396.1 GE/4–354: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
3701. Limit distribution. Embtel 36541 and Deptel 3353.2 Yesterday Achilles took occasion to go over privately with Lacoste at length US ideas given Deptel 3353.
[Page 494]Lacoste stated Bidault and Foreign Office most definitely shared our concern at French public expectations of IC settlement at Geneva as result US concessions. He believed Bidault and Foreign Office fully understood US position and state of public and Congressional opinion. (He states that as result meeting reported Embtel 3654 steps had already been taken to emphasize to Cabinet members and ministries concerned that essence of US position was no concessions in exchange for Communist promises.)
Lacoste stated that despite French official realism, government must take into account fact of currently excessive French hopes for Geneva. For example Foreign Office shared our view that any IC agreement reached quickly at Geneva would lead to its ultimate loss and was fully aware of time and difficulty which have been required to reach Korean armistice, but that French public opinion was obviously expecting quick results, as IC debate in Assembly had made only too clear. Part of French Government’s job between now and Geneva would be to reduce this excessive optimism, but it would be neither popular nor easy task.
He hoped Bidault and other French Ministers would publicly express thoughts along lines paragraph 2 Deptel 3353 but that US officials would not since these were things which Frenchmen could well expound patriotically but which would sound patronizing to French ears when expressed by others.
He fully shared conviction that we must avoid any misunderstanding as to each other’s positions. Close tripartite unity would be essential and it was of paramount importance that failure, if there was failure, at Geneva to produce satisfactory IC settlement must be clearly attributable to Russians and Chinese despite undoubted Communist efforts to put blame on US.