396.1 GE/4–2954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

secret

Secto 32. Sent Saigon 10, repeated information Paris 139, London 88, Bangkok 2, Manila 5. Saigon’s 7, repeated Paris 706, London 42, Bangkok 153, Manila 212, Department 2110.1 USDel believes most important immediate measures to counteract political and military consequences of fall of Dien–Bien–Phu will be those taken by French [Page 608] and Vietnamese political and military authorities. USDel notes evidences of French determination to send reinforcements to Indochina and to expand airfield, et cetera. US is cooperating fully with these measures. USDel would hope that in addition present crisis would result in vigorous, effective words and deeds by Vietnamese Government on both political and military planes. USDel also believes that statements and actions by political parties and other groups giving impression of growing national unity and determination would be most helpful and would have excellent stimulating effect on developing free world concern for independence and integrity of Vietnam and belief that indispensable Vietnamese capacity and will exist and growing in face temporarily adverse circumstances.2

Dulles
  1. For the text of telegram 7 from Saigon to Geneva, Apr. 25, which contained an outline of the immediate political consequences of the fall of Dien Bien Phu and possible remedies, see volume xiii.
  2. For a report from McClintock in Saigon on the internal political situation in Vietnam, see telegram 2188 from Saigon, May 3, in volume xiii.