to avoid giving an advantage to one side or the other.

Prime Minister Indonesia⁵ agreed with Nehru’s approach but wished get two points clear.

(1) He saw situation Indochina as being directly related to power politics of great powers and Geneva Conference was bound become forum of power politics. Recent increase in violence of fighting in Indochina was proof of power politics where each side was striving build up position of strength in Geneva through Indochina. China actively supported Ho Chi Minh. China known to be pressing demand for admission to UN. He therefore thought acceptance cease–fire by Viet Minh would be more likely if some indication given that China’s demand would soon be satisfied. Conference therefore should consider cease–fire in relation admission China to UN.

(2) He was concerned over question of sovereignty and wished to know to whom independence would be given, either to Ho Chi Minh or Associated States. What guarantee would there be for independence? Ho Chi Minh has been branded as Communist but to his followers he is national leader.

Rest of session devoted discuss these points. Mohammed Ali⁶ argued strongly that cease–fire in itself not sufficient, that if there was a choice between colonialism and communism former was less dangerous since it could be persuaded by pressure at world opinion to foster nationalism and would eventually lead to independence, that on other hand Communist occupation was a means to an end and brought danger to world peace closer to home, that conference should do nothing to prejudice or anticipate results of Geneva Conference, that he was against any “accusation of intervention”, that he would accept first three points Nehru’s plan, i.e., climate of peace, cease–fire, and independence but not points four and five re conference calling for direct negotiations between forces in Indochina and non–intervention agreement. Indonesian Prime Minister insisted on his view of linking admission Communist China to UN with cease–fire but Nehru, Mohammed Ali and Kotelawala opposed. (Nehru added that China’s admission UN would however go long way toward relieving existing tensions.)

There was unanimous approval of Prime Ministers on Nehru’s first two points and it also was agreed that conference should not embarrass Geneva Conference.

Discussions continue on topics today.

Crowe

1. Sir John Kotelawala.
2. The Colombo Conference. The meeting of Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, took place in Colombo, Ceylon Apr. 28–May 2. For the text of the final communiqué, see Documents on International Affairs, 1954 (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 166–169.
3. Made on Apr. 25 in New Delhi.
4. U Nu.
5. Ali Sastroamidjojo.
6. Prime Minister of Pakistan.