Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/3–2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret

Seoul, March 26, 1954—8 p.m.

946. Repeated information Tokyo 577. Limit distribution. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Deptel 757 repeated Tokyo 2110.¹ Following are Embassy comments on numbered questions reference telegram with emphasis on qualification noted last paragraph thereof namely, estimate of ROK position based on analysis ROK views from information heretofore available and not new consultations with government.

1. In formulating proposals (1) and (2) Embtel 864² Embassy was mindful of fact that US Government position has previously been that troop withdrawal should follow rather than precede political unification of Korea, and of security consideration which dictated that position. One important respect however in which present situation differs from that in 1948–50 is that US and its UN allies are now publicly committed to come immediately and forcefully to aid of ROK in event of further Communist aggression, a commitment which did not exist in earlier period and which in our opinion now constitutes even more important deterrent than actual presence US forces in Korea. It amply evident moreover that no chance exists for fair elections in North Korea so long as Chinese Communist forces occupy that area; to this extent President Rhee’s repeated insistence on withdrawal such forces as pre-condition to unification of Korea is entirely realistic. Although withdrawal US-UN forces from South Korea prior to political unification of country would inevitably involve risks from our point of view, it is believed such risks would be substantially reduced by effective international inspection and supervision envisaged those proposals. Although we see little reason to believe Communists would seriously consider solution along these lines which would in fact permit such effective inspection and supervision, and while we believe US should not accept any proposal of this nature which did not embody such safeguards, it is believed proposal along lines that outlined reference telegram would receive wide degree of support and be effective means smoking out Communists and making clear latter’s predatory motivation in this regard.

In addition these general considerations following factors were considered by Embassy in connection proposals (1) and (2):

(a) Impression US-UN forces likely be reduced to token force by next spring anyway and desirability relate this probability to our Geneva position and extract maximum benefit therefrom;

(b) One of principal advantages which has arisen from retention US forces Korea has been their potential effect in influencing ROK Government, but Embassy inclined believe our influence in future likely be about same whether or not we have token force here;

(c) As noted above, Rhee has publicly and privately specified withdrawal Chinese Communist forces as prior requirement for holding elections Korea;

(d) In addition taking initiative from Communists by incorporating withdrawal all foreign forces in package proposal for Korea, there might be advantage in demonstrating inseparability these two facets Korean settlement and thus strengthening our position in opposing possible Communist proposal for agreement on withdrawal before discussion other aspects problem;

(e) It would be effective demonstration of fact US does not have imperialistic ambitions in Asia;

(f) Presumably by time proposal implemented ROK forces would be built up to presently envisaged maximum strength and would be backed by US power in Japan, Okinawa, etc;

(g) Such relatively early withdrawal might be embarrassing to Communists if their control North Korea without military forces therein not fully established by that time (altho this seems doubtful); conceivably it might also stimulate Sino-Soviet dispute over domination North Korea.

2. Since one of principal Chinese Communist objectives appears be withdrawal US-UN forces from Asian continent this gives us certain bargaining leverage with them. This tempered however by fact they must already be aware US contemplating withdrawal in view public discussion such withdrawal in US. Even with Communist awareness our general intentions, which seems unavoidable in circumstances, believe we should exploit our agreement withdrawal to maximum in seeking satisfactory package proposal including unification under acceptable conditions. To this extent believe we should avoid public official statements re future withdrawals US forces from Korea for duration Geneva Conference on Korea (Embtel 841).³

(3) Seems likely ROK Government will initially insist on Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as first order business and may even wish obtain agreement thereon prior discussion other measures but believe they can be brought see advantages using withdrawal US-UN forces as part of package proposal to seek satisfactory unification Korea. This matter primarily of presentation of problem to ROK. While Rhee has stated clearly withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections is essential, he has never to Embassy’s knowledge specifically rejected idea reaching simultaneous agreement on withdrawal and unification.

(4) Believe ROK position this question may depend on assurances, or absence thereof, from US re measures to unify Korea if Geneva fails do so. On assumption US cannot satisfy Rhee on supporting attainment his objective by military means, whether by affording logistic, naval and air support or otherwise, Rhee’s attitude may be determined by his analysis of likelihood embroiling US in military adventure before our forces actually withdrawn. From this viewpoint he may wish delay our withdrawal unless he concludes such withdrawal essential obtain Chinese Communist withdrawal and considers this objective overriding. In this situation period between conclusion Geneva Conference and final withdrawal US-UN forces would be period maximum risk for US and we may have to be prepared deal firmly with Rhee on this problem.

(5) This question answered partly by preceding paragraph. Rhee would probably consider withdrawal all forces from Korea without unification agreement in relation to his overriding objective Chinese Communist withdrawal and his analysis chances engaging US in unification effort by military means before our withdrawal completed, as discussed above. In other words he probably would not like such agreement but might accept it in light of developments at conference itself. Recommend it not be broached as possible ROK–UN proposal until situation at conference becomes clearer.

Briggs

1. Dated Mar. 24, p. 54.
2. Dated Mar. 6, p. 33.

3. Dated Feb. 28; the text read as follows:

   “During my talk with General Hull February 24 he outlined in general terms planning which proceeding in Defense Department re redeployment US Forces Korea. In connection with eventual dissemination this information I urge that Department consider this question in relation to our substantive position on withdrawal forces from Korea at Geneva conference. While as I understand it decision on redeployment can be expected soon, I recommend strongly that information regarding that decision be held as closely as possible. I recognize that it has to be discussed with a number of other governments including that of ROK but would hope that in doing so we should take every precaution to avoid plans becoming public knowledge. It becomes increasingly apparent that major Red Chinese objective at Geneva will probably be to obtain withdrawal foreign forces from ROK. To make known publicly in advance of or during conference fact we are contemplating withdrawal bulk our forces might give Communists substantial tactical advantage at conference table.” (795.00/2–2854)