396.1 GE/4–2754: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
priority
Dulte 16. Repeated information London 80, Paris 130. Paris and London information Ambassador. Reference Dulte 15.1 Following is account of Bidault–Molotov meeting this morning given me by Bidault and supplemented by Chauvel:
Molotov was mild and friendly. Discussion was confined to procedural questions relating to Indochina phase of Conference and did not touch upon substance of possible solution regarding Indochina. Molotov said that it was not possible for the four Berlin Powers to meet to discuss Indochina phase of Geneva without presence of Chinese Communists. However, to avoid creating needless difficulties he was glad to discuss and endeavor to work out arrangements with Bidault.
Bidault said that three Western Powers believed that the composition of the Indochina phase of Geneva should be kept small and had in mind confining it to the four Berlin Powers, the three Associated States, and the three Limitrophe States (Communist China, Thailand, and Burma). Molotov replied by saying that no solution of Indochina could be made at Geneva unless the Viet Minh were represented. (Bidault and Chauvel had expected that in addition to Viet Minh, Molotov might suggest participation at Conference of recently announced Communist governments of liberation of Laos and Cambodia, but Molotov never mentioned these.) Molotov idea of composition was “Big Five”, Associated States, Viet Minh, (a total of nine) and that Burma, Indonesia, and India might also well be included. He said India, in particular, had deep interest in Indochina and had already suggested possible solutions. There was brief discussion regarding who would send invitations to other participants. Molotov put forward idea the nine might invite additional participants, such as India. Bidault indicated great reserve and Molotov put forward idea that “two permanent chairmen” (i.e., United Kingdom and USSR) might issue invitations.
Bidault referred to participation of India and Indonesia and said it would raise question of participation of Australia and other countries in the area which would create difficulties and make Conference too large. Insofar as the Viet Minh was concerned, the Associated States whom he would have to consult were strongly opposed. He would, of course, also have to consult United States and United Kingdom regarding this point. (Bidault has already sent telegram to Paris [Page 592] asking Foreign Office to contact representatives of Associated States urgently this afternoon to try to get affirmative reply regarding Viet Minh participation.) Bidault then suggested possibility of having some form of separate status for certain of the participants. Molotov confined his reply to the comment that it was obviously essential to have the Viet Minh represented if any solution were to be reached.
Molotov told Bidault his schedule “had gotten mixed up” and that he had an appointment to see me at twelve o’clock about the atomic question which did not give him as much time today as he would like to discuss Indochina. They, therefore, agreed to meet again tomorrow morning at 11 a.m. to pursue this discussion.
Bidault is trying to devise some formula which will permit Viet Minh to participate, but not on full membership basis. Eden, Bidault and I agreed to meet tomorrow morning at 10:15, prior to Bidault–Molotov meeting. Following that meeting, Eden and Bidault will lunch with me so that we can have full report and can see where we stand.