Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/4–2554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

confidential
priority

Geneva, April 25, 1954—midnight.

Secto 6. For Phillips from McCardle. Following is transcript of Secretary’s background meeting with American correspondents Geneva April 25. This material should be used in same way that it was used at Berlin conference.² That is, it should be used as guidance for their information program. It can also be used for any briefing which is held in the Department, but there should be no reference that this comes from Secretary. Any such briefing in Department should be confined to the views expressed by Secretary but with no mention textually or otherwise that they come from the Secretary. Following is the Secretary’s background briefing:

“Dulles: I don’t expect I shall be having very many of these background conferences myself because I do not expect to stay here in Geneva very long. I hope that matters will work out so that General Bedell Smith can come to replace me toward the end of this week or the first of next week.…

I would not say I approach this conference in any great spirit of optimism. I joined at Berlin in the agreement to hold the conference because, as far as Korea is concerned, such a conference had been agreed upon and in my opinion it is always appropriate to accept occasions to try to bring about by peaceful means a result which seems to be a desirable result and one which is right and one which in the long run will prevail. It takes a measure of faith to believe that it will prevail, but I have that faith and I’m willing to give a chance for the forces of righteousness, as I call them, to prevail, even though my reason may tell me that it is unlikely that it will happen.

The experience which we have had with the Soviet Union and in relations to areas where they got them, ‘temporarily’ under their control has been that the temporary character has always been turned into permanent, at least in so far as the present time goes and there has been no willingness on their part to relax their grip and I frankly do not see much more likelihood that they would do so in the case of Korea than in the case of Germany, although the situation is somewhat different and there is a slightly greater hope permissible, I think, in the case of Korea than in case of Germany. Certainly the importance of Korea to the scheme of affair is not comparable to the importance of Germany. There are compensations which can properly be made on the free world side in relation to Korea which were not permissible in relation to Germany, having in regard the fact the German area is part, and a very vital part, of the strategy of NATO.

Therefore, I think there is a chance which we are entitled to, and should pursue, that Korea might be peacefully united under acceptable terms. Certainly we will do the best we can to explore that fully we will not be disposed to agree to a unification on terms which would likely mean that the entire area would fall under Communist control. The terms of unification which the Soviet Union proposed for Germany were such that if the election machinery had been as they proposed it, in fact the Communists would have almost had a monopoly of voting throughout all Germany. And that, of course, was rejected and anything similar would be rejected as far as Korea is concerned. Unification, in our opinion, and I think our opinion coincides with that of the Republic of Korea, is not to be had as the price of the sacrifice of real liberty and independence. The war was not fought with its ghastly toll of misery and suffering merely to win a freedom which would be surrendered at the conference table. I have spoken of the Korean phase of the conference.

As far as the Indochina phase of the conference is concerned, the composition of that conference has not yet been determined. I don’t know when that agreement will be reached. Certainly there will be serious problems involved. It took somewhat over—I think it was approximately nine months—to reach agreement about the composition of the Korean conference. Incidentally, what was finally agreed upon, both in terms of composition and in terms of place, was precisely what we had offered immediately after the armistice of last July, so that you can judge where the responsibility for the delay.

I wouldn’t want to guess what the processes will be of agreeing on the composition of an Indochina conference. It could take a long time. It could take a short time. There are, of course, pressures at work there which were not present in relation to the Korean political conference because already in Korea there was an armistice, whereas the fighting goes on very intensively in Indochina. So in that respect the two situations are not comparable. Still there may be, probably will be, considerable problems involved.

One problem which is already manifesting itself in the preliminaries is the effort being made by the Soviet Union to reverse the decision of the Berlin agreement, that was that there would be no Five-Power conference and that Communist China would not be here in any capacity different from the Republic of Korea or Colombia or any other participant at the conference. At Berlin Mr. Molotov opened up that conference with a demand for a Five-Power conference. He fought for it all the way through. We opposed it all the way through and he finally gave in at the end. Now he is attempting to make this Geneva conference into something other than had been agreed upon at Berlin.

As I pointed out in Washington before I left to come here,³ it is not the position of the US to start this conference out on the basis of a breach of the agreement which is the charter of the conference itself. And I see little use in trying to make new agreements at a conference where the opposing parties start out by breaking the agreement on which the conference was called.

If you have any questions I would be glad to try to answer them.

Question. Mr. Secretary, why are you going home in such a short time, whereas you stayed in Berlin four weeks?

Answer. Well, one reason I’m going home is because I did stay in Berlin for four weeks. I can’t be away all the time. And I announced at Berlin when Molotov originally wanted to make this a conference of Foreign Ministers, I refused to make it a conference of Foreign Ministers and made it a conference of representatives.

I explained at the time that Molotov wanted to know why I changed the words from ‘Foreign Ministers’ to ‘representatives’ and what it meant. I said it meant that I would expect to be at this conference at the opening days and that I would expect to go back to Washington.

Q. Does that mean, sir, that you will not participate yourself in the actual discussions on Indochina when that phase of the conference is reached?

A. If I carry out my present intention of going back in a week or less, it seems to me unlikely that the Indochina phase of the conference would be organized within that time. There may of course be, as there usually are at the conferences, informal talks. I have already had some talks with Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault about that matter. I might say that as far as the attendance is concerned, I think that both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault do not expect to be here for the duration of the conference, although that of course is for them to decide. But that is my impression.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you don’t, I take it, intend to return at a later time, if the Indochina phase comes up say in June?

A. Well, that is possible. Nowadays, when you can get across to Europe over night, it should be looked upon as a possibility. I came over the week before for just two or three days and it could be that I would come back if it seemed necessary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect actually to happen tomorrow? How is this conference going to start? What will be the procedures the first day, and so on? Is it anywhere near as well organized in the preliminaries as Berlin was?

A. I do not think that it is as well organized as Berlin was, although even at Berlin there were some unresolved procedural matters which I settled with Mr. Molotov just about a half hour before we actually convened. Now, the problems are somewhat more stubborn this time. There are more people here, and we have less in the way of precedents to guide us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect to see Mr. Molotov before tomorrow’s opening?

A. I have no plan for seeing Mr. Molotov.

Q. What actually happens tomorrow at three o’clock? If presumably that is the time.

A. I don’t know. I expect I will be going out to the building and we will see what happens.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the compensations that might be made to China, I suppose you meant, in return for a settlement in Korea?

A. Well, what I meant there was that there are possibilities of withdrawal of forces in the case of Korea which here were not available in the case of Germany so long as Western Germany plays a part in the NATO forward strategy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what your attitude is likely to be if the opposing side requests that priority be given to a discussion of a cease-fire in Indochina instead of an immediate discussion of Korea?

A. Yes, As to what I would do?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Well, that would be a matter which would primarily be the responsibility of those who are doing the firing, I suppose. The US is not one of those which is doing any firing in Indochina. It is quite possible our friends would want to consult with us in the matter, but I would say that if that matter would come up, the primary responsibility would devolve upon those who were carrying the burden fighting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been frequent suggestions in the last two days that we might very soon be participating in the action in Indochina as a result of the crisis at Dien Bien Phu. Have you anything to say about Dien Bien Phu and the severity of the crisis there and our likely response to it?

A. I think it’s apparent from the reports which are available in the press and which do not depart or vary a great deal from the official information I get that the plight of the defenders is increasingly difficult. They are putting up a very gallant and magnificent struggle, but the capacities of continuing air support are diminishing. Our reaction would be, as it has been for a long time, one of very great sympathy. We have taken, you might say, all steps short of actual belligerency to assist. We have drawn a line of belligerency which we have not crossed and I see no present reason to anticipate that we will cross that line.

Q. Can we afford to see Indochina fall?

A. Well, that question—can we afford to—we certainly wouldn’t like to see it fall, but some things have happened that we don’t like and can’t practically prevent. I don’t mean to suggest that I think Indochina is going to fall.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports today that French have asked us to intervene more directly and that we have told them that constitutionally, it’s impossible to go farther than we have at the present time. Can you say anything about that?

A. No.

Q. Can you confirm or deny, sir, the story that was printed in The New York Times that you did tell the French that we would not fulfill a request from them for American planes with American crews?

A. Not other than to say that that has been the well-known and recognized policy of the administration, not to take part in active belligerency. As has been explained in Washington, there are a few technicians there working in non-combat activities, in non-combat areas. The air-lift operation that was just carried on would merely let the people off at a non-combat zone, and come back again. And it has been a policy of the United States, in accordance the limitations on the President’s authority, to avoid Executive action which might be an act of belligerence, an act of war.

Q. May I ask again question are you not confirming and not denying the Times story, then?

A. I have not seen the Times story.

Q. Well, the story, as I have reported, is that France has asked for direct, large-scale intervention in Indochina by United States aircraft, manned by American crews, but was told it was impossible for President Eisenhower to sanction such a grave move. That is the way it was written in the Times.⁴

A. I prefer not to comment on the story.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any possibility at all of your meeting the Chief of the Chinese Delegation separately before you return home?

A. Not unless our automobiles collide.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us any guidance on what prompted Mr. Eden to return to London for a Cabinet meeting before returning here?

A. No, I am afraid I cannot comment on that.

Q. Have you been informed, Mr. Secretary, of the statement Mr. Nehru made in his Parliament yesterday regarding a series of proposals made for settling the Indochina problem?⁵

A. I have not been officially informed of that. My own information comes from the press. There was in the local Geneva paper this morning what purported to be a text of his proposal, but I had nothing more official than that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think should be the answer of the West to the fall of Dien Bien Phu, if it does fall?

A. I do not want to say anything that would sound as though I think Dien Bien Phu is going to fall. Of course, there are always possibilities of military reverses. We have had plenty of them in our time; and so far, a local military reverse has never changed the course of history to such an extent that the forces opposed to us have ultimately prevailed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do I take you literally that you have no anticipation of getting together with the three other principal Foreign Ministers that invited the nations in this conference to arrange details for tomorrow at three o’clock? You plan, just literally to go to the building at three o’clock and see what happens?

A. I expect that there will be continuing efforts to iron out the remaining difficulties. There is a working committee—Mr. Johnson is on it for US—which is working with corresponding members of the British, French, and Soviet Delegations on these mechanical details of seating arrangements and things of that sort, I have not heard the latest report. He has been working on it, I know, today, and I suppose the work will still go on tomorow morning, will it not?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Q. Have the Chinese sought to get in at that level, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Dulles: No.

Q. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, who will preside tomorrow?

A. No.

Q. One other question: Can you say what our attitude is on the participation or nonparticipation of Viet Minh in the Indochina phase of the conference?

Secretary Dulles: We would be primarily guided by the French views in that respect. We have taken the position in Korea, not always with complete success but, at least, we have taken position that the Republic of Korea and the United States, which bore the great burden of the battle there, should have a primary voice in the conference decisions in relation to Korea, and I feel the same way with reference to Indochina, that the forces of the French Union, including the forces particularly of Vietnam, should have a very influential voice in matters of that sort. And while we would perhaps be consulted, we would be inclined not to try to interpose our veto, in any sense as against what they might want to do.

I have talked in Paris with Emperor Bao Dai about that matter. He feels very strongly against the admission here into the discussions of the representative of the Viet Minh. I do not think the French have finally made up their minds as to what they want, but we ourselves are rather waiting to see the ideas of those who are carrying the burden of the fighting. We are carrying a good deal of the material burden, but in the last analysis, it is the people who fight and die who have the right to the last word on these matters.

Q. Does that apply to the substantive provisions of the Indochina conference, as well, that the French and the people doing the fighting will have to decide the basic decisions and—

A. I would think that would be true up to the point at least where we felt that the issues involved had a pretty demonstrable interest to the United States itself. The United States does have pretty considerable interests in the Western Pacific, and there are some solutions there which we would regard as so disadvantageous that we would seek to prevent them. And if we failed in that respect, we would probably want to disassociate ourselves from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it clear in our own minds whether the Red Chinese will participate in the rotation of the chairmanship of this conference on Korea, or not?

A. There has been no decision of any kind reached yet as to who the chairman will be or how he will be determined.

Q. But we have not taken an absolutely definite position on that, then?

A. Well, there has been no proposal of which I know that the chairmanship should rotate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I go back to your earlier statement about the administration’s policy about not taking part in active belligerency in Indochina, and ask, if you could, to explain a little bit on that, and to explain how that would fit in with your trip a week ago to discuss united action in the Southeast Asia Pact with the French and the British. Would some policy have to be changed for that? That is, that seems to imply the active belligerency if the pact was brought into force.

A. It did. But it is one thing to create an agreed defense arrangement which would have the approval of Congress, either through a joint resolution or through a treaty; it is another thing for the Executive to go off on his own.

Q. Couldn’t the Executive go to Congress in this current situation, Mr. Secretary, if the Executive desired to send military forces into Indochina to keep it from falling to the Communists?

A. He could do so, I suppose. Executives have gone to Congress before, but whether the circumstances are such, whether the President would feel prompted to do so at this particular juncture, I don’t know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel the present situation in Indochina makes urgent the need for your plan for an Asiatic NATO?

A. I do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we come to this conference with anything like the solid front you had in Berlin on the part of our own allies?

A. Well, I think we have a pretty well-agreed position on Korean matters. We have been meeting off and on, with considerable regularity in Washington, with the representatives of the 16 Ambassadors—15 others. We have not had a recent full exchange of views with the representative of Korea, which is, of course, vitally concerned—the most vitally concerned. But I did have, this morning, a very full and satisfactory exchange of views with the Korean Foreign Minister, and I see no reason to anticipate any serious divergencies of views. Of course, when you have 16 people on one side, there is always a chance for variations of emphasis or the order in which you put things. You cannot have it quite as closely coordinated as when we were only three. But I don’t anticipate any serious differences on Korea. The question of Indochina is somewhat different because there you are in the middle of a battle, with a constantly fluctuating situation. The governmental position in France is not as solid as one would perhaps like to see it, and there are more variables in the situation which have made it impractical to reach full agreement for the purpose of this conference. One of the reasons why I came over here to see Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault ten days ago was to try and get things in somewhat better order, at least in terms of our long-range position, which is extremely important.⁶ If we have a solid long-range position, then your day-by-day decisions can be related to that; if you have no fundamental position of agreement, then you are driven hither and thither by the vagaries of daily interests.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how solid do you think the Soviet-China front is, especially at this conference? To what degree do you think Russia will control China?

A. I expect that whatever differences there are will not be discernable to the naked eye.

Q. Sir, is the United States position opposed to any sort of idea of any partition in Indochina?

A. Broadly speaking, it does not seem to lend itself to partition, as has been the temporary situation in Korea. As you know, there is no line there. The fighting breaks out here, there, and the other place—all over the area. It is not confined to Vietnam, but extends to Laos and Cambodia, and it is very difficult to think of the line which would in fact be an acceptable compromise.

It is conceivable, and I could take a map and draw a little bit of a place up in the mountains, and say, ‘if all the Communists would go up here, I would be very happy,’ and let them stay there. That might not be acceptable to them.

Q. Did you find your colleagues in Paris shared your own view about the urgency of setting up the Asiatic NATO?

A. I did not find any change last week from the position which we have developed during the preceding week. I did find in France a preoccupation with immediate, daily problems which was occupying their minds so that there was not quite as much opportunity to develop their long-range planning as would have been otherwise desirable.

Q. Is there no way in which that Asiatic pact could be applied to their day-to-day problems?

A. Well, not until it is brought into being.

Q. Generally assuming, Mr. Secretary, that the negotiation of such a pact would be a very prolonged procedure, do you share that view—a matter many months?

A. No, I do not share that view. You see, if you will check back with the statement which I made, the two communiqués that were issued in London and Paris, there is no reference made there to a pact.⁷ Now, it might take the form of a formalized treaty, but not necessarily. You will see that I referred to the organization of what I call a ‘common defense’. That does not necessarily mean that one would have to await all the processes of the negotiation of something like the Pacific NATO. That was done deliberately because of our awareness of the fact that the situation might not permit of that leisurely processing.

Q. In that form, how would Congressional participation or assent be gained, by resolution?

A. It would, presumably, be in terms of a joint resolution rather than a treaty ratified by the Senate.

Q. Could I just check one brief statement I have in my notes. I believe you said we had already taken all steps short of actual belligerency in Indochina.

A. Perhaps ‘all steps’ is a little bit more comprehensive than the facts warrant. But broadly speaking, we have done everything that the French have asked us to do short of acts which would involve belligerency. That is not literally true. They have once or twice asked for things which did not make sense on consideration. They have asked for planes which they did not have any airfields to handle, and things of that sort. But, within reason, we have met every request of the French short of doing what would be involved in an act of belligerency.

Q. Didn’t they ask for anything which would be an act of belligerency, Mr. Secretary?

A. I would say on that, that they do not have perhaps the same experience as we have on constitutional problems, and know just where the limit of authority in the President lies. Possibly, some of the things they ask for overstep what we would think could be done by the President without committing an act of war, but it has just been in the ‘twilight zone’, you might say.

Reporters: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.”

Dulles

1. Transmitted to the Department of State in four parts.
2. For the proceedings of the Berlin Conference, see volume vii.
3. A reference to the Secretary’s statement made on Apr. 20 in Washington prior to his departure for Europe. Issued as Department of State press release 207 and printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, p. 669.
4. The New York Times, Apr. 25, 1954, p. 1. This article by C. L. Sulzberger also prompted questions from the press in Washington. The Department of State in telegram Tedul 5 to Geneva, Apr. 25, said it was “urgently waiting report your background briefing session with American correspondents in Geneva. We are under considerable pressure here to forward background briefing session to press which we are deferring pending your report of what has been given them in Geneva.” (110.11 DU/4–2554)
5. For Prime Minister Nehru’s proposals made on Apr. 24 in New Delhi, see the memorandum by Stelle to Bowie, Apr. 30, p. 635, The proposals were transmitted to the Department of State from the Embassy in New Delhi in telegram 1596 from New Delhi, Apr. 25, printed in volume xiii.
6. For information regarding Dulles’ conversations with Eden and Bidault, see the extract of telegram 4523, Apr. 13, and the editorial note, pp. 514 and 517, respectively.
7. For information on the two communiqués, see footnote 3, p. 514 and the editorial note, p. 517.