Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/3–3054

Draft Position Paper Prepared for the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference¹

top secret

Washington, March 29, 1954.

U.S. Position with French

In developing a US position on Indochina to be taken with the French, we should use as a point of departure the understandings reached at Berlin where it was clearly understood that neither the US nor France would countenance a solution leading directly or indirectly to a turnover of the area to the Communists. Prevention of such a development is of course our essential objective at Geneva. Therefore, we should attempt to obtain British agreement to the position in Section I below, and then present it to the French in an effort to get tripartite agreement before the Geneva talks on Indochina start. The position in Section II, which implies a French sliding from their Berlin commitment, should remain purely a US position for later use if necessary. (It should be borne in mind throughout the paper that the term “French” refers to the elements of the Laniel cabinet who have heretofore opposed immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh. Any “French” decisions and conclusions at Geneva are probably valid only to the extent they can obtain Assembly support.)

i. position to be taken with french in first instance

1. At Berlin it was understood with Bidault that we, and presumably the French also, would retain full freedom of action at Geneva and were committed to nothing. We are confident France will not take any step at Geneva which will jeopardize our Berlin understanding.

2. There is no possibility whatever of extending any concessions to Communist China (such as recognizing the regime, favoring UN admission, liberalizing trade controls or altering our Formosa policy) in exchange for promises or agreements they might indicate willingness to enter. Long experience has taught us that exchange of our performance for Communist promises is a swindle and we will have no part of it.

3. We consider it highly unlikely that Communist agreement can be obtained at Geneva to a negotiated settlement which would meet the basic conditions for the protection of the US position and interests in Southeast Asia (as stated in NSC 5405).² However, we likewise consider it desirable to have a positive basis for our own planning and thinking.

4. We are of course fully cognizant of the French domestic situation, the pressures to end the war in France, and the warweariness of the French people after eight years of warfare. We also realize the Vietnamese also strongly desire the end of the war.

5. We agreed to having Indochina discussed at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva for the purpose of helping the French Government to resist these domestic pressures, and in order thus to assist France to get ahead with the Navarre Plan.

6. If the French are determined to carry on the war in the absence of a settlement at Geneva, we will of course continue our policy of assisting the French war effort and even of seeking for additional means to help within the general scope of our present arrangements.

7. We believe in the worldwide interests of France that it is essential she continue the struggle to a satisfactory conclusion if no progress is made at Geneva. If France were to abandon Indochina and the millions of anti-Communist Vietnamese her whole position in the world would suffer irreparable harm.

8. Finally, France should reiterate its commitment to carry on under the Navarre Plan in the absence of a settlement emanating from the Geneva talks. From present indications we believe that the French Government will probably agree to giving us a commitment to carry on the struggle if it can be demonstrated convincingly that failure to make progress at Geneva is clearly due to Communist intransigence. If so, we can adopt at Geneva a position based on the above points, with the further understanding with France that this represents a firm position. We should not tell the French that they should consult with us prior to changing their position, if they find it necessary to shift, since this would imply we admitted the French might in fact weaken. Nevertheless, we would certainly become aware immediately of a shift in position, and, in this event, we should consider other courses with the French as follows:

ii. position to be taken by u.s. if french position weakens

A. If US Decides to Intervene Directly

1. If there are no concrete results at Geneva, the US should make an offer of prompt US intervention beyond that envisaged in NSC 5405. This of course requires new NSC action, and it is understood this entire question is now under discussion in the NSC. We should communicate this decision to the French in case of necessity, as appears most effective from a timing and tactical viewpoint. A favorable NSC decision in this sense would of course greatly strengthen our position with the French and make continuation of their own effort much more likely.

2. If the French, even upon being informed that the US has decided to participate directly in the war, say they must negotiate in disregard of US security requirements, we should then take the position as follows: (a) we are not prepared to abandon the area; (b) we will proceed in collaboration with the Associated States (if such a course is possible) and other states which might be willing to go along with us, in trying to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to the Communists. Presumably this course of action would involve departure not only of the US but of the Associated States from Geneva. This would obviously be the most extreme course, and would presuppose that every other possibility had been tried with the French and failed.

B. If US Decides Not to Extend Scope of Its Involvement in Indochinese War

1. In the absence of a favorable decision of the NSC to broaden US direct participation, we should still expect the French Government to carry out its commitment of September 1953 to press forward under the Navarre Plan. We should make sure that the French have taken into account the following possible results stemming from a reneging of their commitment:

(a) If France through one means or another countenances a Communist takeover in Indochina, it will mean far more than the end of France’s position in the Far East. Rather it will be a public exhibition of France’s inability to carry on any longer as a member of the three-power alliance in which she has placed such great stock.

(b) The effect of abandonment would be so severe in North Africa as to have serious repercussions not only on the French position there, but also on the nature of the relationship between France and the US in that area.

(c) If the Indochina war ends on terms not offering the minimum essential guarantees, US dollar aid to France would of course automatically cease. If, however, a satisfactory armistice were arranged, and we entered a reconstruction period, France could plan on continued dollar expenditures as a major part of our contribution to the common cause. We know the present favorable French dollar position is due to the Indochina aid program.

(d) Beyond these points, conclusion of negotiations by France resulting in Communist domination of Indochina, an area of extreme strategic interest to us, would result in consequences which we cannot envisage now in Europe as well as elsewhere.

2. If the NSC decision on US participation is negative, and we are confronted with a weakening of the French position, we are faced with a most difficult dilemma. This is a situation which in fact may arise. Under these circumstances, we can either continue the talks or break them off. In the latter event (presupposing a US refusal to participate directly), breaking off the talks would not achieve our objectives, since we have assumed the French are determined and feel it necessary to have negotiations which would not meet US requirements. In this circumstance our interests would best be served by attempting to hold the French to ways and means of continuing the anti-Communist struggle. In this case we might have to take a position on negotiations at variance with NSC 5405 (which rules them out). The best initial approach would doubtless be to take the line that France held a heavy moral responsibility for the millions of loyal Vietnamese who have been on her side not to mention the safety of the French Expeditionary Corps. Furthermore, Laniel was committed to his proposals to the National Assembly on March 5 (see attachment A³) on which we might comment as follows:

(a) We regard the Laniel six-point program as a firm position and cannot permit erosion therefrom. While the French may wish to bargain from this position, we can note that Laniel did obtain a vote of confidence on this basis. On the other hand, we realize that we cannot go further. This is his maximum position (and our minimum) so we all must stick to it.

(b) Laniel’s Point 6, which bars Viet Minh reinforcements during negotiations, should be spelled out to provide for additional controls by permitting inspection by a specified organism, preferably international. In addition there should be international control of all points covering the means of communication between Communist China and Viet Minh territory.

1. A covering memorandum indicated that this paper was prepared by McBride of WE and that it was revised to reflect comments on an earlier draft.
2. For the text of NSC 5405, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia,” Jan. 16, 1954, see volume xii.
3. Attachment could not be located in Department of State files. Laniel’s conditions were outlined in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6, 1954, p. 435.